In order to confirm a plan under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor must satisfy the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8) or show the court that the plan “does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable, with respect to each class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan.” [1] While there are several options for satisfying the fair and equitable standard as to secured claims, dirt-for-debt cases focus specifically on providing secured creditors with the indubitable equivalent of their claims under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) and typically involve real estate collateral [2].
In a dirt-for-debt plan, a debtor proposes to surrender all or a portion of a secured creditor’s collateral to satisfy all or a portion of the debt owed to the creditor, and must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the value of the surrendered collateral equals or exceeds the value of the secured claim or credit sought [3]. In reality, however, the debtor’s burden is often much greater, as “indubitable” requires that there be no doubt that the creditor will be paid in full [4]. While the statutory language is relatively straightforward, application of the indubitable equivalence standard can be nuanced and fact-intensive, as a court must determine whether a secured creditor’s treatment is “adequate to both compensate the secured creditor for the value of its secured claim, and also ensure the integrity of the creditor's collateral position.” [5]
Traditional Dirt-for-Debt Scenarios
Courts have long held that a transfer of all of the collateral securing a single secured creditor’s claim meets the indubitable-equivalent requirement under § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) [6]. After all, receipt of the collateral itself, by definition, provides the creditor with the full value of its secured claim [7].
However, the analysis is not always that simple, particularly when creditors are vastly oversecured [8], when there are competing liens on the underlying collateral [9], and when debtors seek to cherry-pick collateral for surrender in partial dirt-for-debt plans.
Valuation Issues in Partial Dirt-for-Debt Cases
Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) requires a deb tor to provide the indubitable equivalent of a creditor’s secured claim only, and thus, valuation of the underlying collateral under 11 U.S.C. § 506 plays a critical role in dirt-for-debt cases [10].
Section 506(a)(1) states that the “value [of a secured creditor’s collateral] shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such creditor’s interest.” [11] In other words, there is no fixed valuation approach, and a court must examine the particular facts of each case to determine which valuation method is most appropriate [12]. While a sale is not required to determine value in this context, market factors must be taken into account by the bankruptcy court [13]. Valuation for purposes of § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) is determined as of the date of plan confirmation [14].
Whatever the valuation method employed, courts take a conservative approach to valuation under the strict indubitable-equivalent standard, leaving ample margin for error in favor of the secured creditor to account for the increased risk to the secured creditor and to ensure full payment of the secured claim [15]. Under this framework, courts typically apply liquidation or market value analyses, often with modifications for delay or sale costs, taking into account the “highest and best use” of the property (i.e., that use which is reasonably available that will result in the highest realized value) [16].
Generally, a liquidation analysis is applied in circumstances where it is almost certain that surrender of the collateral will result in liquidation of the collateral by the lender. For example, in In re Simons, the purpose of the disposition was to return undeveloped rural land parcels, best used for recreation or ranching, to the creditor as an adjacent landowner who would need to liquidate the property to be compensated for his claim [17]. The court applied a liquidation value analysis, adding a 10% deduction in the property’s liquidation value to account for costs of sale [18].
Likewise, in In re Invs. Lending Grp. LLC, the court held that “[i]f a proposal before the Court is to surrender property in whole or in part, then a foreclosure or liquidation type value is the proper standard,” and denied confirmation where the determined liquidation value did not provide a sufficient equity cushion to the secured creditor after an 8% reduction for costs of sale [19]. In the chapter 12 case of In re Holland, the court found it inappropriate to use a fair market value for cramdown purposes where the debtor proposed to surrender ranch acreage and buildings to its bank creditor in satisfaction of secured debt, as the bank was not in the ranching business, and “the possibility of forced liquidation would be assumed and a deduction for selling costs would be logical” under such circumstances [20].
In contrast, a fair market value has been used in cases where commercial markets exist for a brokered sale and marketing of the collateral, usually with a reduction in value based on the projected costs of the sale. In In re Stockbridge Properties I, the court found that a fair market value appraisal was more probative of the value of undeveloped commercial lots than the fair value appraisal (or duress appraisal), which provided and modified the fair market value appraisal to reflect a projected delay in sale and costs associated with the same [21]. The court made a similar finding in In re Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co., holding that the lower court “did not err in selecting fair market value (as opposed to liquidation value) as the appropriate measure of value” where the lender stated that the collateral real estate could be sold in a commercially reasonable manner, without the need for foreclosure [22]. In In re Bate Land & Timber LLC, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s findings after it considered testimony from appraisers, loggers, bankers, soil analysts and other creditors over 10 hearings, including testimony relating to topography, average days on the market of property in the area, the economic climate of the location of the properties, and the economic history of the particular tracts, to determine the highest and best use of the land and fair market valuation based on the same [23].
Despite having multiple methodologies available for valuation, wide variances in proposed valuations of the parties may result in a lack of certainty such that a court is unable to find indubitable equivalence, sending the parties back to the drawing board. For example, in In re Arnold & Baker Farms, the Ninth Circuit held that because the per-acre valuations presented to the bankruptcy court were so far apart, the court could not determine, without a doubt, that the secured creditor would realize the indubitable equivalent of its secured claim upon disposition of the collateral surrendered [24].
Additionally, the Central District of California’s recent opinion in In re Fleming reopened a court’s determination of value after sale, finding that equitable mootness did not apply under the facts of the case [25]. In In re Fleming, the bankruptcy court issued a determination of value in connection with 46 unfinished lots in a real estate development, finding that selling the lots individually would be the commercially reasonable method of disposition, and that transfer of the lots to the objecting secured creditor met the indubitable-equivalence standard using a present-day value methodology as of April 2019 [26].
The Ninth Circuit BAP subsequently vacated the confirmation order and remanded the case to the bankruptcy court, but only after the subject collateral was transferred to the secured lender [27]. The debtor ultimately proposed a new plan approximately two years later that sought to offset the secured creditor’s claim using the court’s April 2019 value of the surrendered collateral, and such plan was again confirmed over the secured creditor’s objection [28]. The secured creditor appealed the bankruptcy court’s order confirming the later plan, arguing that the April 2019 valuation did not account for the holding and sale costs that were incurred by the lender and did not provide the indubitable equivalent of the secured creditor’s claim [29].
The district court held that the later plan was not fair and equitable, as its use of the April 2019 value to reduce the secured creditor’s remaining claim failed to account for holding costs, discounted cash flow, or associated risk incurred by the secured creditor and could not support a dollar-for-dollar reduction of the secured claim [30]. In finding the same, the court noted that because the secured creditor chose to sell the lots in a bulk sale, and not individually, the secured creditor was not entitled to the cash equivalent of its shortfall, but rather some other lesser amount to be determined by the bankruptcy court [31].
Key Takeaways
Dirt-for-debt cases demonstrate the broad risk to secured creditors associated with a return of collateral in cramdown scenarios and highlight the value of trusted experts in determining value in light of all possible uses of the collateral, both in lending and in defending claims in the context of a dirt-for-debt plan. Additionally, secured creditors must consider projected costs and methods of disposition in their valuation analyses to effectively protect their interests. Likewise, because the indubitable-equivalent standard is so high, debtors’ counsel should consider the same factors in fashioning relief under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) to increase the likelihood of plan confirmation in dirt-for-debt cases.
[1] 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1).
[2] See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii). “[T]he concept of indubitable equivalence is rooted in the language of In re Murel Holding Corp., in which the court stated that ‘a creditor who fears the safety of his principal will scarcely be content with ... [interest payments alone]; he wishes to get his money or at least the property. We see no reason to suppose that the statute was intended to deprive him of that ... unless by a substitute of the most indubitable equivalence.’” Matter of Sandy Ridge Dev. Corp., 881 F.2d 1346, 1350 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d 941, 942 (2d Cir. 1935)).
[3] In re Arnold & Baker Farms, 177 B.R. 648, 654 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994), aff'd, 85 F.3d 1415 (9th Cir. 1996) (collecting cases); Matter of Briscoe Enterprises Ltd., II, 994 F.2d 1160, 1165 (5th Cir. 1993).
[4] In re Walat Farms Inc., 70 B.R. 330, 334 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987) (“Indubitable” means “too evident to be doubted,” citing Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1985)). See also In re CRB Partners LLC, 2013 WL 796566, at *6 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. March 4, 2013); In re Prosperity Park LLC, 2011 WL 1878210, at *4 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. May 17, 2011); In re 431 W. Ponce De Leon LLC, 515 B.R. 660, 682 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2014).
[5] In re Bate Land & Timber LLC, 877 F.3d 188, 192 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing 4-506 Collier on Bankruptcy § 506.03 (16th ed. 2017)).
[6] Sandy Ridge, 881 F.2d at 1354 (“In situations involving only one creditor and one debtor, the value of the undersecured creditor's secured claim is simply the value of the underlying collateral” … “common sense tells us that property is the indubitable equivalent of itself.”); In re Arnold & Baker Farms, 85 F.3d 1415, 1423 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[A] creditor necessarily receives the indubitable equivalent of its secured claim when it receives the collateral securing that claim, regardless of how the court values the collateral.”); CRB Partners, 2013 WL 796566, at *4 (“There is little question that plans proposing to surrender all property to which a lien attaches are ‘fair and equitable’ and the creditor in such cases receives the indubitable equivalent of its secured claim.”) (citation omitted).
[7] Id. See also 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1).
[8] See In re Future Energy Corp., 83 B.R. 470, 495 at n. 39 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (exacting indubitable equivalence standard “necessarily include[s] a margin for error, i.e., a surplus of value, so that realization of equivalence would be indubitable. A plan of this type could not be crammed down over the objection of junior dissenting creditors,” as “overpayment of senior creditors is violative of the fair and equitable standard”).
[9] Walat Farms Inc., 70 B.R. at 337 (denying confirmation of plan that sought to surrender portions of real estate collateral to satisfy debt of both its first and second lienholders, denying first lienholder recourse against entirety of collateral should its portion result in sale proceeds insufficient to satisfy its secured claim).
[10] Arnold & Baker Farms, 85 F.3d at 1423 (citing Sandy Ridge, 881 F.2d at 1350).
[11] 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1).
[12] See In re Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co., 2 F.3d 1151, 1993 WL 309734, at *7 (6th Cir. 1993) (“‘Value’ does not necessarily contemplate forced sale or liquidation value of the collateral; nor does it always imply a full going concern value. Courts will have to determine value on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the facts of each case and the competing interests in the case.”) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 356 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5787, 6312). See also S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 68, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5787, 5854.
[13] Sandy Ridge, 881 F.2d at 1354 (citing Matter of Texas Extrusion Corp., 844 F.2d 1142, 1164 (5th Cir. 1988)).
[14] See In re Heritage Highgate Inc., 679 F.3d 132, 143 n.9 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Where, as here, the purpose of the valuation is to determine the treatment of a claim by a plan, the values determined at the § 506(a) hearing must be compatible with the values that will prevail on the confirmation date . . . .”) (quotation omitted); In re Atlanta S. Bus. Park Ltd., 173 B.R. 444, 450 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994); Prosperity Park, 2011 WL 1878210, at *4 (requiring “the indubitable equivalence of a cash payment on the date of confirmation”); In re Elm Creek Joint Venture, 93 B.R. 105, 111 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988) (same).
[15] Bate Land & Timber, 877 F.3d at 197 (“The bankruptcy court weighs the qualifications, credibility, and conclusions of each party's expert” and, “in an effort to hedge the uncertainty inherent in property valuation … courts are instructed to take a conservative approach to determining fair market value.”). See also In re Investors Lending Grp. LLC, 489 B.R. 307, 314 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2013) (“[T]he decision must be so conservatively or sparingly applied as to ensure that the lender forced over its objection to accept property in satisfaction of a claim receives the indubitable equivalent of cash.”); In re Simons, 113 B.R. 942, 947 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990) (“[V]aluation is not an exact science, and the chance for error always exists. A conservative approach should, therefore, be taken in order to protect the secured creditor in this regard.”); In re Bannerman Holdings LLC, 2010 WL 4260003, at *4 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Oct. 20, 2010) (“In a contested confirmation hearing, the court's assessment of the evidence indicative of value should be conservative, in light of the uncertainties involved.”). “[A dirt-for-debt plan] shifts the burden of sale of the [property] from the Debtors to the secured creditor. By doing so, the Debtors have shifted the risk of loss as well as the potential for gain, to the secured creditor … the secured claimant will not be earning interest on this portion of the secured claim until such time as the property is sold and converted to cash … valuation is not an exact science, and the chance for error always exists.” In re CRB Partners LLC, 2013 WL 796566 at *4 (After determining that the value of the property was only slightly more than the lender’s claim, the court held that such a cushion was not enough to “ensure the safety of or prevent jeopardy to the principal”).
[16] See Bate Land & Timber, 877 F.3d at 193 (“In valuing property, a bankruptcy court may choose to consider a property's ‘highest and best use’ instead of its current physical condition.”); In re Park Forest Dev. Corp., 197 B.R. 388, 397 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996); In re Stockbridge Properties I Ltd., 141 B.R. 469, 471–72 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992); In re Thoburn Ltd. P’ship, 513 B.R. 887, 888 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2013); In re Sailboat Props. LLC, 2011 WL 1299301, at *2 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 2011).
[17] Simons, 113 B.R. at 947.
[18] Id.
[19] Investors Lending Group, 489 B.R. at 315.
[20] In re Holland, 2019 WL 2895278, at *9 (Bankr. D. Idaho July 3, 2019).
[21] Stockbridge Properties I, 141 B.R. at 472.
[22] In re Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co., 2 F.3d 1151, 1993 WL 309734 at *7 (6th Cir. 1993).
[23] Bate Land & Timber LLC, 877 F.3d at 198–99.
[24] Arnold & Baker Farms, 85 F.3d at 1424.
[25] In re Fleming, 2022 WL 1605376, at *8 (C.D. Cal. May 20, 2022).
[26] Id. at *2.
[27] Id.
[28] Id. at *3.
[29] Id. at *4.
[30] Id. at *11-12.
[31] Id. at *13.