Fee Enhancements How Do You Get One Part II

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Jul/Aug 2001

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In the seminal Seventh Circuit fee-enhancement case, UNR
Industries, the court
denied a 25 percent upward adjustment to the lodestar despite the
debtor's counsel's
novel and "downright ingenious" use of bankruptcy in a mass-tort case
involving
thousands of asbestos-related lawsuits. Relying on Blum and

Delaware I, the court
reasoned that the experience of counsel and the novelty, difficulty and
complexity of
the issues were "strongly presumed" to be reflected in the $3.2 million
lodestar
awarded to counsel, and that where counsel had failed to carry its
burden of
demonstrating (1) that the lodestar did not fairly compensate counsel
for the work
performed, or (2) that comparably skilled non-bankruptcy lawyers would
have received
a premium for the work performed, an enhancement was
improper.<a href="#39" name="39a">39</a>

In accordance with UNR, most bankruptcy courts have adhered to

the
Hensley-Blum-Delaware I and II limitations in evaluating
the propriety of fee
enhancements in bankruptcy.<a href="#40" name="40a">40</a> For instance, courts from multiple
jurisdictions have
reiterated the position that many of the Johnson factors are
subsumed within the
lodestar and may therefore not serve as an independent basis for a fee
enhancement.<a href="#41" name="41a">41</a>

As one court observed, "excellent results" will not justify a fee
enhancement where
a law firm's representation has otherwise enhanced the firm's reputation

in the bankruptcy
community, where such representation "will mean additional business and
referrals...in
the future" and where the applicant has held itself out as "a firm where

excellent
services and results are the norm, not the exception."<a href="#42" name="42a">42</a> Despite this and many
similar holdings, bankruptcy courts have nonetheless been willing to
award fee
enhancements to estate professionals under various circumstances. For
example,
enhancements have been awarded:

<h4>(i) To Debtor's Counsel:</h4>

1. where a non-payment contingency was created by evidence suggesting

that the
debtor "did not like to pay its lawyers," and where the rates charged by

counsel were
below-market, "bargain rates," a 33 percent or $10,000 fee enhancement
would
be awarded in order to fairly compensate counsel;<a href="#43" name="43a">43</a>

2. where a non-payment contingency is combined with extreme hardship
to counsel,
who was required to borrow money in order to continue representing the
debtor, a fee
enhancement may be permissible if in fact a 100 percent distribution to
unsecured
creditors is ultimately realized;<a href="#44" name="44a">44</a>

3. where a "great" non-payment contingency is combined with the
transformation of
200 debtors with no unencumbered assets into solvent companies that
confirmed a
plan providing a 60 percent dividend to creditors, where $33 billion in
claims
were successfully litigated in 132 proceedings, and where the debtors'
former
management approved of the enhancement, counsel would be awarded a fee
enhancement of
$1.3 million;<a href="#45" name="45a">45</a>

4. where a non-payment contingency is combined with confirmation of a

plan that,
contrary to initial expectations, reduced claims from $50 to $20
million, fully
satisfied all secured and priority claims, and provided a dividend to
unsecured
creditors and shareholders, a 30 percent fee enhancement would be
awarded to enhance
the lodestar fees of partners, but not those of associates or
paralegals;<a href="#46" name="46a">46</a>

5. where liquidation appeared likely at the outset of the case, but
where counsel
instead negotiated a plan providing for a 100 percent dividend to
creditors, plus
interest, or roughly $40 million in excess of the sums that would have
been
received in a liquidation, and where counsel's base hourly rates were
modest in light
of his experience and national reputation, counsel would be awarded a 10

percent fee
enhancement;<a href="#47" name="47a">47</a>

6. where initial recovery projections for general unsecured creditors

were 5 percent
or less due to the debtor's $5,674,404.70 insolvency, and where
ultimately
all secured and unsecured claims were paid in full and the debtor
emerged from chapter
11 with a net worth of approximately $3.5 million, 200 percent fee
enhancements
would be awarded;<a href="#48" name="48a">48</a>

7. where a partial non-payment contingency is combined with what
appeared to be
at the outset of the case no realistic prospect of reorganization due to

the debtor's
substantial operating losses, its incurrence of monthly interest
payments at the rate
of 22 percent, and the loss of its key employees, but where, due to the
innovative and skillful efforts of counsel in resolving untested
provisions of the
then-new Bankruptcy Code, a 100 percent dividend and substantial returns

to
stockholders were ultimately realized, a fee enhancement would be
rewarded;<a href="#49" name="49a">49</a>

8. where counsel achieved a "relatively quick and successful
completion of the
case," a $10,000 fee enhancement would be awarded once counsel's
lodestar fees
were otherwise reduced by approximately the same amount in order to
conform counsel's
rates with those charged by local professionals;<a href="#50" name="50a">50</a>

9. where a non-payment contingency is combined with delays in
counsel's receipt
of fees and "exceptional results," a $10,000 fee enhancement would be
awarded
once counsel's lodestar fees were otherwise reduced by approximately 40%

in order to
account for hours expended by counsel pursuing unsuccessful avoidance
litigation;<a href="#51" name="51a">51</a>

<h4>(ii) To Counsel for a Trustee:</h4>

10. where a non-payment contingency is combined with delay in
payments to
counsel, the absence of any objections to the requested enhancement, a
protracted
16-year case, the establishment of landmark authority, and counsel's
personal safety
being placed at risk due to the engagement, a $117,500 fee would be
awarded
to enhance counsel's $1.35 million lodestar;<a href="#52" name="52a">52</a>

11. where counsel successfully disposed of a radio station in the
face of
harassment, character assassination, affronts to professional
competence, repeated
groundless suits, unfavorable and demeaning publicity, and where a
lis pendens tied up
property of counsel's law firm, a 15 percent fee enhancement would be
awarded;<a href="#53" name="53a">53</a>

12. where a non-payment contingency is combined with an excellent
result and the
requested $35,000 fee adjustment results in hourly rates that are not
unreasonably
high ($175 for the lead partner and $130 for associates), an upward
enhancement is permissible;<a href="#54" name="54a">54</a>

13. where a non-payment contingency is combined with an excellent
result in an
11-year case resulting in full payment to creditors, and the total fee
award of
$1.4 million is reasonable, a fee multiplier of 1.7 times (that is, a 70
percent enhancement of) the lodestar is permissible;<a href="#55" name="55a">55</a>

14. where class-action litigators are employed on behalf of an estate

under a
contingency-fee arrangement, they are entitled, under "common fund"
standards, to a
fee enhancement of 1.5 times the amount of their lodestar;<a href="#56" name="56a">56</a>

15. where counsel for a chapter 7 trustee successfully reduced the
estate's claims
from $9 million to $1 million and recovered funds sufficient to allow
for a 40
percent dividend to creditors, a $17,500 fee enhancement would be
awarded;<a href="#57" name="57a">57</a>

16. where counsel for a chapter 11 trustee was able to increase the
tenancy
rate in the debtor's commercial office building from 45 to 84 percent,
negotiate
and compromise claims of all creditors, sell the debtor's real property
for $34
million cash without incurring a broker's fee, fully pay all
administrative and priority
claims and provide dividends to equity security holders, all within 11
months, a
$33,618.50 fee enhancement would be awarded;<a href="#58" name="58a">58</a>

17. where a non-payment contingency is combined with the trustee's
resuscitation
of a case that had languished for six months prior to his appointment,
and where his
successful efforts to sell the debtor's sole encumbered asset resulted
in the satisfaction
of claims junior to those of the first-priority lienholder, a fee
enhancement of 13
percent would be awarded;<a href="#59" name="59a">59</a>

18. where a non-payment contingency results from an estate's
administrative
insolvency and the existence of only speculative assets, where counsel
demonstrated
appropriate billing judgment by not charging for travel time over the
six-year course
of the case, where a 100 percent dividend, plus interest to unsecured
creditors,
would not have been realized from the formerly insolvent estate but for
the unique
blend of skill, diplomacy, preparation, negotiating prowess and sheer
investment of
counsel's time, and where counsel singularly fostered the transformation

of a bitter
and contentious case into one of cooperation and professionalism, an 8.6

percent
enhancement fee would be awarded;<a href="#60" name="60a">60</a>

19. where a non-payment contingency is combined with a case requiring

special
expertise due to the involuntary nature of the proceeding, where there
are threats
against counsel and an intransient debtor, where all creditors would not

have been paid
in full with interest but for counsel's initiative, perseverance and
skill and where
no party with a pecuniary interest in the case objected to the fee
request, counsel
would be awarded $20,000 over its $15,000 lodestar; however, such award
should not be characterized as an "enhancement" or a "bonus," but rather

final
compensation under an analysis of reasonableness;<a href="#61" name="61a">61</a>

<h4>(iii) To Counsel for a Committee:</h4>

20. where a non-payment contingency is supported by evidence that the

committee
was unable to find counsel willing to represent it for approximately 90
days after
the commencement of the case, committee counsel would be entitled to a
50 percent
upward adjustment of the lodestar;<a href="#62" name="62a">62</a>

21. where an insolvent pork processor with $2.2 billion in annual
revenues
confirmed a plan within one year that provided unsecured creditors with
a 100
percent payout, plus interest, committee counsel would be awarded a 15
percent
fee enhancement in the amount of $37,500;<a href="#63" name="63a">63</a>

22. where a very substantial non-payment contingency is combined with

payment
delays, a 10 percent fee enhancement would be awarded once counsel's
lodestar fees
were otherwise reduced in order to reflect counsel's complete lack of
billing
judgment;<a href="#64" name="64a">64</a>

<h4>(iv) To Multiple Estate Professionals:</h4>

23. where counsel for the chapter 11 trustee and the creditors'
committee
performed their jobs "well" and in a "professional and proficient
manner," they
would be entitled to a "20 percent success fee;"<a href="#65" name="65a">65</a>

24. where counsel successfully resolved multibillion-dollar claims of

asbestos
personal-injury claimants by confirming a plan involving 31 debtor
affiliates in five
months and where counsel's efforts were "herculean" and "nothing short
of a truly
remarkable tour de force," enhancements of between 5-10 percent of the
lodestar are
permissible;<a href="#66" name="66a">66</a>

25. where resolution of among the largest and most complex bankruptcy

proceedings
filed to that point in time under the Bankruptcy Code was consummated
before the
second anniversary of the petition date, where enormous liabilities were

successfully
resolved, creditors were to receive a 100 percent payout and the
reorganized entity
was to re-enter the business community with assets of approximately $100

million,
modest fee enhancements would be awarded;<a href="#67" name="67a">67</a>

26. where a non-payment contingency is combined with exceptional
results that are
not reflected in the lodestar and where the case had the potential to
become one of
the more complicated, lengthy, expensive and controversial proceedings
in the court's
experience, but where instead the case was resolved in five months with
a minimum of
court involvement, the court would award a $75,000 fee enhancement to be
unequally divided among five of the estate's
professionals;<a href="#68" name="68a">68</a>

27. where an estate has $199 on the petition date and three and
one-half
years later, a plan is confirmed with total assets of $20.9 million
providing for
a 100 percent distribution to unsecured creditors, a premium may be
awarded in order
to reward these "spectacular results;"<a href="#69" name="69a">69</a>

28. where the debtor, in one of the largest chapter 11 cases ever
filed,
confirmed a plan providing for 70-100 percent distributions to the
estate's
45,000 creditors within three years, 12 percent fee enhancements may
properly
be awarded to some of the estate's professionals;<a href="#70" name="70a">70</a>

29. where a non-payment contingency is combined with counsels'
"incredible effort,"
without which a majority of the 48 debtors would not have been able to
confirm plans
within approximately two years, and where complex issues, unparalleled
in the court's
experience, were successfully resolved due to counsels' efforts, counsel

for the debtors
would be awarded 50 percent fee enhancements, and counsel for the
trustees and
receivers would be awarded 26 percent fee enhancements;<a href="#71" name="71a">71</a>

30. where a prolonged reorganization resulted in the debtor's special

counsel and
the creditor and equity committees' counsel bearing the economic burden
of substantial
payment delays, the court would award requested fee enhancements in the
amounts of
$33,362, $98,161 and $87,418, respectively, in order to compensate
counsel for the time-value of money;<a href="#72" name="72a">72</a>

31. where the value of the debtor's estate was increased from $1
billion to
$2.3 billion within approximately two years, (i) the equity committee's
financial
advisor's $2 million lodestar would be enhanced by $1 million based on
its
unprecedented fulfillment of duties normally undertaken by the debtor
and its
implementation of novel devices that enhanced equity-holders' value
without cost to
higher-priority claimants; and (ii) the court-appointed examiner's
$268,875
lodestar would be enhanced by $200,000 based on his assumption of a
proactive
and instrumental role in forcing disclosures that supported
substantially higher
enterprise values, and that substantially benefited the estate at the
risk of his
professional reputation;<a href="#73" name="73a">73</a>

32. where a non-payment contingency was even more substantial than in

the typical
contingent-fee arrangement, and yet counsel willingly and knowingly made

a substantial
three-year investment of time with very little prospect of recompense,
fee enhancements
of 15 percent would be awarded to counsel for the debtor and the
unsecured creditors'
committee;<a href="#74" name="74a">74</a>

33. where a non-payment contingency existed by virtue of there being
no "free
assets" in the estate to assure that administrative expenses would ever
be paid, where
it appeared at the outset of the case that there was no prospect
whatsoever for a
sizeable dividend but, due to counsel's ingenious efforts, all unsecured

creditors were
paid in full, and no party other than the U.S. Trustee objected to the
requested
premiums, fee enhancements of 50 and 70 percent would be awarded to
counsel for
the unsecured creditors' committee and the chapter 11
trustee;<a href="#75" name="75a">75</a>

<h4>(v) Other:</h4>

34. where a secured creditor's counsel directed the course of the
case to a much
more favorable result for all parties-in-interest, counsel's $4,582.50
lodestar
would be enhanced for a total award of $8,957.50.<a href="#76" name="76a">76</a>

Although decisions other than those synopsized above have awarded fee

enhancements
in both reported and unreported decisions, these cases demonstrate the
fact-sensitive
nature of the fee-enhancement inquiry. Despite the somewhat
unpredictable outcomes of
fee enhancement requests, at least two standards pertaining to such
requests are, in
fact, constant. First, the burden of proof is always on the applicant
seeking the
premium,<a href="#77" name="77a">77</a> and
the "evidentiary showing necessary to justify [the] fee enhancement must
be proportional to the amount at issue."<a href="#78" name="78a">78</a> Second, the abuse-of-discretion standard
uniformly governs appellate review of a bankruptcy court's award or
denial of a
requested premium,<a href="#79" name="79a">79</a> and appellate courts often recite the
highly discretionary nature
of the fee-enhancement inquiry.<a href="#80" name="80a">80</a>

Other than the burden of proof and the standard of appellate review,
few constants
can be gleaned from a review of existing fee enhancement precedents.
Despite this
absence of uniformity, certain fee-enhancement guidelines can
nonetheless be discerned
from the existing case law. First, many of the most generous fee
enhancement awards
pre-date the Supreme Court's more restrictive Hensley-Blum-Delaware
I and II
guidelines, and accordingly, the precedential value of those cases is
presumably less
forceful than those decided after the Supreme Court pronouncements.
Second, it is
now clear, based on Supreme Court precedents and applicable bankruptcy
court
interpretations thereof, that bankruptcy courts have, and may exercise,
their discretion
to award fee enhancements for (1) superior performance if (a) the

applicant has
produced specific evidence that the services rendered are superior to
what one would
expect in light of the hourly rates charged; (b) the lodestar does not
fairly
compensate the applicant for the work done; and/or (c) the lodestar
falls short of
the compensation earned by comparably skilled attorneys providing
non-bankruptcy
services;<a href="#81" name="81a">81</a> and
(2) risk of non-payment if the applicant is not employed on a
contingency-fee basis and the application can show that without such
risk enhancement,
the estate would have faced substantial difficulties in finding counsel
in the relevant
market.<a href="#82" name="82a">82</a>

While the foregoing discussion summarizes the few principles that can

be derived from
existing fee-enhancement opinions, it is evident from a survey of the
case law that
these guidelines have by no means resulted in uniform bankruptcy court
determinations
concerning the propriety or impropriety of requested fee enhancements.
Predictably, this
lack of uniformity results in uncertainty for the bankruptcy
practitioner who either seeks
or opposes such fee enhancements. Until further clarity is provided by
either Congress
or the Supreme Court, fee-enhancement determinations will likely
continue to be ad
hoc, discretionary inquiries in which the court and practitioner are

forced to cite
and rely on widely divergent, fact-sensitive case precedents.

<hr>
<h3>Footnotes</h3>

<a name="39">39</a> <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP2.1&vr=1.0&cite=…;

986 F.2d at 208, 210-11.</a> <a href="#39a">Return to article</a>

<a name="40">40</a> For exceptions to this
general adherence to Supreme Court precedents, see <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP2.1&vr=1.0&cite=…

re Baldwin-United Corp., 79 B.R. 321, 346
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987)</a> (Delaware II is not binding when
analyzing fee enhancements under Bankruptcy Code §330(a)); <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP2.1&vr=1.0&cite=…
re Chary, 201 B.R. 783, 785-86 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1996)</a> (stating

that no authority had been cited that would
require the court to apply non-bankruptcy Supreme Court cases). <a href="#40a">Return to article</a>

<a name="41">41</a> See <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP2.1&vr=1.0&cite=…

re El Paso Refining L.P., 2000 WL 33152050 *7 (Bankr. W.D. Texas
Dec. 4, 2000)</a> (Johnson factors
are subsumed within the lodestar amount); <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP2.1&vr=1.0&cite=…

re Powerine Oil Co., 71 B.R. 767, 772-73 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986)</a>

("results obtained" are generally subsumed within other factors used to
calculate the lodestar and should therefore not be used as an
independent
basis for increasing the fee award); <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP2.1&vr=1.0&cite=…

re Big Rivers Elec. Corp., 252 B.R. 676, 686 (W.D. Ky. 2000)</a>
(the
lodestar subsumes most, if not all, of the Johnson factors,
including the novelty and complexity of the issues, the special skill
and
experience of counsel, the quality of representation and the results
obtained); <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP2.1&vr=1.0&cite=…

re Southern Merchandise Distribs. Inc., 117 B.R.
725, 723 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990)</a> (although the "results obtained"
factor alone will not normally provide a basis for increasing
the lodestar, the presence of this factor, combined with the "contingent

fee" factor, may provide such a basis); <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP2.1&vr=1.0&cite=…

re Energy Coop.
Inc., 95 B.R. 961, 965 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989)</a> (novelty and
complexity of the issues, the special skill and experience
of counsel, the quality of representation and the results obtained are
presumably fully reflected in the lodestar and thus cannot serve as a
basis for increasing the fee award; however, risk of non-payment may
justify an increase where counsel can show that without an adjustment
for risk, the estate would have faced substantial difficulties in
finding competent counsel in the relevant market); <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP2.1&vr=1.0&cite=…

re East Peoria Hotel
Corp., 145 B.R. 956, 962-63 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1991)</a> (the
lodestar figure subsumes a number of the Johnson factors,
including the customary fee and the experience, reputation, ability and
skill of counsel; moreover, an enhancement based on "results obtained"
is questionable given that there are not too many miracles to be
performed in the bankruptcy court); <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP2.1&vr=1.0&cite=…

re Price, 143 B.R. 190,
197-98 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992)</a> (complexity and novelty of the
issues, the large number of persons benefitted, the superior
quality of service and the exceptional results obtained are not
sufficient bases upon which to award a fee enhancement); <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP2.1&vr=1.0&cite=…

re Fender, 12
F.3d 480, 488 (5th Cir. 1994)</a> (to award an enhancement for
complexity, skill, results and experience would double-count the

Johnson factors). <a href="#41a">Return to article</a>

<a name="42">42</a> <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP2.1&vr=1.0&cite=…

re Interco Sys. Inc., 206 B.R. 61, 63-64 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1997)</a>.

<a href="#42a">Return to article</a>

<a name="43">43</a> <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP2.1&vr=1.0&cite=…

re Cedic Dev. Co., 219 F.3d 1115, 1116-17 (9th Cir. 2000)</a>. <a href="#43a">Return to article</a>

<a name="44">44</a> <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP2.1&vr=1.0&cite=…

re D.W.G.K. Restaurants, 106 B.R. 194, 196-97 (Bankr. S.D. Cal.
1989)</a>. Although the D.W.G.K.
court ultimately refused to award a fee enhancement due to the debtor's
failure to make scheduled payments to unsecured creditors, it advised
counsel that if such payments were in fact made, the court would deem it

a "rare" and "exceptional" case that warranted the requested fee
enhancement. <a href="#44a">Return to article</a>

<a name="45">45</a> <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP2.1&vr=1.0&cite=…;

79 B.R. at 344, 347</a>. Successor counsel for the creditors' committee
was also awarded a $150,000 fee
enhancement for its role in changing the "tenor of the committee" "from
combative to cooperative." <a href="#45a">Return to article</a>

<a name="46">46</a> <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP2.1&vr=1.0&cite=…

re Idak Corp., 26 B.R. 793, 796-97, 800 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982)</a>.
<a href="#46a">Return to article</a>

<a name="47">47</a> <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP2.1&vr=1.0&cite=…

re Moramerica Fin. Corp., 100 B.R. 451, 453-55, 457-58 (Bankr. N.D.
Iowa 1989)</a>. <a href="#47a">Return to article</a>

<a name="48">48</a> <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP2.1&vr=1.0&cite=…

re Farah, 141 B.R. 920, 922, 925 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992)</a>. The
Farah court opined that despite widespread
reliance on precedents involving fee-shifting statutes, in reality
bankruptcy cases are much more akin to class-action, common-fund cases,
and
accordingly, precedents involving such common-fund cases are the more
reliable authorities. <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP2.1&vr=1.0&cite=…;

at 926 n.7</a>. <a href="#48a">Return to article</a>

<a name="49">49</a> <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP2.1&vr=1.0&cite=…

re Warrior Drilling & Eng'g., 9 B.R. 841, 842-44, 848-50 (Bankr.

N.D. Ala. 1981)</a>. <a href="#49a">Return to article</a>

<a name="50">50</a> <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP2.1&vr=1.0&cite=…

re Wendy's of Montana Inc., 111 B.R. 314, 315, 317 (Bankr. D. Mont.
1988)</a>. <a href="#50a">Return to article</a>

<a name="51">51</a> <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP2.1&vr=1.0&cite=…

re Port Royal Land & Timber Co., 105 B.R. 72, 73, 78 (Bankr.
S.D. Ala. 1989)</a>. <a href="#51a">Return to article</a>

<a name="52">52</a> <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP2.1&vr=1.0&cite=…

re Blue Coal Corp., 206 B.R. 721, 722, 725, 727 (Bankr. M.D. Pa.
1997)</a>. <a href="#52a">Return to article</a>

<a name="53">53</a> <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP2.1&vr=1.0&cite=…

re Whet Inc., 61 B.R. 709, 711-13 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986)</a>. <a href="#53a">Return to article</a>

<a name="54">54</a> <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP2.1&vr=1.0&cite=…

Merchandise, 117 B.R. at 727-28</a>. <a href="#54a">Return to
article</a>

<a name="55">55</a> <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP2.1&vr=1.0&cite=…

re Lawler, 807 F.2d 1207, 1213 (5th Cir. 1987)</a>. <a href="#55a">Return to article</a>

<a name="56">56</a> <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP2.1&vr=1.0&cite=…

re Churchfield Management & Inv. Corp., 98 B.R. 838, 856 (Bankr.

N.D. Ill. 1989)</a>. <a href="#56a">Return to article</a>

<a name="57">57</a> <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP2.1&vr=1.0&cite=…

re Chary, 201 B.R. 783, 785-86 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1996)</a>. As
noted above, the Chary court rejected the
applicability of non-bankruptcy Supreme Court fee-enhancement precedent.

<a href="#57a">Return to article</a>

<a name="58">58</a> <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP2.1&vr=1.0&cite=…

re One City Centre Assoc., 111 B.R. 872, 878-79 (Bankr. E.D. Cal.
1990)</a>. <a href="#58a">Return to article</a>

<a name="59">59</a> <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP2.1&vr=1.0&cite=…

re Stable Mews Assocs., 49 B.R. 395, 399, 403-05 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1985)</a>. <a href="#59a">Return to article</a>

<a name="60">60</a> <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP2.1&vr=1.0&cite=…

Paso, 257 B.R. at 816, 838-40</a>. <a href="#60a">Return to
article</a>

<a name="61">61</a> <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP2.1&vr=1.0&cite=…

Foods, 234 B.R. at 123-24, 132-34</a>. <a href="#61a">Return to
article</a>

<a name="62">62</a> <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP2.1&vr=1.0&cite=…;

71 B.R. at 773-74</a>. (Note that Powerine was decided prior to
the Supreme Court's 1987 Delaware II decision,
which instructs that if a risk enhancement is proper, it should not
exceed 1/3 of the lodestar.) <a href="#62a">Return to article</a>

<a name="63">63</a> <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP2.1&vr=1.0&cite=…

re Wilson Foods Corp., 40 B.R. 118, 121-22 (Bankr. W.D. Okla.
1984).</a> <a href="#63a">Return to article</a>

<a name="64">64</a> In re The Leonard
Jed Co., 118 B.R. 339, 343, 347 (Bankr. D. Md. 1990). <a href="#64a">Return to article</a>

<a name="65">65</a> In re Garland
Corp., 8 B.R. 826, 834 (Bankr. D. Mass 1981). This case precedes the

Hensley-Blum-Delaware I and II line of cases and does not
apply any sort of objective standard for analyzing the propriety of fee
enhancements. <a href="#65a">Return to article</a>

<a name="66">66</a> In re Hillsborough
Holdings Corp., 191 B.R. 937, 939-40 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995);

see, also, In re Hillsborough Holdings Corp., 127 F.3d 1398, 1400

(11th Cir. 1997). <a href="#66a">Return to article</a>

<a name="67">67</a> In re Penn-Dixie
Indus. Inc., 18 B.R. 834, 835-36 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982). <a href="#67a">Return to article</a>

<a name="68">68</a> In re Summit
Communities of Florida, 84 B.R. 863, 66-67, 873 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1988). <a href="#68a">Return to article</a>

<a name="69">69</a> In re Aminex
Corp., 15 B.R. 356, 358, 361-62 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981). <a href="#69a">Return to article</a>

<a name="70">70</a> In re White Motor
Credit Corp., 50 B.R. 885, 886-88, 894-95 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
<a href="#70a">Return to article</a>

<a name="71">71</a> In re Bolton Hall
Nursing Home, 40 B.R. 657, 659, 662-64, 667 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984).
<a href="#71a">Return to article</a>

<a name="72">72</a> In re Public Serv.
Co., 138 B.R. 660, 663 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1992). <a href="#72a">Return
to article</a>

<a name="73">73</a> In re Public Serv.
Co., 160 B.R. 404, 438, 441-42, 444-45, 449-50 (Bankr. D. N.H.
1993). <a href="#73a">Return to article</a>

<a name="74">74</a> In re Yankton
College, 101 B.R. 151, 168 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1989). <a href="#74a">Return to article</a>

<a name="75">75</a> In re Elmendorf
Board Corp., 57 B.R. 580, 582-83, 586-87 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1986). <a href="#75a">Return to article</a>

<a name="76">76</a> In re Breeden,
180 B.R. 802, 811 (Bankr. N.D. W.Va. 1995); see, also, In re
Fall, 93 B.R. 1003, 1011 (Bankr. D. Dre. 1988) (awarding $354.10
premium on lodestar fees of $26,154.77). <a href="#76a">Return to
article</a>

<a name="77">77</a> Blum, 465 U.S.
at 896; Fall, 93 B.R. at 1011. <a href="#77a">Return to
article</a>

<a name="78">78</a> In re Atlas, 202

B.R. 1019, 1021 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996). <a href="#78a">Return to
article</a>

<a name="79">79</a> Fender, 12 F.3d
at 487; Cedic, 219 B.R. at 116; Big Rivers, 252 B.R. at
681. <a href="#79a">Return to article</a>

<a name="80">80</a> Leffler v. Meer,

936 F.2d 981, 984-85 (7th Cir. 1991). <a href="#80a">Return to
article</a>

<a name="81">81</a> In re Manoa, 853

F.2d at 688; UNR, 986 F.2d at 211. <a href="#81a">Return to
article</a>

<a name="82">82</a> Delaware II, 483

U.S. at 731, 733. <a href="#82a">Return to article</a>

Journal Authors

Lydia T. Protopapas