By: Louis Calabro
St. John’s Law Student
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff
In In re Gunboat International, Ltd., the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina held that section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code, which protects a good faith purchaser from a reversal of an order approving a bankruptcy sale, does not apply to collateral attacks on a sale order under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”). In that case, the debtor (“Gunboat”) agreed to sell its interest in the G4—a sailboat model contracted between the debtor and two other parties—to a third party, Mr. Chen. In the months leading up to the sale, The Holland Companies (“Holland”), which held certain exclusive manufacturing and usage rights over the G4, had been negotiating a settlement agreement to buy Gunboat’s interest in the G4. Holland was unaware that Gunboat was attempting to sell Gunboat’s G4 interest to another party and believed that Gunboat should have given Holland an opportunity to make a more attractive offer considering its ongoing attempts to settle. On May 10, 2016, the court entered a final order approving the sale of Gunboat’s assets to Mr. Chen. Thereafter, Holland filed a motion to reconsider with the court under FRCP Rule 60(b); in response, Gunboat opposed.
By: Sumaya Restagno
St. John’s Law Student
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff
Under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”), Congress imposed strict limitations on payments made specifically to retain key employees of companies in chapter 11 bankruptcy and narrowed the circumstances under which these payments could be made through the addition of section 503(c). Under section 503(c)(1), chapter 11 debtors may pay a bonus to certain employees under a Key Employee Retention Plan (“KERP”) upon approval of the court and after a showing that certain required factors have been satisfied. Under section 503(c)(3), chapter 11 debtors may pay a bonus under a Key Employee Incentive Plan (“KEIP”) to certain employees after they attain certain measurable, difficult-to-reach milestones. Payments under a KEIP are described as being outside the ordinary course of business and are statutorily prohibited unless justified by the facts and circumstances of the case. Many courts have held this standard to be synonymous with the “business judgment” standard that governed KERPS prior to the BAPCPA which is not as strict as the test under 503(c)(1).
By: Dylan Coyne
St. John’s Law Student
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff
In In re Alpha Natural Resources, Inc., a Virginia bankruptcy court allowed a coal mining company to reject its collective bargaining agreements thereby permitting the company to sell its revenue generating assets. Alpha Natural Resources, Inc. (“Alpha”) is the largest coal producing company by volume in the United States and began to sustain severe financial difficulties after the coal industry began to decline in 2011. In an effort to stay afloat, Alpha began to cut costs by freezing wages, laying off employees and reducing benefits for non-union employees in 2013. In its Chapter 11 case, Alpha explored selling its core revenue generating assets to its prepetition lenders (the “Bidders”), who served as a stalking horse for the sale. The Bidders, however, were not willing to assume Alpha’s liabilities to Alpha’s unions as required under the collective bargaining agreement or under the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992 (the “Coal Act”). Accordingly, Alpha filed a motion for an order rejecting the collective bargaining agreements. Alpha’s unions objected to the request, arguing that §§ 1113 and 1114 of the Bankruptcy Code do not apply to Alpha since Alpha is liquidating and those sections address reorganization, and further that Alpha had not satisfied the elements of those same statutes.
By: Lauren Gross
St. John’s Law Student
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff
In Music Mix Mobile, LLC v. Newman (In re Stage Presence, Inc.), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that the plaintiffs’ alter ego allegations were sufficient to withstand a defendant’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs, Music Mix Mobile, LLC, et al., alleged they were not paid by Stage Presence Incorporated (a chapter 11 debtor), One for Each Island Ltd. (“OFEI”) and three individual producers of the benefit program: Newman, Weiner, and Marquette for audio, editing, teleprompter, music mixing and other services they provided in connection with the Childhelp program. Among other theories of contract liability against defendants, the plaintiffs asserted that OFEI, Newman, Weiner, and Marquette should jointly share in the contract liabilities of Stage Presence on “alter ego” grounds.
By: Sara Brenner
St. John’s Law Student
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff
In In re Murray, chapter 13 debtor Mr. Murray (the “Debtor”), sued Revenue Management Corporation and Donald Aucoin (“Defendants”), alleging that the Defendants violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). According to the Debtor, the Defendants violated the FDCPA by including a reference to purported litigation as reflected by inserting a “vs” between the Defendants’ names and the Debtor in the top right corner of a collection letter.
By: Dean Katsionis
St. John’s Law Student
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff
Section 546(c) of the Bankruptcy Code preserves a vendor’s right to reclaim goods sold to an insolvent debtor within forty-five days of the debtor’s bankruptcy filing.[1] Courts have had to address whether a post-petition lender’s subsequently perfected security interest defeats the vendor’s reclamation rights when a post-petition loan is used to repay the debtor’s prepetition secured loan, which are generally subject to reclamation rights.[2] In In re Reichold Holdings US, Inc., the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware overruled a liquidating trustee’s objection to a vendor’s reclamation claim, holding that the vendor’s reclamation rights arose before a post-petition DIP lender’s liens attached, and as such, those liens were subject to the prior reclamation rights of the vendor.[3]
By: J. Tyler Mills
St. John’s Law Student
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff
In Rosenberg v. DVI Receivables XVII, LLC,[1] the Third Circuit held that an award of damages after the dismissal of an involuntary bankruptcy petition does not preempt a claim for tortious interference with contracts and business relationships brought against the petitioning creditors by injured parties who were not alleged debtors.[2] There, an involuntary bankruptcy was brought against a medical imaging company to collect on leases for various medical equipment.[3] After the involuntary petition was dismissed, the alleged debtor sued the petitioning creditors to recover costs, attorney’s fees, and damages for the bad faith filing of the involuntary petition.[4] The jury awarded the alleged debtor $1.1 million in compensatory damages and $5 million in punitive damages.[5]
By: Nicholas Marcello
St. John’s Law Student
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff
In In re Genesys Research Institute, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts denied motions for reconsideration holding there was no error in approving the sale and disposition of research equipment and biological samples free and clear of liens, claims, and interests.[1] In support of its motion to sell research equipment by public auction and destroy experimental cancers cells, the Trustee of Genesys Research Institute, a debtor, argued that the costs and burdens of maintaining the biological materials warranted the prompt disposition of them.[2] The Trustee noted that no party appeared to take custody and control of the biological materials despite all marketing efforts.[3] The Trustee also represented that he had no ability to reorganize the research lab and that he was required to liquidate the debtor’s assets in furtherance of his duties as a chapter 11 trustee.[4] The Court approved the disposition of the cells and the sale of the equipment free and clear of all interest and liens over the objection of, among others, the Department of Energy (“DOE”).[5] The disposition of the research led to the incineration of (hundreds) of biological samples, backed by thousands of dollars in grants, which were part of vital cancer research.[6] The researcher’s work was considered to be “groundbreaking and paradigm-shifting in the field of cancer biology” because they were able to turn normal human cells into cancer cells.[7]
By: Allison N. Smalley
St. John’s Law Student
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff
In Securities Investor Protection Corporation v. Bernie L. Madoff Investment Securities, LLC,[1] the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York concluded that a recipient should return fictitious profits he gained through the Ponzi scheme operated by Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities (“BLMIS”).[2] Andrew Cohen withdrew approximately $4 million from his account at BLMIS between January 18, 1996 and December 11, 2008.[3] Of that withdrawal, approximately $1.1 million was fictitious profit.[4] Irving Picard, as the trustee of BLMIS,[5] sought to recover the fictitious profits from several recipients, including Cohen, under Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code.[6] As a defense, Cohen asserted that he gave “value” to BLMIS when he received the fictitious profits.[7] The bankruptcy court, however, rejected this defense and concluded that the District Court should find in favor of Picard.[8]
By: Christina Mavrikis
St. John’s Law Student
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff
In In re G-I Holdings, Inc., the Third Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals held that the New York City Housing Authority (“NYCHA”) could not repackage a claim for damages against G-I Holdings in the hopes of circumventing federal bankruptcy laws. G-I Holdings was the manufacturer of housing products containing asbestos. Seeking to address its asbestos related lawsuits, in 2001 GI Holdings filed for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey. NYCHA submitted a half-billion dollar claim against G-I Holdings for property damage to its buildings. NYCHA claimed it had to take expensive measures to remove asbestos containing material from its buildings. In 2009, the District Court for the District of New Jersey and the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey approved a plan of reorganization that disposed all covered claims against G-I Holdings. Claim holders were also barred from reasserting such claims.