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Room to Breathe: The Ninth Circuit Decides that a Trustee’s Avoidance Powers Preempt State Law Statutes of Repose

It is well settled that state law statutes of limitations do not affect a trustee’s ability to bring fraudulent transfer actions, so long as the limitations period has not expired before the petition date.[1] Assuming that the limitations period has not expired, the limitations period essentially freezes, and the bankruptcy trustee has two years of “breathing room” to investigate and bring fraudulent transfer claims.[2]

In Hellas II, Second Circuit Finds “Intent” Key to Limiting Safe Harbor Under 11 U.S.C. § 546(e)

In December 2014, attorneys and financial advisors serving both unsecured creditors’ committees and trustees watched as the Second Circuit expanded the “safe-harbor” provision available to defendants in certain clawback litigations. The safe-harbor provision was designed by Congress to protect certain securities and other transactions including “settlement payments” from avoidance actions. In 11 U.S.C. 546(e),[1] the Bankruptcy Code sets forth that a trustee may not avoid a transfer that was a settlement payment to (or for the benefit of) a broker or financial institution, or for a payment made in connection with a securities contract.

Expanding the Safe Harbor of § 546(e): Securitized Loan Payments Are Shielded from Avoidance

In a case of first impression, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois recently held that loan payments related to a two-tiered securitization structure are protected from avoidance by 11 U.S.C. § 546(e). Specifically, in Krol v. Key Bank National Association (In re MCK Millennium Centre Parking LLC),[1] the court held that the debtor’s payments on a nondebtor affiliate’s loan, which had been transferred into a trust as part of a commercial mortgage-backed securitization, were made “in connection with a securities contract” under § 546(e) and, therefore, were not avoidable as preferential or constructively fraudulent transfers.

“Broadcasting Lies”: Broadcaster Liability in Consumer Fraud, Part 1

Two recent cases suggest that broadcasters who advertise a debtor’s fraudulent business may be vulnerable to § 548 claims. If the broadcaster received notice of the debtor’s fraudulent business practices, it may lack good faith. Yet a recent decision from the Fifth Circuit suggests that even if good faith exists, advertising that grew the debtor’s fraud does not provide reasonably equivalent value. In this first of two articles, good faith is addressed.

Commercial Fraud Committee Member Spotlight - Richard Lauter

In this edition of the Commercial Fraud Committee Newsletter, we introduce a new feature: an interview with a Commercial Fraud Committee member. Our inaugural interviewee is Richard Lauter, Commercial Fraud Committee Chair. Rich is a partner at Freeborn & Peters LLP in Chicago, where he leads his firm’s Bankruptcy and Restructuring Group. We sat down with Rich and asked him some questions regarding his involvement in ABI and the Commercial Fraud Committee in general. The following is an excerpt of our discussion.

Minnesota Supreme Court Rejects Presumption that Ponzi Schemes Are Insolvent as a Matter of Law

Over the past several years, creditors, bankruptcy trustees and receivers have used § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code and the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA) to “claw back” amounts paid to winning investors in a Ponzi scheme (i.e., payments made to investors greater than their investment). In such cases, several courts have held that once the plaintiff proves the existence of a Ponzi scheme, then it is presumed that the transfers were made with the actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud the transferor’s creditors.

For Good-Faith Defense to Shield a Transferee from a Fraudulent Transfer Avoidance Claim, Transferor Must Receive Reasonably Equivalent Value

A series of recent Tenth Circuit decisions illustrate the potential pitfalls defendants face in relying on the good faith and subsequent transferee defenses in fraudulent transfer avoidance claims.[1] In both cases, law firms were required to return fees they had undisputedly earned. The fees were determined to have been fraudulent transfers because the firm, although paid by the transferor, did not perform legal services on behalf of the transferor, but rather for third parties.