[1]Creditors may attack a debtor’s discharge in two ways: by objecting to the debtor’s discharge in toto, or by objecting to the dischargeability of a particular debt.[2] Both require an adversary complaint.[3] An objecting party must file a § 727 or 523 complaint within 60 days after the first date set for the § 341 meeting.[4] Upon the motion of a party in interest before the deadline, the court may extend the deadline for cause.[5]
What happens when a party fails to file an extension motion, and later files a § 523 or 727 complaint? Parties in this position concocted a solution: Argue that they can utilize another party’s timely filed extension motion for their own complaint. This workaround is called “piggybacking.” Courts differ on their acceptance of piggybacking and on what factors matter. Below are practical tips[6] to both to defeat and embrace piggybacking.
- Know when not to use piggybacking. Piggybacking is unnecessary where the court makes a mistake in setting the discharge deadline or the creditor did not receive notice of the deadline.[7]
- The language of the extension motion and order is paramount. “[A]n extension granted ... would ordinarily benefit only the movant, but its scope and effect would depend on the terms of the extension.”[8] From this legislative history, courts constructed a rule: By default, an extension benefits only the movant, but specific language in the motion or order may merit an exception.
- Think carefully about the wording of your extension motion. If your goal is to allow piggybacking off your extension motion, include broad extension language such as “numerous interested parties.”[9] If your goal is to limit piggybacking, include limiting language such as “the requested extension relates solely to the claims held” by the movant.[10]
- Submit a proposed order.[11] If you want the extension order to apply to only your client, submit an order with limiting language;[12] if limiting language is present, courts will almost never allow piggybacking. Do the opposite if your goal is to allow piggybacking off your extension.[13]
- Use the correct terminology when requesting an extension. A § 727 complaint is a complaint “objecting to the debtor’s discharge”;[14] a § 523 complaint is a complaint “to obtain a determination of the dischargeability of any debt.”[15] When extending the deadline, citing the correct statute (and rule) and using the correct terminology will avoid confusion if piggybacking becomes an issue.[16]
- Know who you are piggybacking. Unless your piggybacking client has a close relationship to another creditor that timely extended its own deadline,[17] your best chance is to piggyback off the trustee’s extension. Courts disagree about the trustee’s standing,[18] but there is at least an argument that the trustee represents the interests of all creditors. However, because trustees cannot file § 523 complaints,[19] a court may reason that a trustee was representing your client’s interests under § 727 but not § 523.[20]
- Don’t argue excusable neglect. Under Rule 9006(b)(1), “excusable neglect” is the generic standard for extending a deadline after the fact. However, this general rule yields to the more specific extension rules found in Rules 4004 and 4007; in other words, excusable neglect does not apply.[21]
- If you miss the discharge deadline, file a motion to extend before filing a discharge-related complaint. This saves time and money: Wouldn’t you rather know before filing the complaint whether the court is going to dismiss it for untimeliness?[22]
- Cite some universal cause for extension. The standard for extension of the discharge deadline is “cause.” If you are trying to piggyback off a party who cited a universal cause that also applies to your client, say so;[23] in contrast, to preclude later piggybacking, cite a specific cause in your extension motion that applies only to your client.
- Make a due process argument. Courts are usually sympathetic to a debtor’s lack of due process notice of a specific creditor’s intent to extend the discharge deadline. If you represent a debtor and you had no notice that the piggybacking creditor wanted an extended deadline, make a due process argument;[24] on the piggybacking side, if you made it clear to the debtor that you wanted an extension, use the due process argument in support of piggybacking.[25]
- Have the trustee put it in writing. Even if the trustee agrees orally to extend the discharge deadline on behalf of your client, insist on specific language in the motion. Failure to incorporate such language may be fatal to a piggybacking creditor if the oral agreement was made without the debtor’s knowledge.[26]
- Move for a more definite statement or move to alter the order extending the deadline. Clarifying vague language in an extension motion may preclude later piggybacking attempts by non-movants (if you represent the debtor) or clarify that the extension covers your client (if you represent a piggybacking creditor).[27] Likewise, moving to clarify vague language in an extension order may alter later piggybacking attempts by providing arguments for or against piggybacking.[28]
Conclusion
All that being said, the safest option is to file a timely complaint, and the second safest option is to file your own timely extension motion if you are unprepared to file the complaint. Piggybacking, however, is potentially available when options number one and two are not.
[1] My thanks to Judge Norton and my co-clerk, Clay Nordsiek, for their contributions. Any views expressed in this article are my own and not those of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Missouri.
[2] See 11.U.S.C. §§ 727 and 523 (respectively). All further statutory references are to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101, et seq.
[3] Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(4), (6). The § 523 deadline only applies to complaints filed under § 523(c); otherwise, a § 523 complaint may be filed “at any time.” Id. at 4007(b).
[4] Id. at 4004(a) (§ 727 complaint), 4007(c) (§ 523(c) complaint).
[5] Id. at 4004(b)(1), 4007(c).
[6] For a broader explanation of piggybacking, see Robert Lohr, “Who Is Permitted to Object to a Ch. 7 Debtor’s Discharge, and When?,” 35 Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 34 (March 2016), and Phillip Berger & Matthew Kaufmann, “Piggybacking onto Other Creditor’s Extension-of-Time Order Is Proper,” 35 Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 35 (March 2016).
[7] In re Tatum, 60 B.R. 335, 337 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986).
[8] In re McCord, 184 B.R. 522, 523 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1995) (citing the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 4004).
[9] In re Demos, 57 F.3d 1037 (11th Cir. 1995) (piggybacking allowed).
[10] In re Kilroy, 354 B.R. 476 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006) (no piggybacking allowed).
[11] If your jurisdiction allows.
[12] See, e.g., In re Freeman, no. 13-30055, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 3939 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Sept. 19, 2013) (no piggybacking where the proposed order provided “exists to extend the deadline for the United States Trustee”).
[13] See, e.g., In re Brady, 101 F.3d 1165 (6th Cir. 1996) (piggybacking allowed where motion was silent, but the trustee’s proposed order — adopted by the court — purported to extend the deadline on behalf of all creditors).
[14] Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4004(a).
[15] Id. at 4007(a).
[16] See Brady, 101 F.3d at 1169 (extension motion was ambiguous because it referred to the deadline to file a “non-discharge complaint”).
[17] In re Overmyer, 24 B.R. 437 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (piggybacking allowed; one party was the other’s wholly owned subsidiary).
[18] Compare Brady, 101 F.3d at 1170 (trustee has standing), with In re Farmer, 786 F.2d 618 (4th Cir. 1986) (trustee does not have standing).
[19] Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007(a).
[20] In re Owen-Moore, 435 B.R. 685 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2010) (trustee not a party in interest to an individual creditor’s § 523 extension).
[21] Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)(3); In re Costa, 471 B.R. 768, 775 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012) (“The argument based on excusable neglect is therefore of no help to the plaintiff.”); In re Floyd, 37 B.R. 890, 892 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1984) (excusable neglect “clearly inapplicable”).
[22] Compare Farmer, 786 F.2d 618 (considering piggybacking in the context of the debtor’s objection to the trustee’s motion to extend, before the creditor filed a complaint), with In re Ortman, 51 B.R. 7 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1984) (bankruptcy court dismissed the creditor’s § 523 complaint after rejecting its piggybacking argument).
[23] In re Gerhart, no. 96-01440, 1996 Bankr. LEXIS 2002 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa Aug. 13, 1996) (universal cause present).
[24] McCord, 184 B.R. 522 (no piggybacking because the debtor had no due process notice at the time of the extension motion).
[25] In re Watkins, 365 B.R. 574 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2007) (piggybacking allowed where the debtor had due process notice; the creditor said it wanted an extension at a hearing when debtor was present).
[26] In re Kneis, no. 08-18014, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 1564 (Bankr. D.N.J. June 15, 2009) (no piggybacking even though the trustee orally assured the creditor of the extension); Frati v. Gennaco, no. 10-11055, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6563 (D. Mass. Jan. 24, 2011) (same).
[27] Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e) does not automatically apply in a contested matter, but the court may choose to have it apply. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9014(c).
[28] Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 applies in cases under the Code. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024.