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Bankr. W.D.N.C.: In re Drysdale- Denial of Motion to Entire Seal Pro Se Bankruptcy

Bankr. W.D.N.C.: In re Drysdale- Denial of Motion to Entire Seal Pro Se Bankruptcy Ed Boltz Fri, 07/25/2025 - 15:57 Summary: In In re Drysdale, the Court denied two motions filed by pro se Chapter 13 Debtor Katherine Danielle Drysdale seeking to entirely seal her bankruptcy case from public view on PACER. Her initial "Motion to Restrict Public Access" and subsequent "Emergency Ex Parte Motion to Temporarily Seal Entire Docket" invoked 11 U.S.C. § 107(b) and Bankruptcy Rule 9037, broadly citing concerns about identity theft, potential danger to her minor son, and future filings that might contain "scandalous" or "confidential commercial" information. Judge Laura T. Beyer declined to hold a hearing—after the Debtor refused to notice one and vocally opposed the idea—and ruled directly on the motions. The Court emphasized the presumption of public access to bankruptcy proceedings under both the First Amendment and Bankruptcy Code § 107(a). While the Code allows for limited redaction or sealing in cases involving trade secrets, defamatory content, or identifiable data that presents a risk of identity theft, the Debtor's request to wholesale seal the docket and prevent future public posting of filings "inverts" the statute’s purpose and lacks any individualized, cognizable showing. The Court concluded that the Debtor failed to assert any specific grounds for sealing beyond what would apply generically to most bankruptcy filers and that she did not even identify any actual filings—past or future—that met the narrow statutory exceptions. She was encouraged to redact personal identifiers pursuant to Rule 9037 and to file appropriately tailored motions in the future, should a specific need arise. Commentary: This decision is a strong reaffirmation that bankruptcy is, and must remain, a public process, even in the digital age where PACER enables widespread access. While courts appropriately recognize privacy concerns in narrow instances—especially under Rule 9037 and § 107(b)—Judge Beyer made clear that a Debtor cannot demand wholesale secrecy based on speculative or generalized fears. The irony here is that the Debtor's attempts to seal the docket only further highlighted the content of her filings and drew judicial attention to procedural missteps, including a refusal to notice a hearing and unsupported accusations against the Court. For consumer practitioners, Drysdale serves as a reminder to be mindful of sensitive information in filings—but also to counsel clients on the inherently public nature of bankruptcy. If the privacy concerns are serious enough, perhaps bankruptcy is not the appropriate remedy—or sealing requests must be narrowly tailored and well-supported. Courts are not inclined to build “shadow dockets” hidden from public scrutiny. Moreover, Drysdale demonstrates the limits of self-help in bankruptcy. By refusing to follow procedural requirements for noticed motions or cooperate with the Court’s process, the Debtor ensured her arguments would not get far—even if there had been a more persuasive basis. The door remains open to redactions or future narrowly targeted sealing requests, but the Court will not countenance turning off the lights entirely on a Chapter 13 case. As the Western District's own Garlock litigation demonstrated a decade ago, transparency in bankruptcy protects the public, the judiciary, and even the parties themselves. Practitioners should treat sealing as the exception, not the rule—and be prepared to pay the price (procedurally and substantively) to obtain it. While unmentioned in the opinion, the tone, content, and procedural irregularities in the case strongly suggest either the involvement of a BPP, sovereign citizen beliefs, or both. Additional review of the petition itself (e.g., form completion, declaration of preparer, debtor’s statements) would confirm these suspicions more concretely. With proper attribution, please share this post. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document in_re_drysdale.pdf (252.03 KB) Category Western District

Law Review: Kunkel, Declan, A Mill of Miller: Examining the Supreme Court’s Recent Bankruptcy Jurisprudence (April 18, 2025)

Law Review: Kunkel, Declan, A Mill of Miller: Examining the Supreme Court’s Recent Bankruptcy Jurisprudence (April 18, 2025) Ed Boltz Thu, 07/24/2025 - 18:12 Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5265839 Abstract: In the recent Supreme Court case United States v. Miller, the Court resolved a nuanced but technical dispute in bankruptcy law: whether a trustee can use § 544(b)’s avoidance power against the government a separate, state-law waiver of sovereign immunity. In holding that a trustee does need a second waiver—apart from § 106(a)’s general waiver of sovereign immunity—the Court not only resolved a circuit split, but issued a holding with several noteworthy parts. First, the Court affirmed that § 544(b) requires a true “actual creditor,” meaning a trustee can only act if an actual creditor could have recovered outside bankruptcy. While the Court referenced legislative history and bankruptcy treatises to support this interpretation, the plain text of the Code does not as clearly support that proposition. The better argument lies in history and structure—but the Court had previously rejected such tools in last term’s Perdue Pharma decision. Second, the decision appears to cut back on the principle that Justice Holmes outlined in Moore v. Bay: that a trustee’s powers exceed those of any individual creditor. In Miller, dismissed Moore as limited to recovery, not avoidance, a distinction seen as novel and unsupported by precedent. Third, the Court failed to address whether sovereign immunity even applies to in rem proceedings like bankruptcy, where prior rulings (e.g., Katz) suggest immunity concerns are diminished. By interpreting § 544(b) as requiring a creditor who could sue independently—and thus requiring another sovereign immunity waiver—the Court has curtailed the effectiveness of bankruptcy trustees in recovering assets and protecting creditor interests. Finally, the Court’s opinion reflects a curious reading of the bankruptcy code. By imposing a second, sovereign immunity hurdle, the Court created inconsistencies with other Code sections like § 548 and § 549, which do not require a separate waiver and allow broader trustee recovery. Finally, at bottom, although a § 544(b) avoidance action borrows its content from state law, the trustee’s suit is still a federal law claim. And in Miller, the Court confronted just such a federal action: a trustee, operating under a federal waiver of sovereign immunity, borrowed a state law cause of action to bring his federal suit and met all the requirements for that claim. In holding that the trustee needed a second waiver of sovereign immunity, the court derived a requirement that can follow from the Code’s text but has several broader implications. Commentary: Declan Kunkel’s review of United States v. Miller astutely highlights how the Supreme Court, under the guise of statutory interpretation, narrowed trustees’ avoidance powers by requiring a second sovereign immunity waiver for § 544(b) claims that rely on state law. Despite § 106(a)’s broad waiver, the Court held that the trustee couldn’t avoid a fraudulent transfer to the IRS unless a real-world creditor could have sued the government outside bankruptcy—a reading unsupported by the Code’s text or precedent like Moore v. Bay. Kunkel rightly critiques this move as doctrinally inconsistent and practically damaging. It ignores the in rem nature of avoidance actions and undermines the estate’s ability to recover fraudulent transfers. The result? A potent shift in favor of federal creditors, at the expense of bankruptcy's core goal: equitable distribution to all. With proper attribution, please share this post. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document a_mill_of_miller_examining_the_supreme_courts_recent_bankruptcy_jurisprudence.pdf (153.85 KB) Category Law Reviews & Studies

Economics Review: Jain, Jash, Are hospital bills hazardous to your financial health? (May 31, 2024)

Economics Review: Jain, Jash, Are hospital bills hazardous to your financial health? (May 31, 2024) Ed Boltz Wed, 07/23/2025 - 17:29 Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5315512 Abstract: This paper studies the effect of hospital prices on the financial health of individuals. I construct a novel zip-level measure of prices hospitals charge for their services using detailed healthcare micro-data and state hospital cost reports obtained via a series of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. Using an instrumental variable strategy that captures insurers' market power, the findings reveal a causal link between higher hospital prices and adverse financial outcomes, including a rise in personal bankruptcy filings, reduced demand and increased application denials for home mortgages, and increased use of credit cards and home equity line of credit. I provide evidence that these results are not driven by declining income, deteriorating health, or over-utilization of health services in the local area. I show that such price increases disproportionately impact areas with individuals particularly exposed to healthcare prices, such as areas with a higher percentage of uninsured individuals, lower Medicare/Medicaid enrollment, and areas with a higher population concentration of people of color. Furthermore, I show that home equity mitigates some of these effects. The results are robust to alternative specifications and the use of an alternative instrument that exploits price changes induced by hospital peer effects in a geographic area. Commentary: In “Are Hospital Bills Hazardous to Your Financial Health?”, economist Jash Jain confirms with empirical rigor what bankruptcy attorneys have long witnessed in client interviews and court filings: a hospital visit—insured or not—can easily spiral into unpayable debt, aggressive collections, and eventual bankruptcy. Using linked data from hospital discharges and consumer credit reports, Jain demonstrates that nearly 18% of nonelderly insured adults are subject to debt collection within a year of hospitalization. These aren’t edge cases—they are the modal experience of being a patient in the American healthcare system. Jain’s findings dovetail with earlier work by Elizabeth Warren, who—well before her Senate career—documented that medical issues are among the most common contributors to bankruptcy filings. In her landmark studies, Warren found that over a third of consumer bankruptcies were tied to medical debt, income loss due to illness, or both, even among families with insurance. Jain’s paper provides a compelling postscript: the situation hasn’t improved; if anything, the mechanisms of medical debt collection have grown faster and more punitive. Key insights from Jain’s study include: Medical collections start fast and early: The debt collection curve steepens within 60 days post-discharge, often before patients have even received an itemized bill or had a chance to dispute charges. Collections follow hospitalization with startling regularity, raising the median patient’s unpaid medical debt by $349—even among those with Medicaid or private insurance. Insurance does not insulate patients from financial harm: The presence of coverage is not sufficient to prevent collection activity; in fact, Jain finds high collection rates even among Medicaid patients, suggesting systemic failures in billing, adjudication, or charity care screening. The patient’s financial condition is often worse, not just because of the bill—but because of the illness: Time off work, loss of income, and the physical inability to manage finances all converge at precisely the time the billing clock starts ticking. As Warren’s earlier work made clear, it is the intersection of medical and economic vulnerability that drives the majority of “medical bankruptcies.” Jain also notes that these financial harms are unevenly distributed—Black patients, publicly insured patients, and those from poorer ZIP codes are more likely to experience collections. This suggests not just a health care affordability crisis, but a civil justice and equity crisis as well. For practitioners in North Carolina and elsewhere, Jain’s paper lends new weight to what’s often buried in the schedules of a Chapter 7 or 13: hospital bills that outlast the illness, frustrate reasonable negotiation, and are quickly weaponized by third-party collectors. In many cases, filing bankruptcy is the patient’s only meaningful opportunity to respond to a hospital’s financial demands—one of the few forums where the imbalance of power between debtor and provider can be recalibrated, at least modestly. In short, Jain’s paper validates Warren’s long standing argument: medical debt is not just a symptom of bankruptcy —it is a cause of it. And for too many American families, the road from ER to 341 meeting is far shorter than policymakers would like to admit. With proper attribution, please share this post. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document are_hospital_bills_hazardous_to_your_financial_health.pdf (790.24 KB) Category Law Reviews & Studies

Bankr. M.D.N.C.: Oral Ruling Summary – Napper v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. - Denial of 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss related to Improper Dual Mortgage Records

Bankr. M.D.N.C.: Oral Ruling Summary – Napper v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. - Denial of 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss related to Improper Dual Mortgage Records Ed Boltz Tue, 07/22/2025 - 18:12 Summary: In a thorough oral ruling from the bench ( a Google transcription of which is attach- use with caution!), Judge Lena James denied Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc.’s (“SPS”) defense under Rule 12(b)(6), holding that plaintiff Bonita Napper plausibly alleged violations of Bankruptcy Rule 3002.1, the automatic stay under § 362, and the North Carolina Debt Collection Act. The ruling cleared the case to proceed into discovery. 1. Rule 3002.1(i) – Inaccurate Cure Response Judge James rejected SPS’s argument that Rule 3002.1(i) sanctions only apply when no response is filed. Even though SPS had filed a Response to Notice of Final Cure, it was inaccurate and incomplete. The judge emphasized that: “Filing a notice containing incorrect statements can be as damaging as failing to file such notice timely.” Citing Harlow, Ferrell, and other persuasive decisions, Judge James found an implicit requirement of accuracy and transparency in Rule 3002.1(g). She held that Napper plausibly alleged that SPS misrepresented the account’s status and omitted key payment details, triggering remedies under 3002.1(i) including fee-shifting and evidentiary preclusion. 2. § 362(a) Stay Violation – Misapplied Payments & Coercion The Court found the complaint stated a plausible claim for willful violation of the automatic stay. SPS allegedly misapplied plan payments, told the debtor she was behind when she wasn’t, and then used that misrepresentation to try to collect an additional payment. The judge cited Mann v. Chase Manhattan but distinguished it, noting this was no mere internal bookkeeping error: “The defendant acted to exercise improper control over estate property... and communicated the resulting inaccurate balance to the plaintiff.” Judge James further concluded that Napper had also plausibly pled a § 362(a)(6) violation. SPS allegedly told her it would not remove the bankruptcy designation from her mortgage account unless she signed a reaffirmation agreement — a tactic Judge James noted could be considered “sufficiently threatening or coercive” depending on the facts developed in discovery. 3. North Carolina Debt Collection Act Claim While filing a proof of claim alone is not “debt collection,” Judge James ruled that SPS’s direct postpetition communications demanding payment for a month already paid, along with its reaffirmation-related pressure, could support a claim under the NCDCA: “Such direct attempts can constitute an attempt to collect a debt sufficient to meet the required element for a claim under the NCDCA.” Judge James concluded that all claims were sufficiently pled to proceed. She acknowledged that the dollar value of damages might not be high but emphasized the legal sufficiency of the allegations — particularly the seriousness of misapplied payments, misrepresentations to the debtor and the Court, and improper coercive tactics following plan completion. Commentary: Great work by Craig Shapiro and Wes Schollander! Keep your fingers crossed for their continued success. In rejecting that defense, Judge James aligned squarely with a powerful recent decision out of her sister court in the Western District: In re Peach (W.D.N.C., March 2025, Judge Laura Beyer). There, Judge Beyer sanctioned Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing for precisely the same pattern of conduct: using vague mortgage statements, hidden fees, and noncompliance with Rule 3002.1 to sow confusion, extract charges, and preserve claims for future collection. As Judge Beyer made clear: “Shellpoint must file an FRBP 3002.1 notice... regardless of whether it intends to collect the fees during the case or at some point in the future. A contrary holding would frustrate the purpose of the rule and be a tremendous disservice to debtors.” — In re Peach, at ¶ 32 That sentiment echoes Judge James’s reasoning in Napper, where she held that an inaccurate or misleading response under Rule 3002.1(g) is not just procedurally insufficient—it strikes at the heart of the Chapter 13 system. Both judges correctly identify that Rule 3002.1 is a transparency tool, not a procedural technicality. With proper attribution, please share this post. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document bench_ruling_mtd_12b6_denied_mortgage_servicing_violations_2020.05.22.pdf (28.07 KB) Document 2025-05-19_order_incorporating_bench_ruling.pdf (329.81 KB) Document napper_12b6.pdf (298.11 KB) Document napper_oppostion_to_12b6.pdf (769.34 KB) Category Middle District

Working Paper: Papich, Sarah- Do Employer Credit Check Bans Increase Default? (May 05, 2025)

Working Paper: Papich, Sarah- Do Employer Credit Check Bans Increase Default? (May 05, 2025) Ed Boltz Mon, 07/21/2025 - 19:47 Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5242161 Abstract Employers often perform credit checks on prospective employees. Twelve states have banned this practice with the goal of improving employment prospects for individuals with poor credit histories. An unintended consequence of these bans is that they reduce the incentive to repay debt. This paper provides the first causal evidence of how pre-employment credit check bans (PECCBs) affect debt repayment. I find that PECCBs increase the probability of bankruptcy by 0.9 percentage points on average, equivalent to a 17.6% increase from the mean. The probabilities of past-due accounts and collections are unaffected on average, but heterogeneity by credit score prior to treatment shows that these probabilities increase among all consumers except those with the lowest scores. These findings show that consumers are sensitive to changes in the penalty for default, especially when they are deciding whether to file bankruptcy. Commentary: Sarah Papich’s working paper makes the bold claim that pre-employment credit check bans (PECCBs) lead to a 17.6% increase in bankruptcy filings. The suggestion is that by removing a potential employment penalty, these bans lower the "cost" of default—encouraging more strategic bankruptcy filings, particularly among consumers with mid- to high-range credit scores. But from a bankruptcy practitioner’s perspective, this analysis leaves out several crucial elements: 1. 11 U.S.C. § 525(b) Already Prohibits Certain Employment Discrimination: Papich’s premise is that PECCBs uniquely shield job applicants from negative credit information—particularly bankruptcy—being used against them in hiring decisions. But this overlooks the fact that § 525(b) of the Bankruptcy Code already prohibits private employers from terminating or discriminating against an employee solely because they filed for bankruptcy. While the statute doesn’t extend to hiring decisions, its existence undermines the idea that bankruptcy is, across the board, a signal of “irresponsibility” to employers. Congress has already taken steps to prevent such stigma in the workplace—something the paper does not acknowledge. 2. Bankruptcy Is Not Taken Lightly: Characterizing post-PECCB bankruptcies as “strategic” also feels untethered from day-to-day consumer bankruptcy practice and falls prey to flawed assumptions that debtors are merely homo economicus, making perfectly rational, self-interested decisions to consistently maximize their personal gain or utility. Most Chapter 7 and 13 filings arise from life events—job loss, illness, divorce—and a gut-wrenching decision, not clever calculations about employment incentives. Even if some consumers become slightly more willing to file because the perceived consequences are less dire, that doesn’t make those filings frivolous. It might mean the system is working: consumers finally see a clearer path to both financial and occupational recovery. 3. Bankruptcy Makes for Better Employees—Even the Military Thinks So Contrary to the stigma, employees who file bankruptcy often become more reliable workers. By shedding the stress and chaos of unmanageable debt—wage garnishments, creditor harassment, and financial stress—filers regain focus and stability. Bankruptcy offers the kind of clean slate that allows people to show up fully in their jobs. Even the Department of Defense recognizes this. Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, unpaid debts can trigger discipline or loss of security clearance. But filing bankruptcy? That’s often seen as a responsible step toward financial recovery. In fact, DoD clearance adjudicators routinely favor bankruptcy over default. If the military trusts bankruptcy filers with national security, civilian employers should too. 4. Bankruptcy Attorneys Should Support PECCBs Far from being a problem, PECCBs help reduce the very employment stigma that keeps people trapped in cycles of debt. Consumer bankruptcy attorneys should welcome PECCBs as public policy that aligns with the core promise of bankruptcy: the fresh start. Bankruptcy isn't just about discharging debt—it’s about restoring access to opportunity. When job applicants are excluded because of credit histories that often reflect structural hardship more than personal failure, it undermines the rehabilitative function of bankruptcy itself. Banning credit checks in hiring expands economic participation and reduces the shame and fear surrounding bankruptcy—making it a more effective tool, not a more reckless one. While this paper’s quantitative rigor is valuable, its framing risks reinforcing the myth that consumer bankruptcy is driven by gamesmanship rather than necessity. More importantly, it fails to consider that PECCBs complement, rather than conflict with, the Bankruptcy Code’s protective spirit. For those of us working with debtors every day, that’s not a flaw in the policy—it’s the whole point. See the attached for States with Pre-Employment Credit Check Bans With proper attribution, please share this post. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document do_employer_credit_check_bans_increase_default.pdf (3.63 MB) Document peccb_states_list.pdf (2.43 KB) Category Law Reviews & Studies

4th Cir.: Tiber Creek Partners v. Ellume USA- Bankruptcy in the Land Down Under

4th Cir.: Tiber Creek Partners v. Ellume USA- Bankruptcy in the Land Down Under Ed Boltz Fri, 07/18/2025 - 18:20 Summary: Tiber Creek Partners, a Virginia-based consulting firm, helped Ellume Ltd.—an Australian biotech company—and its U.S. subsidiary secure over $260 million in COVID testing contracts from Uncle Sam. When Ellume didn’t pay up, Tiber Creek sued in its home forum, the Eastern District of Virginia. But the district court dismissed the case on forum non conveniens grounds, and the Fourth Circuit just affirmed, sending the whole affair packing to Australia faster than you can sing “Waltzing Matilda.” Tiber Creek filed two suits: Ellume I: A breach of contract action against Ellume USA Ellume II: A fraud case alleging that Ellume and its execs improperly shifted liability to the insolvent parent The catch? Ellume Ltd. had entered voluntary administration (Australia’s version of Chapter 11 and definitely not a Kangaroo Court), and Tiber Creek had already filed a claim there. Most of the key witnesses, documents, and dirty laundry were in the land down under. Plus, several of the relevant contracts—including a Deed of Variation and a 2022 Services Agreement—were governed by Australian law and designated Australian courts as the forum of choice. The district court said, essentially, “This is an Australian matter for Australian courts,” and dismissed both suits without prejudice. The Fourth Circuit agreed: even though Tiber Creek sued in its home forum (which generally gets strong deference), the ties to Australia were just too strong to ignore. Otherwise, they reasoned, you’d have courts on two continents litigating overlapping issues. And if that’s not a logistical Foster’s-fueled headache, what is? Tiber Creek protested that it was being ousted from its own backyard and that Ellume USA was a domestic defendant. But the majority wasn’t buying it. Instead, they held that consolidating both cases in Australia was the more efficient and fair approach—even if it meant the Virginia-based plaintiff got knocked down. In dissent, Judge Richardson channeled his inner Crocodile Dundee and scoffed at the majority’s “that’s not a forum—this is a forum” analysis. He emphasized that a citizen suing in its home court should only be bounced if keeping the case would be truly oppressive to the defendants, not merely less convenient. He summed it up as “a result that defies common sense”—like drinking tea without milk or calling flip-flops “thongs.” Commentary: The court’s holding is a walkabout through some thorny terrain of international contracts, forum selection clauses, and foreign insolvency. Though unpublished, this opinion quietly broadens the power of forum non conveniens when foreign bankruptcy is lurking in the background—even without Chapter 15 recognition. The court treated the Australian voluntary administration (and later liquidation) as a meaningful factor, despite no formal recognition of it under U.S. law. Apparently, if you come from a land down under, that’s jurisdiction enough. Also notable: the panel relied heavily on the contractual terms pointing toward Australia, even though Tiber Creek tried to sue only the U.S. subsidiary. Moral of the story? If your consulting agreement is vague about who owes you money, and you’ve signed later documents governed by foreign law, don’t be shocked if the judge tells you to take your invoice walk 500 hundred miles (and then walk 500 more). Yet perhaps the real legacy of this case lies in its narrative arc. After all, Tiber Creek thought it was collecting U.S. taxpayer money from a U.S. company, in a U.S. court. So with the dismissal being without prejudice, there’s still a chance Tiber Creek reboots the fight in Australia. So don’t count them out just yet since in the immortal words of Chumbawamba they might “get knocked down, but .. get up again, you're never gonna keep me down...” With proper attribution, please share this post. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document tiber_creek_partners_v._ellume_usa.pdf (180.11 KB) Category 4th Circuit Court of Appeals

4th Cir. : Jackson v. Bankruptcy Administrator- Dismissal of Pro See Appeal

4th Cir. : Jackson v. Bankruptcy Administrator- Dismissal of Pro See Appeal Ed Boltz Thu, 07/17/2025 - 16:31 Summary: Carlos Andre Jackson, a pro se debtor, inexplicably filed a full-blown Chapter 11 without a lawyer in March 2024. The filing was defective from the start: he failed to complete prepetition credit counseling (violating § 109(h)), filed incomplete schedules, didn’t comply with § 343 at the § 341 meeting, and missed reporting deadlines. Despite numerous continuances and leniency from the court, he never retained counsel or cured the deficiencies. On June 11, 2024, the bankruptcy court dismissed the case with prejudice and barred Jackson from refiling for 180 days from that date, citing bad faith and likely refiling. Jackson appealed, but the Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Commentary: Here’s the catch: the 180-day bar expired on December 8, 2024. Since the court didn’t tie the bar to the outcome of appeals, the restriction appears to have lapsed—even though Jackson was still litigating in mid-2025. Takeaway: While the court aimed to curb abuse, it could have extended the bar through the conclusion of appeals. As it stands, Jackson may now be eligible to refile—though any new case would certainly face serious scrutiny. That said, any creditors that have slept on their rights (since there was no stay pending appeal) for more than a year, so perhaps Mr. Jackson could propose, with the assistance of counsel, a Chapter 13 case. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document in_re_jackson-_dismissal_with_prejudice.pdf (171.32 KB) Document jackson_v._bankruptcy_administrator_circuit.pdf (109.99 KB) Document jackson_v._bankruptcy_administrator_district.pdf (125.81 KB) Category 4th Circuit Court of Appeals

Bankr. W.D.Va.: In re Sorrells- Modification of Chapter 13 plan following Inhertitance

Bankr. W.D.Va.: In re Sorrells- Modification of Chapter 13 plan following Inhertitance Stafford Patterson Tue, 07/15/2025 - 17:50 Summary: Steven and Christina Sorrells were near the end of their 50-month Chapter 13 plan, having made regular payments totaling a 39% dividend to unsecured creditors. After Steven Sorrells received a net $26,236 from an inherited IRA—funds he intended to use to pay off the plan early—the Chapter 13 trustee instead moved to modify the plan to require a 100% dividend to unsecured creditors, citing a substantial and unanticipated improvement in the debtors’ financial condition. The Bankruptcy Court, applying In re Murphy, 474 F.3d 143 (4th Cir. 2007), partially granted the trustee’s motion. The court found that receipt of the IRA funds was indeed a substantial and unanticipated change in financial condition, piercing the res judicata effect of the confirmed plan. However, the court rejected the trustee’s argument that the debtors’ unliquidated claim to a future inheritance also justified modification. Notably, the court did not rubber-stamp the trustee’s request for the full $30,000 lump sum. Recognizing the debtors’ modest lifestyle, deferred home maintenance, and legitimate household needs, the court limited the required modification to $14,986—deducting $11,250 for necessary repairs (truck inspection, furnace replacement, driveway repair) from the IRA funds. Commentary: In a decision that balances fidelity to the Bankruptcy Code with practical realism, Judge Connelly provides a nuanced roadmap for post-confirmation plan modifications under § 1329. While reaffirming Murphy’s substantial-and-unanticipated-change test, the court carefully distinguishes between liquid and illiquid post-confirmation assets—declining to modify the plan based on a mere inchoate expectancy in a probate estate. Of particular note is the court’s insistence that feasibility under §1325(a)(6) cannot be met through hypothetical access to assets. For example, the court noted that if the Sorrells "had the IRA remained in an illiquid form, it would not render the same effect on his financial condition". (Virginia, unlike North Carolina, does not appear to allow the exemption of inherited IRAs. See In re Hall, 559 B.R. 679 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2016) versus N.C.G.S. § 1C-1601(a)(9) and In re Brooks.) By crediting the debtors' actual household needs—car repairs, heat in winter, and safe ingress/egress—the court offers a reminder that bankruptcy is meant to rehabilitate, not punish. The opinion does also include a caution for Chapter 13 trustees, as Judge Connelly (herself having served as a Chapter 13 Trustee before taking the bench) describes the tenor of the Chapter 13 trustee's argument as " disproportionate to the facts". While in this case that rhetoric did not cross the line, it was still evaluated for whether it violated the obligation under §1325(a)(3) that a motion to modify be brought in good faith. That expectation of good faith applies to Trustees, not just debtors. Consumer bankruptcy practitioners should also take heed of this footnote-worthy clarification: § 1327 vests property in the debtor free and clear of claims, meaning postconfirmation asset acquisition does not ipso facto trigger modification. In rejecting the trustee’s overreach, the court reaffirms the Chapter 13 bargain—creditors get their due, but debtors retain some hope of financial stability. This case offers an excellent example of how careful recordkeeping, transparency, and updated schedules (even mid-plan) can inoculate debtors from trustee accusations of bad faith or nondisclosure. Debtor’s counsel did well to preserve credibility, enabling the court to adopt a measured approach rather than imposing the draconian remedy sought by the trustee. It follows the logic from In re Adams, where the debtors were, in addition to their exemptions, entitled to keep the portion of the proceeds from the sale of their home resulting from the pay-down of the mortgage during their Chapter 13 case. It also offers a persuasive counterweight to Carroll v. Logan, 735 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 2013), distinguishing between property-of-the-estate status and feasibility or necessity of modification. This is a valuable decision for Chapter 13 attorneys navigating the increasingly common terrain of post-confirmation inheritances and other windfalls. The court's refusal to apply a blanket rule in favor of 100% plan funding from such assets will resonate with consumer practitioners throughout the Fourth Circuit. With proper attribution, please share this post. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document in_re_sorrells.pdf (857.5 KB) Category Western District