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Law Review: McLaughlin, Christopher- NC School of Government Tax Foreclosures: An Overview

Law Review: McLaughlin, Christopher- NC School of Government Tax Foreclosures: An Overview Ed Boltz Thu, 09/11/2025 - 20:50 Summary McLaughlin’s bulletin provides North Carolina counties with a primer on tax foreclosure. Local governments can use either: Mortgage-style foreclosure (G.S. 105-374) – a full civil action, with attorney’s fees chargeable to the taxpayer. In rem foreclosure (G.S. 105-375) – a streamlined, judgment-based process with a capped $250 administrative fee. The article covers lien priority, redemption rights, surplus distribution, and the mechanics of sales and upset bids. It also notes that counties may foreclose even against tax-exempt organizations (if taxes accrued before the exemption) or property owned by debtors who previously went through bankruptcy, once the automatic stay no longer applies. Commentary For consumer debtor attorneys, the key intersection is with bankruptcy and constitutional law: Automatic stayin Bankruptcy – McLaughlin states foreclosure can resume once a bankruptcy ends by dismissal or discharge. But under § 362(c), the stay continues against property of the estate until case closure (or abandonment), meaning a county may need stay relief even post-discharge. Counties rarely press this distinction, but debtor counsel should. County motions for relief – Counties, like any secured creditor, can seek stay relief under § 362(d), though cost often deters them. This can buy debtors critical time to cure arrears or negotiate. This option is not presented in the article. Tyler v. Hennepin County – The Supreme Court made clear that keeping more than is owed in taxes is a taking. North Carolina already requires that surplus proceeds from the initial foreclosure sale be turned over to the clerk of court for distribution. But what about the subsequent sale scenario? Under G.S. 105-376, if a county is the high bidder and takes title, it holds the property “for the benefit of all taxing units” and may later dispose of it. Current law lets the county keep any surplus above taxes when it later resells. After Tyler, t hat practice may be constitutionally suspect. The Court’s reasoning—that equity beyond the tax debt is still the homeowner’s property—suggests that if the county resells for more than the taxes owed, the excess belongs to the former owner, not the county. Consumer attorneys should be prepared to argue that Tyler extends to this scenario. A county cannot avoid the Takings Clause by first bidding in the taxes, taking title, and then capturing the homeowner’s equity on resale. Just as Minnesota could not legislate away surplus equity, North Carolina counties cannot sidestep it through G.S. 105-376. Practical leverage – Even if courts have yet to apply Tyler this way, raising the issue can help debtor counsel negotiate with counties—particularly in hardship cases or where a homeowner has substantial equity at risk. Takeaway McLaughlin’s bulletin outlines the procedural mechanics counties rely on, but in a post- Tyler world, debtors and their attorneys should not assume counties can lawfully pocket resale profits after acquiring property for back taxes. That question is ripe for litigation, and until resolved, consumer attorneys should press Tyler arguments whenever equity remains in a foreclosed home. With proper attribution, please share this post. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document tax_foreclosures_an_overview.pdf (483.42 KB) Category Law Reviews & Studies

W.D.N.C.: Black v. Brice-Upholds Business Judgment Rule, Rejects Caremark Claim

W.D.N.C.: Black v. Brice-Upholds Business Judgment Rule, Rejects Caremark Claim Ed Boltz Tue, 09/09/2025 - 16:43 Summary: Schletter, Inc., a Delaware-incorporated solar racking manufacturer based in Shelby, NC, lost market competitiveness when its FS Uno system fell behind the competition. CEO Dennis Brice, after months of analysis and with approval from its German parent company, launched a new “G-Max” product intended to be cheaper, lighter, and easier to install. To meet aggressive delivery deadlines in contracts with steep liquidated damages, development was rushed, no testing was performed, costs and production capacity were misjudged, and customers struggled with installation. The product rollout failed, customer claims mounted, and Brice was terminated in 2017. Schletter filed Chapter 11 in 2018. Post-confirmation, Plan Administrator Carol Black sued Brice for breach of fiduciary duty under Delaware law, arguing he acted for the benefit of the German parent (continuing licensing fees) rather than the debtor, and that ignoring “red flags” about the G-Max launch constituted a Caremark oversight breach. The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment for Brice, applying the business judgment rule. On appeal, the district court affirmed: Wholly-owned subsidiary status – Under German corporate practice, the unissued 5% treasury shares didn’t change that Schletter Germany held 100% of outstanding stock. Brice’s fiduciary duty was to the parent, so licensing fee decisions could not be a loyalty breach. No Caremark claim – Alleged “red flags” (lack of testing, risky contract terms, inadequate capacity) were hindsight critiques of business risk, not evidence of knowing illegality or bad faith. Business judgment rule applied – The decision to launch G-Max was a rational attempt to address competitive decline, and nothing rebutted the presumption of good faith. Because the business judgment rule shielded Brice, the court did not address his indemnification clause defenses. With proper attribution, please share this post. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document black_v._brice.pdf (266.43 KB) Category Western District

M.D.N.C.: Brown v. First Advantage Background Services Corp. & Ashcott, LLC- Default Judgment for FCRA as to Liability not Damages

M.D.N.C.: Brown v. First Advantage Background Services Corp. & Ashcott, LLC- Default Judgment for FCRA as to Liability not Damages Ed Boltz Mon, 09/08/2025 - 17:34 Summary: When Charles Brown applied for a long-haul truck driving job with a FedEx contractor, he did what every applicant expects—passed the interview and drug test—only to have his offer rescinded after a background check falsely claimed he had felony convictions. The root cause: Defendant Ashcott, LLC, hired by First Advantage to run criminal records searches, (Good Grief!) matched another “Charles Brown” from Philadelphia (with a different middle name and Social Security number) to him, and reported that the match was based on Brown’s *full* name and SSN—something that simply could not be true. Brown sued both First Advantage and Ashcott under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). After settling with First Advantage, he pursued a default judgment against Ashcott. The court found Ashcott properly served, that its conduct violated § 1681e(b) by failing to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy, and that the error was a proximate cause of Brown’s lost job and emotional distress. However, damages were another matter. Brown asked for $100,000 compensatory (for a year’s lost wages and distress) and $100,000 punitive damages. Evidence showed he had other employment until April 2023 and some income thereafter, so his lost wage calculation did not match reality. The court granted default judgment *as to liability*, denied punitive damages for lack of evidence of a willful violation, and set the matter for a damages hearing unless Brown supplements his proof to account for other income during the relevant period. Commentary: The opinion is a tidy reminder for consumer advocates that FCRA liability is not just about “false” reports—it’s about whether the background screener reasonably matched the data. Here, Ashcott claimed a perfect match on SSN when the middle name and SSN were actually different. That misstatement essentially doomed them once they defaulted. From a practice standpoint, this case illustrates: The importance of damages proof: Even with liability conceded, a plaintiff must prove actual damages with specificity, especially if there was other income or mitigation. Bankruptcy attorneys are well familiar with similar challenges when proving lost wages in discharge injunction or stay violation actions. The uphill battle for punitive damages: Without facts showing reckless disregard or intentional misconduct, courts will not presume willfulness from mere negligence. Parallel lessons for bankruptcy cases: Consumer debtors wrongfully denied employment due to inaccurate credit or criminal background reports may have viable FCRA claims, but those claims must be backed by documentary proof of lost earnings and clear causation—especially if those damages will be property of the estate and subject to trustee oversight. The factual irony here is that, had there been a Chapter 13 case, the false report’s economic harm (which would not be protected as under the personal injury exemption) could have impacted the debtor’s ability to fund a plan—yet the litigation and any recovery could also have been estate property. This makes a strong argument for debtor’s counsel to consider FCRA claims not just as side litigation, but as tools to protect the debtor’s fresh start and preserve plan feasibility. With proper attribution, please share this post. Blog comments Attachment Document brown_v._first_advantage.pdf (112.31 KB) Category Middle District

M.D.N.C.: Brown v. First Advantage Background Services Corp. & Ashcott, LLC- Default Judgment for FCRA as to Liability not Damages

M.D.N.C.: Brown v. First Advantage Background Services Corp. & Ashcott, LLC- Default Judgment for FCRA as to Liability not Damages Ed Boltz Mon, 09/08/2025 - 17:34 Summary: When Charles Brown applied for a long-haul truck driving job with a FedEx contractor, he did what every applicant expects—passed the interview and drug test—only to have his offer rescinded after a background check falsely claimed he had felony convictions. The root cause: Defendant Ashcott, LLC, hired by First Advantage to run criminal records searches, (Good Grief!) matched another “Charles Brown” from Philadelphia (with a different middle name and Social Security number) to him, and reported that the match was based on Brown’s *full* name and SSN—something that simply could not be true. Brown sued both First Advantage and Ashcott under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). After settling with First Advantage, he pursued a default judgment against Ashcott. The court found Ashcott properly served, that its conduct violated § 1681e(b) by failing to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy, and that the error was a proximate cause of Brown’s lost job and emotional distress. However, damages were another matter. Brown asked for $100,000 compensatory (for a year’s lost wages and distress) and $100,000 punitive damages. Evidence showed he had other employment until April 2023 and some income thereafter, so his lost wage calculation did not match reality. The court granted default judgment *as to liability*, denied punitive damages for lack of evidence of a willful violation, and set the matter for a damages hearing unless Brown supplements his proof to account for other income during the relevant period. Commentary: The opinion is a tidy reminder for consumer advocates that FCRA liability is not just about “false” reports—it’s about whether the background screener reasonably matched the data. Here, Ashcott claimed a perfect match on SSN when the middle name and SSN were actually different. That misstatement essentially doomed them once they defaulted. From a practice standpoint, this case illustrates: The importance of damages proof: Even with liability conceded, a plaintiff must prove actual damages with specificity, especially if there was other income or mitigation. Bankruptcy attorneys are well familiar with similar challenges when proving lost wages in discharge injunction or stay violation actions. The uphill battle for punitive damages: Without facts showing reckless disregard or intentional misconduct, courts will not presume willfulness from mere negligence. Parallel lessons for bankruptcy cases: Consumer debtors wrongfully denied employment due to inaccurate credit or criminal background reports may have viable FCRA claims, but those claims must be backed by documentary proof of lost earnings and clear causation—especially if those damages will be property of the estate and subject to trustee oversight. The factual irony here is that, had there been a Chapter 13 case, the false report’s economic harm (which would not be protected as under the personal injury exemption) could have impacted the debtor’s ability to fund a plan—yet the litigation and any recovery could also have been estate property. This makes a strong argument for debtor’s counsel to consider FCRA claims not just as side litigation, but as tools to protect the debtor’s fresh start and preserve plan feasibility. With proper attribution, please share this post. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document brown_v._first_advantage.pdf (112.31 KB) Category Middle District

Law Review: Hampson, Christopher D., "Bespoke, Tailored, and Off-the-Rack Bankruptcy: A Response to Professor Coordes's 'Bespoke Bankruptcy'"

Law Review: Hampson, Christopher D., "Bespoke, Tailored, and Off-the-Rack Bankruptcy: A Response to Professor Coordes's 'Bespoke Bankruptcy'" Ed Boltz Fri, 09/05/2025 - 16:34 Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub/1234 Abstract: Toward the end of every semester that I teach bankruptcy, I let my students vote on which “non-traditional” insolvency regimes they would like to study, including municipal bankruptcy, sovereign bankruptcy, and financial institutions. What I am really trying to do is convey to the students that the default procedures and substantive rules in Chapters 7 and 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code do not apply to all types of enterprises. Summary: In *Bespoke, Tailored, and Off-the-Rack Bankruptcy: A Response to Professor Coordes’s “Bespoke Bankruptcy”*, Professor Christopher Hampson expands Coordes’s taxonomy of “bankruptcy misfits” into three categories: Off-the-rack bankruptcy – the default Chapters 7 and 11 structure, with liquidation as the constant background threat. Tailored bankruptcy – Congress begins with the Code and tweaks it for a specific group, e.g., Chapter 12 or Subchapter V. Bespoke bankruptcy – a separate statutory regime built from scratch for entities “too important to fail” or whose governance or public role makes the standard model unworkable, e.g., Chapter 9 municipalities, PROMESA territorial cases, or Dodd-Frank bank resolutions. Hampson emphasizes that “misfit” status hinges on substantive differences, not whether the law is located in Title 11. Governance constraints (elected officials in municipalities, regulatory oversight in bank failures) often drive bespoke designs. He notes Coordes’s list of possible candidates—utilities, churches, nonprofits, public universities, mass tort defendants, and tribal corporations—and urges evaluating whether each needs tailoring or a fully bespoke regime. Tailoring is appropriate when standard Code processes suffice with moderate adjustments; bespoke is reserved for when off-the-rack solutions cannot work at all. Commentary: For consumer bankruptcy practitioners, this framework resonates with the Fourth Circuit’s Trantham v. Tate approach, which underscored the flexibility in Chapter 13 to craft nonstandard plan provisions so long as they comply with § 1322(b) and confirmation standards. Hampson’s “tailored” category suggests Congress could—and debtor’s counsel already can—create procedural or substantive adjustments within the Code to better fit certain consumer debtor populations. In other words, *Trantham* opens a door for “micro-tailoring” inside individual cases, while Hampson describes “macro-tailoring” by statute. Potential “bespoke” or “tailored” consumer bankruptcy categories could include: Attorney Fee Only Bankruptcy – Somewhere between a Chapter 7 and a Chapter 13 case that allows for immediate filing of the bankruptcy without payment up-front of attorneys fees and then discharge once those have been paid. This has been haphazardly accomplished with bifurcated fee agreements, low-pay Chapter 13s and conversions. Student loan–heavy debtors – Tailored provisions to permit discharge or structured repayment without undue hardship litigation, potentially modeled on Subchapter V’s streamlined timelines and mediation focus. This includes the b espoke Buchanan provisions, which allow or continue enrollment in IDR plans. Medical debt bankruptcies – Tailored rules prioritizing preservation of access to care, limiting the impact on future insurance coverage, or limiting impact on credit scores due to the innocent nature of the debt. Gig economy/variable income debtors – Tailored income determination and plan modification rules that account for income volatility and avoid serial defaults. Elderly debtors – Bespoke or heavily tailored regimes that protect retirement income and simplify plan administration when debt structure is modest but repayment ability is constrained by age and health. Natural disaster victims – A bespoke chapter (or subchapter) providing extended plan moratoria, expedited lien stripping for uninhabitable homes, and coordinated FEMA/insurance claim handling. Home preservation–focused debtors – Tailored provisions expanding mortgage cure rights beyond § 1322(b)(5), deferred payment of non-exempt equity to unsecured creditors, requiring servicer transparency akin to online access following In re Klemkowski. The mortgage modification programs adopted by many bankruptcy courts across the country, including all three districts in North Carolina are tailored for this. Mass consumer fraud victims – Group Chapter 13 plans combining streamlined proof-of-claim defenses with coordinated recovery from common wrongdoers. Consumer attorneys could, post- Trantham, experiment with nonstandard plan language to simulate these regimes in individual cases—e.g., a “Student Loan Chapter 13” provision requiring mediation and fixed interest amortization; or a “Disaster Recovery Chapter 13” with seasonal payment step-ups. The test will be whether courts view these as permissible tailoring or an impermissible rewrite of the Code. If Congress takes up bespoke consumer bankruptcy, these categories could be codified much like Chapter 12 was for farmers and Sub V for small businesses—starting as an emergency measure and, if successful, becoming a permanent feature of the Code. With proper attribution, please share this post. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document bespoke_tailored_and_off-the-rack_bankruptcy_a_response_to_pro.pdf (245.52 KB) Category Law Reviews & Studies

Law Review (Policy): Lederer, Anneliese and Kushner, Andrew- The Shady Side of Solar System Financing

Law Review (Policy): Lederer, Anneliese and Kushner, Andrew- The Shady Side of Solar System Financing Ed Boltz Thu, 09/04/2025 - 15:56 Available at: https://www.responsiblelending.org/research-publication/shady-side-sola… Executive Summary: Rising energy costs and the increasing environmental threats posed by climate change are causing a growing number of American homeowners to turn to the financial services sector to pay for energy-efficient renovations and upgrades to their homes. This segment of a broader financial market, known as consumer green lending, provides financing for many consumer products designed to have a positive environmental impact and provide potential energy cost savings. As of 2023, 4.4% of all residential homes in the United States had solar power systems installed, with Hawaii, California, and Arizona having the greatest percentages of homes powered by residential solar systems. The solar finance industry is significantly smaller than the mortgage market; however, its reliance on securitization for capital and an estimated $3.89 billion in asset-backed securities represents a growing economic footprint. The clean energy transition in the United States will not succeed and will not be equitable without broad adoption by low-to-moderate income (LMI) consumers. This will require a clear understanding of the consumer benefits of clean energy, as well as effective state and federal consumer protection regulations. Key Findings: Elements of solar financing products and sales processes are identical to those used by predatory subprime lenders in 2007 to target low- and moderate-income and minority borrowers. GoodLeap, Sunlight Financial, Mosaic, Sunrun, and Sunnova together account for 80% of the residential solar loan market, according to the most recently available public estimate. Solar financing agreements often leave homeowners in a worse economic situation than before the door-to-door salesperson visited them. This solar debt elevates the risk that the consumer will lose their home to bankruptcy or foreclosure. The price of the solar system typically is substantially inflated if a consumer finances a system. This allows door-to-door sellers to falsely represent that borrowers are getting financing with a low nominal payment rate when most of the financing cost is hidden in the inflated price of the solar panel system. This markup amount is not revealed to the homeowner, and installers are often forbidden from disclosing the markup. Commentary: For consumer bankruptcy practitioners, the treatment of solar panels and their financing remains a tangle of unresolved issues. In some cases, panels are clearly fixtures subject to mortgage liens; in others, they remain personal property under a UCC-1 filing. Lease and PPA arrangements add another layer, often looking less like ownership and more like a burdensome executory contract. As the CRL report shows, the sales and financing practices themselves can be fertile ground for Truth in Lending, UDTPA, or Holder Rule claims—if the forced arbitration clauses don’t shut the courthouse door. The confusion shows up in bankruptcy schedules and plan treatment. Is the panel lender a mortgage creditor whose collateral is part of the home? Or a creditor secured by personal property with an inflated claim that could be bifurcated or crammed down? Should the system be assumed, rejected, or stripped? And when the financing includes hidden “dealer fees” or an unperfected lien, can we challenge the claim entirely? Courts vary widely in approach, and the law has not settled—meaning that debtors with identical panels may get wildly different outcomes depending on jurisdiction, trustee, and even how the panels were bolted down. Given the aggressive and sometimes predatory nature of solar financing, consumer bankruptcy attorneys should: Scrutinize loan documents for arbitration clauses, hidden fees, and inflated prices used to mask interest rates. Investigate lien perfection—many UCC filings describe the panels but don’t comply with fixture filing requirements. Consider whether claims are subject to setoff or recoupment based on state UDAP laws or the FTC Holder Rule. Prepare to educate the court on why a purported “fixture” might still be personal property—and why that matters for valuation and claim treatment. Subject solar panel finance creditors to discovery to obtain accurate details about both their lending practices and the resale value for used solar panels. In short, solar panel financing in consumer bankruptcy is like the early days of mortgage securitization litigation—confusing, inconsistent, and ripe for both creditor overreach and debtor defense. Until appellate guidance or legislative reform arrives, practitioners will need to navigate a patchwork of interpretations and be ready to litigate classification, lien validity, and consumer protection violations alongside the usual plan feasibility and disposable income issues. Finally, CRL and the authors of this report would perform a great public service by extending their investigation into how solar panel debt is treated in consumer bankruptcy cases nationwide. Review of the wealth of data available in bankruptcy cases through PACER could shed light on the inconsistent treatment of these claims, expose whether predatory financing survives discharge, and inform both policymakers and courts on how best to protect debtors caught between green energy aspirations and high-pressure, high-cost financing schemes. NACA Webinar: What to Do with Solar Panels in Bankruptcy. With proper attribution, please share this post. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document solar_panels_in_bankruptcy_flowchart.pdf (30.07 KB) Document crl-shady-side-solar-financing-jul2024.pdf (945.47 KB) Category Law Reviews & Studies

Bankr. E.D.N.C.- JSmith v. IRS- Bankruptcy Court Determination of Eligibility for ERC

Bankr. E.D.N.C.- JSmith v. IRS- Bankruptcy Court Determination of Eligibility for ERC Ed Boltz Wed, 09/03/2025 - 16:40 Summary: In JSmith Civil, LLC v. United States (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Aug. 7, 2025), Judge Callaway granted summary judgment for the IRS in an adversary proceeding seeking over $1 million in Employee Retention Credit (ERC) tax refunds. Under the CARES Act, a business qualifies for the ERC only if its operations were “fully or partially suspended” due to a compulsory governmental order tied to COVID-19. JSmith argued that North Carolina’s Executive Orders, OSHA/CDC guidance, and other pandemic disruptions forced it to suspend one-third of its construction operations in Q2 2020 and Q2 2021. The court held that Executive Order 121 explicitly exempted all “construction” from closure, that OSHA/CDC documents were nonbinding guidance (not “orders”), and that general pandemic impacts such as quarantines and supply delays did not meet the statutory standard. Because JSmith could not identify a qualifying governmental order that required it to suspend operations, the court found no material factual dispute and ruled for the United States. Commentary: This decision is not just a COVID-era tax case; it is a procedural roadmap for how bankruptcy courts can handle fact-intensive disputes about government benefits or entitlements. The opinion is notable for three reasons. First, it applies the post- Loper Bright directive that courts must independently construe statutory terms, treating agency guidance as persuasive but not controlling. Second, it draws a sharp line between binding “orders” and nonbinding “recommendations,” a distinction that will matter in future disputes over statutory triggers for financial relief. Third, the court’s structured approach—starting with statutory eligibility, then parsing the factual record for qualifying events—offers a clear procedural template for similar determinations. That structure could be readily adapted in consumer bankruptcy matters far beyond the ERC. For example, in Chapter 13 cases where debtors seek to compel turnover or crediting of federal or state benefits—think student loan payment credits toward Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF), income-driven repayment forgiveness, or tax-based credits like the Child Tax Credit—the same two-step process could apply: Identify the exact statutory eligibility criteria (including whether they are “presumption-in” or “presumption-out” like the ERC), and Determine whether the debtor can prove those criteria with admissible evidence, not just assumptions or guidance. For PSLF in particular, a debtor might allege that payments made through a confirmed Chapter 13 plan must be counted toward the 120-payment requirement. The PSLF statute and regulations define what counts as a “qualifying payment” and under what “qualifying repayment plan.” Just as in JSmith, the court could resolve the issue by (a) interpreting the statutory and regulatory definitions without deference to agency gloss that contradicts the text, and (b) making factual findings on whether the debtor’s Chapter 13 payments satisfy those definitions—perhaps through stipulated facts or a short evidentiary hearing. In short, JSmith reinforces that these determinations are ripe for resolution through targeted summary judgment or similar procedural devices. When applied to consumer cases, that efficiency can cut through bureaucratic intransigence, clarify statutory entitlements, and, in PSLF scenarios, potentially unlock years of loan forgiveness credit for debtors before their bankruptcy cases close. With proper attribution, please share this post. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document jsmith_v._irs.pdf (249.03 KB) Category Eastern District

Law Review (Note): Daniels, Haley- Insurers Have Standing to Object to Reorganization Plans

Law Review (Note): Daniels, Haley- Insurers Have Standing to Object to Reorganization Plans Ed Boltz Tue, 09/02/2025 - 17:03 Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/bankruptcy_research_library/372/ Abstract: Section 1109 of title 11 of the United States Code (the "Bankruptcy Code") allows any "party in interest" to raise, appear, and be heard on any issue in a chapter 11 bankruptcy case. The term party in interest is not otherwise defined in the Bankruptcy Code. The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase to describe a party that has a sufficient stake in the outcome of the bankruptcy reorganization. Importantly, Section 1128(b) of the Bankruptcy Code explicitly provides that a party in interest "may object to confirmation of a plan" in a chapter 11 case. The United States Supreme Court has held that an insurer with a significant financial stake is a party in interest with the right to object to a proposed chapter 11 reorganization plan. The significance of the insurers’ financial stake and thus bankruptcy standing to object to the plan are usually dependent on if the reorganization plan is defined as "insurance neutral." A plan is insurance neutral if it does not increase the reorganizing debtor’s insurance provider’s financial obligations or risks. If a reorganization plan is insurance neutral, an insurer will not have bankruptcy standing; if it is not insurance neutral, the insurer will have bankruptcy standing. This article analyzes why insurers, in chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, have standing under the Bankruptcy Code as parties in interest, allowing for their objections to the confirmation of a chapter 11 debtor’s plan. Part I will describe the traditional understanding of a legal party in interest. Part II will discuss the decision In re Thorpe Insulation Co., highlighting the facts, reasoning and holding of what becomes almost a precursor to the holding in Truck Ins. Exch., combining the previous definitions of a party in interest as well as an introduction to insurance neutral plans with asbestos liability claims specifically. Part III then explains Section 524(g) trusts created in response to asbestos liability claims, and finds, using case law, that in these specific cases, it is rare that insurers will be found lack standing. Next, in Part IV, the article will move to a detailed discussion of the analysis of Truck Ins. Exch. alone, providing an overview of the facts of the case, the influences for the Court’s analysis in defining Section 1109(b), and the logic behind the conclusion that the insurers had standing. Finally, the article will conclude in Section V with a summary of the modern case law analyzed in the article, and a concise rule of law as it relates to the specific issues considered in the other sections. Commentary: The lesson from Truck Ins. Exch. is that “insurance neutrality” is the dividing line. In the consumer Chapter 13 context, most insurance issues—like routine continuation of coverage—are neutral and give the insurer no real stake in the case. But when the bankruptcy plan or orders dictate how claim proceeds are used, release the debtor’s liability in ways that impair the insurer’s defenses, or alter the timing or manner of payments, insurers could be treated as parties in interest with standing to object. That said, in consumer cases, courts tend to be cautious about opening the door to every tangentially interested insurer, so a clear showing of direct, non-incidental financial impact would be needed to avoid having such objections dismissed as beyond the scope of § 1324. Chapter 13 does not have § 1109(b)’s broad party-in-interest language (it instead using a mishmash of "creditors" and and without a listing of potential types of "parties in interest" under § 1324 and § 1302/§ 1307 for who may object), but courts often borrow standing principles across chapters when interpreting “party in interest” in § 1324(a). The Truck Ins. Exch. rationale could allow various insurers—life, health, auto, homeowners—to participate in a Chapter 13 if the plan, motions, or adversary proceedings materially alter their obligations. Examples could include: Car insurers if the plan proposes to treat a pending total-loss claim in a way that affects subrogation rights or the insurer’s payout obligations. Homeowners’ insurers if a motion to approve repairs or settle claims from a property loss affects lien priorities or distribution of insurance proceeds. Health insurers if the plan addresses pending personal injury claims in which the insurer has a contractual reimbursement/subrogation right. Life insurers in rare cases where a policy’s cash surrender value is pledged or surrendered as part of the plan, directly impacting policy obligations. With proper attribution, please share this post. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document insurers_have_standing_to_object_to_reorganization_plans.pdf (287.9 KB) Category Law Reviews & Studies

Law Review (Note): Galletti, Michael- The Valuation of Crypto Currency Mining Property Under 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1)

Law Review (Note): Galletti, Michael- The Valuation of Crypto Currency Mining Property Under 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) Ed Boltz Fri, 08/29/2025 - 16:03 Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/bankruptcy_research_library/374/ Abstract: Section 506(a)(1) of title 11 of the United States Code (the "Bankruptcy Code") provides that a secured creditor's claim is "a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property . . . and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest . . . is less than the amount of such allowed claim." The valuation of collateral is determined "in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property." However, the Bankruptcy Code is silent on which valuation method courts should employ. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit noted in In re Heritage Highgate, Inc. that "Congress envisioned a flexible approach to valuation whereby bankruptcy courts would choose the standard that best fits the circumstances of a particular case." The Supreme Court elaborated in Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash that the lower courts must evaluate the "actual" use of the property by the debtor in its valuation analysis. This article analyzes the valuation of crypto currency mining assets under section 506(a)(1) in bankruptcy cases. The nature of crypto currency mining provides unique challenges in the valuation step. The mining process requires hundreds of sophisticated “miners,” potentially costing over $10,000 each, and requiring significant energy resources that are usually provided by individualized agreements with public and private utilities. Part I of this article discusses the valuation of special use property. Part II discusses potential valuation methods available to the court. Commentary: In what appears to be the first and only decision valuing cryptocurrency mining facilities under §506(a)(1), Bay Point Capital Partners v. Thomas Switch Holding—affirmed all the way to the Eleventh Circuit—the court classified the property as “special use” because of its substantial (15 MW) dedicated electrical infrastructure, lack of comparable properties, and limited alternative uses. That designation drove the choice of the cost approach over income or sales-comparison methods, with the court relying heavily on the testimony of an appraiser who actually defined “special use.” For practitioners, the lesson is clear: in cases involving unique, infrastructure-intensive collateral—whether crypto mines, data centers, or otherwise—the fight will be over the expert who gets to set the definitional terms, and once “special use” status is secured, the cost approach will often follow, producing a higher valuation for secured creditors and less for unsecureds. Following a still largely untested idea from Billy Brewer, while crypto mining itself isn’t “producing” electricity, these facilities often operate under custom, high-capacity utility service agreements—sometimes with embedded rights, rate discounts, or infrastructure upgrades that are essentially inseparable from the property. If those agreements are characterized as energy transmission/distribution assets , that could bring the property within the scope of § 363(h)(4). Then even though § 363(h) allows a trustee to sell both the estate’s and a co-owner’s interest in property, if certain conditions are met, subsection (h)(4) prohibits the sale of jointly owned property if unless it “ is not used in the production, transmission, or distribution, for sale, of electric energy or of natural or synthetic gas for heat, light, or power.” With proper attribution, please share this post. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document the_valuation_of_crypto_currency_mining_property_under_11_u.s.c._506a1.pdf (273.68 KB) Category Law Reviews & Studies

Law Review (Note): Caraballo, Samantha- Rejection of an Executory Contract Does Not Invalidate Rights Exercised or Performance Rendered Prior to Rejection

Law Review (Note): Caraballo, Samantha- Rejection of an Executory Contract Does Not Invalidate Rights Exercised or Performance Rendered Prior to Rejection Ed Boltz Thu, 08/28/2025 - 16:59 Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/bankruptcy_research_library/370/ Abstract: Under section 365 of Title 11 of the United States Code (the "Bankruptcy Code"), a trustee or a debtor in possession may "reject" an executory contract. Rejection results in a breach of contract. Courts consider non-bankruptcy contract law to determine the impact of the breach on the executory contract. In general, rejection does not undo a party’s past performance or exercise of rights under the contract. Instead, it relieves a debtor from its future obligation to perform. Part I of this Article explains the different approaches to defining "executory contract." Part II of this Article elaborates on a trustee and debtor in possession’s power to reject an executory contract in a bankruptcy case. Part III of this Article discusses the consequence of rejection. Part IV of this Article addresses rejection’s impact on past performance and exercise of rights under the contract Commentary: This note makes clear that under Mission Prod. Holdings v. Tempnology and its progeny, rejection under § 365 is a breach, not a rescission, and does not unwind rights already granted or exercised prior to rejection. That distinction is critical when considering whether contractual provisions—particularly those mandating arbitration—survive rejection. Considering, for example, whether an arbitration clause is an “executory contract” depends first on whether it is part of a broader agreement with continuing obligations on both sides at the petition date. Under the Countryman test (favored by the Fourth Circuit), an arbitration agreement standing alone may be executory if, at filing, each party still had material unperformed obligations—such as the debtor’s obligation to arbitrate disputes and the counterparty’s obligation to participate in and be bound by arbitration. Under the functional approach, an arbitration clause could be treated as executory even if the creditor’s only duty is to arbitrate, if rejecting it would confer a tangible benefit on the estate. If the arbitration provision is embedded in a broader executory contract (e.g., a consumer loan agreement or service contract), and that contract is rejected (or deemed rejected if not timely assumed), rejection constitutes a breach of the arbitration clause as well. Under Mission Products, however, breach does not necessarily erase rights that survive outside bankruptcy law. This raises the thorny question: is the right to compel arbitration a “vested” right that survives breach, or merely a future performance obligation? Some courts have held that arbitration clauses are procedural mechanisms for resolving disputes—not substantive rights that “vest” pre-breach—and thus can be rendered unenforceable if the executory contract containing them is rejected and not assumed. Others treat arbitration as a stand-alone enforceable right, analogizing it to a forum-selection clause, which generally survives breach. In consumer bankruptcy, this analysis has practical importance: if arbitration is rejected, debtors may keep disputes in bankruptcy court without having to meet the McMahon/ Epic Systems pro-arbitration federal policy head-on. With proper attribution, please share this post. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document rejection_of_an_executory_contract_does_not_invalidate_rights_exercised_or_performance_rendered_prior_to_rejection.pdf (286.56 KB) Category Law Reviews & Studies