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 By: Brett Joseph

St. John’s Law Student

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff

In In re Greenwich Sentry, L.P.,[1] the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that section 1111(a) of the Bankruptcy Code did not prevent the court from requiring all interest holders to file proofs of interest.[2] In 2010, Greenwich Sentry Partners, L.P. (“the Debtor”) filed a petition for Chapter 11 relief.[3] The Debtor also filed its schedules and a statement of financial affairs,[4] which listed Christopher McLoughlin Keough, Quantum Hedge Strategies Fund, LP, and SIM Hedged Strategies Trust (the “Purported Limited Partners”) as interest holders. The Purported Limited Partner’s interests were listed on the Debtor’s schedules, but were not listed as disputed, contingent, or unliquidated.[5] The court issued an amended bar date order requiring all interest holders to file proofs of interest, even if their interests were not listed as disputed, contingent, or unliquidated.[6] Despite receiving a copy of the amended bar date order, the Purported Limited Partners did not file proofs of interest by the bar date. Nevertheless, the Purported Limited Partners sought a declaration from the court that they were holders of allowed limited partner interests, entitled to distribution.[7] The court denied the motion, holding that the Purported Limited Partners were required to submit proofs of interest in accordance with the amended bar date order and that they had failed to do so.[8]

By: Joseph P. Donnelly IV

St. John’s Law Student

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff

By: Samantha M. Tusa

St. John’s Law Student

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff

The Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held, in In re Piccinini[1], that bankruptcy courts have exclusive jurisdiction over attorneys’ fees incurred in bankruptcy proceedings because of the “restrictive language” of section 329 of the Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”). [2]  The issue arose after the debtor terminated his original attorney who then filed a suit against the debtor in state court to collect his fees.[3]  The bankruptcy court stayed the state court collection action pending the bankruptcy court’s resolution of the fee dispute. [4]

By: Jessica L. Macrina
St. John's Law Student
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff

In a case of first impression, Lavie v. Ran (In re Ran),[1] the Fifth Circuit denied a petition for recognition of an Israeli bankruptcy proceeding under chapter 15 for an individual debtor because it did not qualify as a foreign main or foreign nonmain proceeding.[2] The court found that neither the debtor’s “center of main interest” (“COMI”) nor his “establishment” were located in Israel at the time the petition for recognition was filed.[3] Relying on both the statute’s use of the present tense and chapter 15’s stated purpose of international uniformity, the Fifth Circuit explicitly rejected the argument that the debtor’s COMI and his establishment should be determined at the time the foreign bankruptcy was filed.[4] 

By: Mark Sicari
St. John's Law Student
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff

In S.E.C. v. Byers[1], the Second Circuit determined that the district court had the equitable authority to enter an anti-litigation injunction that prohibited creditors from filing an involuntary bankruptcy petition against a debtor that is in an SEC receivership.[2] Responding to a $250 million Ponzi scheme perpetrated by the debtor companies, the SEC requested immediate injunctive relief from the district court.[3] The court appointed a receiver and entered an anti-litigation injunction.[4] Specifically, the injunction prevented creditors from filing an involuntary bankruptcy petition.[5] The Second Circuit affirmed the injunction, explaining that the district court’s equitable powers enabled it to keep the receivership assets out of bankruptcy.[6]

By: Shintaro Kitayama
St. John's Law Student
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff

In a case of first impression, the Fifth Circuit, in Condor Insurance Limited v. Petroquest Resources, Inc. (In re Condor Insurance Limited),[1]held that foreign representatives in a chapter 15 proceeding can assert an avoidance action under foreign law in a United States bankruptcy court.[2] The case was initiated when a foreign insurance company’s creditors filed a winding up petition, which is similar to a U.S. chapter 7 proceeding, in Nevis, [3] a small Caribbean island that is part of the Federation of Saint Kitts and Nevis. The Nevis liquidators filed a chapter 15 bankruptcy proceeding in Mississippi and sought to recover the assets under Nevis avoidance law. [4]  The Fifth Circuit held that section 1521(a)(7) allows a U.S. bankruptcy court to offer avoidance relief under foreign law.[5]

By: Justin Zaroovabeli
St. John's Law Student
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff

Recently, in In re Reiman,[1] a Michigan bankruptcy court held that a trustee could not revoke abandonment of property that he later discovered to have additional value.[2] The Reimans, the debtors, listed both their house’s value and a secured claim above their house’s value on their chapter 7 schedules.[3] After the trustee filed his no-asset report, the bankruptcy case closed and the debtors received a discharge.[4] The property eventually foreclosed at a bid price below the house’s fair market value and the trustee moved to re-open the case to recover any additional value in the house.[5] Although the court re-opened the case,[6] the court denied the trustee’s motion to revoke abandonment because the trustee’s no asset-report was not influenced by an unforeseeable change or mistake of law.[7] The court also noted that policy considerations typically favored finality in bankruptcy cases.[8]

By: David Wohlstadter
St. John's Law Student
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff

In AASI Creditor Liquidating Trust v. Raymond James & Associates, Inc. (In re All American Semiconductor, Inc.),[1] a bankruptcy court held that res judicata barred creditors from objecting to a final fee order because the creditors had notice of the prior hearing regarding the fee application and should have objected to the specific fees then.  The liquidating trustee challenged pre-petition fees paid to a financial advisor for his efforts to sell various assets owned by the debtor.[2]  The bankruptcy court overruled the trustee’s objection because the creditor’s committee and United States Trustee had already objected unsuccessfully during the final fee hearing.[3]

By: Deirdre E. Burke
St. John's Law Student
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff

Recently in O’Sullivan v. Loy (In re Loy),[1] a Virginia district court held that although a bankruptcy proceeding is ancillary to a foreign main proceeding, a chapter 15 “case” was commenced upon the filing of the petition for recognition in a United States bankruptcy court and not on the date of commencement of the foreign insolvency proceeding.[2] Certain chapter 15 provisions authorize relief after the “commencement of the case.”[3] Chapter 15, however, does not define the date commencement is considered to have occurred.  As a result, determining whether these statutes refer to the date the foreign proceeding commenced or the date of the foreign representative’s petition for recognition in U.S. bankruptcy courts can have significant ramifications.[4] In this case, an English Trustee was unable to avoid the debtor’s transfer of United States property as a post-petition transfer under sections 1520 and 549 of the Code, because the transfer took place before the English Trustee filed the petition for recognition in U.S. bankruptcy court.[5]