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Seth Woodhall

St. John’s University School of Law

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff

 

A vital aspect of chapter 11 is confirmation of the estate’s plan. Section 1123 of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth the components of a chapter 11 plan.[1] While section 1123(a) provides certain mandatory provisions be included in a chapter 11 plan, section 1123(b) provides a permissible set of additional provisions that may be included in a chapter 11 plan.[2] While the first five sub-sections of section 1123(b) list out specific provisions that may be included in a plan, sub-section six simply states that a plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title.”[3] Under this subsection, some courts have authorized the use of third party releases as “appropriate and essential in mass-tort litigations[.]”[4]Other courts have observed that “nothing in the bankruptcy code grants a bankruptcy court the ‘extraordinary’ power to release and enjoin claim against a third party without the consent of the affected claimants.”[5] The Supreme Court resolved this conflict by finding “that the bankruptcy code does not authorize a release and injunction that… effectively seeks to discharge claims against a nondebtor without the consent of affected claimants.”[6]

In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., part of Purdue Pharma L.P.’s (“Purdue”) chapter 11 plan, was a release and injunction for the Sackler family.[7] The Sacklers owned and operated Purdue while it created, sold and marketed the prescription drug OxyContin.[8] The Sacklers were extensively involved in the development of the prescription drug, which Purdue marketed to be a “less addictive” alternative to other opioids on the market.[9] While OxyContin became “the most prescribed brand-name narcotic medication in the United States” between 1996 and 2019, it did so because of the painkiller’s misbranding as “less addictive” than other opioids.[10] In 2007, an affiliate of Purdue plead guilty to a federal felony relating to the misbranding, and as a result, thousands of civil lawsuits sought damages from Purdue and the Sacklers relating to injuries caused by the deceptive marketing practices.[11]

Purdue filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2019 after a string of adverse court decisions resulting in damages.[12] Before Purdue filed for bankruptcy, the Sackler family took assets out of the company, totaling nearly $11 billion dollars, leaving it in a “significantly weakened state.”[13] As part of Purdue’s chapter 11 plan, the Sacklers proposed to return $4.325 billion (which would later be increased by $1.175-$1.675 billion) of the $11 billion that they withdrew from Purdue.[14] In exchange, the Sacklers would receive a release and injunction, extinguishing any current and future claims of negligence, fraud or willful misconduct against them for their involvement in Purdue’s sales of OxyContin.[15] After polling victims and creditors, the bankruptcy court for the Southern District of New York approved the overall plan with the Sackler release.[16]

Once the plan was confirmed by the bankruptcy court, plan opponents, including five different state attorney generals, appealed to the district court for Southern District of New York.[17] The district court for the Southern District of New York vacated the decision, holding that nothing in the law would authorize a bankruptcy court judge to confirm a plan with a release from claims provision without consent from victims.[18] Purdue, the Sacklers and various creditors appealed to the Second Circuit, which  reversed the district court’s order.[19] The Second Circuit concluded “that a bankruptcy court enjoys broad authority to modify debtor-creditor claims.”[20] The U.S. Trustee filed an application with the Supreme Court to stay the Second Circuit’s decision, which was treated as a Writ of Certiorari.[21]

The Supreme Court found that a bankruptcy court may not extend the benefits of a chapter 11 discharge to non-debtors.  The Supreme Court’s decision lists three principal reasons for this decision. First, the language of 11 U.S.C. §1123(b) does not support a bankruptcy judge’s ability to approve a provision in a bankruptcy plan giving relief to non-debtors.[22] Second, there are no other statutes of title 11 that would support a bankruptcy court having this broad discretion of approving a release provision to a non-debtor.[23] Third, nowhere in of the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code is there support for non-debtor discharge in litigation claims.[24]

Notably, the Supreme Court did not address what constitutes consent for the purpose of granting consensual third party releases.[25] The court noted that “[consensual releases] pose different questions and may rest on different legal grounds than the non-consensual releases at issue[.]”[26] The court stated that this was not an “occasion…to express a view on what qualifies as a consensual release”[27] despite having “95 percent approv[al]” of the plan.[28] In the court’s view, because they decided to categorize this case as a dispute over a non-consensual release, this still left open the ability for the Sacklers and the victims to negotiate a “consensual release[.]”[29] However, without any other guiding support from the court over what a consensual release would entail in this context, it was warned that the victims may not be able to obtain a deal similar to the one stated in the chapter 11 plan.[30]

            While the majority held that the Supreme Court should not subvert Congress’s authority by broadening the power of §1123(b), the dissent favored looking at public policy in their decision.[31] In the dissent’s view, the Court should have upheld the Sackler family release since it will lead to “substantial and adequate compensation” for victims.[32] This was forwarded by “fervent[] support” from victims and creditors who approved the bankruptcy plan.[33] The dissent also disagreed with the majority’s idea that third-party releases should only be granted by Congress.[34]  Especially since the asbestos bankruptcy cases, including Dalkon Shield, Dow Corning, Catholic Church and Boy Scout have showed that third-party releases have been a vital part of mass-tort litigations.[35]

The dissent stated that third-party releases have a history of receiving approval from courts and victims alike, especially in the Second Circuit, a “leader on the non-debtor release issue.”[36] The dissent laid out several factors that the Second Circuit has used in the past to find whether a third-party release is an “appropriate” implementation to a chapter 11 plan.[37] One fact is whether the plan received overwhelming support from creditors, which   “the Second Circuit defined as 75 percent ‘bare minimum.’”[38] The dissent explained that this approval measure was greater than what is required for a normal approval of a plan to ensure that the victims are receiving a fair pay-out based on the plan’s terms.[39] The dissent magnified this approach to advocate for a “holistic inquiry that depends on the precise facts and circumstances of each case.”[40]

This case ultimately will have a lasting impact over how large-scale corporations and entities approach mass-tort litigations through the United States Bankruptcy system. While the court disallowed “non-consensual” third-party releases, it left open the possibility for future cases to challenge what could be deemed a consensual release in a chapter 11 plan.[41]




[1] See 11 U.S.C. §1123 (“[§1123] addresses the ‘[c]ontents’–or terms–of the bankruptcy reorganization plan a debtor presents and a court approves in Chapter 11 proceedings.”) (quoting Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L. P., 144 S. Ct. 2071 (2024)). 

[2] See id. §1123(b)

[3] Id. §1123(b)(1)­(6).

[4] Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2071, 2089 (2024).

[5] Id. at 2080.

[6] Id. at 2088.

[7] See id. at 2079.

[8] See id. at 2078. 

[9] Id. 

[10] Id.

[11] See id.

[12] See id. at 2079.

[13] Id. at 2079.

[14] See id. at 2079–80.

[15] See id. at 2080.

[16] See id. at 2079–80. 

[17] See In re Purdue Pharm. L.P., 619 B.R. 38, 42 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

[18] See Harrington, 144 S. Ct. at 2080. 

[19] See id.

[20] Id.

[21] See id.

[22] See id. at 2081–84. 

[23] See id. at 2084–86.

[24] See id. at 2086–87.

[25] See id. at 2087–88. 

[26] Id. at 2087. 

[27] Id. at 2088.

[28] Id.at 2103.

[29] Id. at 2087.

[30] See id. at 2086–87.

[31] See id. at 2088­. 

[32] Id.

[33] Id.

[34] See id. at 2093­–94.

[35] See id.

[36] Id. at 2096

[37] Id.

[38] Id.

[39] See id. at 2097

[40] Id. at 2096.

[41] Id. at 2088. 

 

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