Is Substantive Consolidation a Viable Cause of Action Post-Law?

Chem. Bank New York Tr. Co. v. Kheel, 369 F.2d 845, 847 (2d Cir. 1966); In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp. Inc., 138 B.R. 723, 764 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 2005), as amended (Aug. 23, 2005), as amended (Sept. 2, 2005), as amended (Oct. 12, 2005), as amended (Nov. 1, 2007); In re DRW Prop. Co. 82, 54 B.R. 489, 494 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985); In re Donut Queen Ltd., 41 B.R. 706, 708-09 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984); In re Richton Int’l Corp., 12 B.R. 555, 557 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981); Talcott v. Wharton (In re Cont'l Vending Mach. Corp.), 517 F.2d 997, 1000 (2d Cir. 1975); Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188, 188 L. Ed. 2d 146 (2014); Goldman v. Haverstraw Assocs. (In re R.H.N. Realty Corp.), 84 B.R. 356, 358 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); Morse Operations Inc. v. Robins Le-COCQ, Inc. (In re Lease-a-Fleet Inc.), 141 B.R. 869, 872-75 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992); In re Pearlman, 462 B.R. 849, 856 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012).