A Tale of Two Proceedings Turnabout Is Fair Play in the Yukos U.S. Bankruptcy Cases

Journal Issue

Jul/Aug 2006

Column Name

The International Scene

Citation

ABI Journal, Vol. XXV, No. 6, p. 24, July/August 2006

Bankruptcy Code

Topic Tags

International Insolvency

Venue/Jurisdiction

Journal HTML Content

The continuing drama relating to the demise of Russia's leading oil company, the
Yukos Oil Co., has generated two U.S. bankruptcy proceedings that have raised
some of the most interesting cross-border insolvency issues in the last year.
Both proceedings emanate from the pitched battle between Yukos' management and
equity investors on the one hand—who assert that the Russian government
is expropriating the company for its own benefit in violation of Russian and
international law—and the Russian government and an interim insolvency
receiver appointed by a Russian court (the receiver) on the other hand—who
assert that Yukos' management caused the company to commit a tax fraud of approximately
$27.5 billion that can only be resolved in a Russian court.
Both sides have extended their litigation campaigns to the U.S. bankruptcy
courts in an effort to gain strategic leverage. The first American case involved
the voluntary chapter 11 petition filed by Yukos' management in an effort to
prevent the Russian government's foreclosure sale in Russia of material assets
of the company. Ultimately, that case was dismissed by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court
for the Southern District of Texas in February 2005 in a decision that found
Russia to be the appropriate forum for resolution of the parties' dispute.2
In March 2006, Yukos was placed into Russian bankruptcy proceedings by its banks,
and in a classic "turnabout is fair play" tactic, the Russian bankruptcy
receiver filed a chapter 15 case in New York to obtain an injunction to prevent
Yukos' management from consummating their own material asset sales of the company's
indirect interests in a Lithuanian oil refinery company.
Each case was brought by diametrically opposed parties, yet both cases sought
to accomplish a similar objective. Both were innovative efforts to use U.S.
bankruptcy law as a sword to enjoin non-U.S. transactions involving the sale
of significant non-U.S. assets by non-U.S. entities to non-U.S. acquirors. Indeed,
the only readily apparent U.S. role in either case was the fact that third parties
with material roles in the targeted transactions were subject to the jurisdiction
of U.S. bankruptcy courts and therefore would be likely to refrain from taking
(or facilitating) actions that would violate U.S. court-ordered injunctions.
In essence, the Yukos cases represent a creative anti-takeover litigation
strategy through the use of U.S. bankruptcy law.
Both cases have tested the outer limits of U.S. bankruptcy law in the cross-border
context. Yukos' chapter 11 case resulted in a significant decision regarding
the breadth of U.S. bankruptcy jurisdiction over foreign enterprises with little
or no assets or operations in the United States. And the chapter 15 case is
the first major contested cross-border case brought under the newly enacted
chapter 15 regime. This article discusses some of the intriguing issues presented
by these cases and their implications for future cross-border restructurings.
The Yukos Chapter 11 Case

The tale of the Yukos controversy has been widely reported.3
Yukos had been one of the leading success stories of the Russian economy's conversion
to a market-based system, eventually growing to an estimated market capitalization
of approximately $40 billion. After a remarkable period of growth, an enormous
financial and political scandal erupted when the Russian government alleged
that the company had evaded paying $27.5 billion of taxes and arrested and imprisoned
Yukos' CEO, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who had become a well-known public figure
rumored to be interested in challenging the incumbent Russian president in future
elections. In response to these developments, members of Yukos' senior management,
particularly U.S. citizens such as Bruce K. Misamore who served as its CFO,
elected to manage the company's affairs from (what they termed "exile")
outside of Russia.
The Russian government sought to satisfy its purported tax claims through a
foreclosure auction regarding Yukos' largest asset, its interests in Yugans-kneftegas
(YNG). Yukos was not subject to any Russian insolvency proceeding at the time,
and Misamore caused the filing of a voluntary chapter 11 petition in the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas on Dec. 14, 2004 (the petition
date).4 Through the bankruptcy filing, Yukos sought to invoke U.S.
bankruptcy law's automatic stay to enjoin the auction. In addition, Yukos obtained
a temporary restraining order (TRO) from the bankruptcy court that enjoined
numerous third parties who were subject to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction
from assisting or participating in the auction and foreclosure sale.5
Through these actions, Yukos was able temporarily to stymie the Russian foreclosure
process because of the unwillingness of the banks who were intending to finance
the acquirer to follow through on the financing in violation of the TRO and
automatic stay. Ultimately, however, as discussed below, some of these third
parties convinced the bankruptcy court to dismiss Yukos' chapter 11 case and
the Russian government sold YNG to Rosneft, a Russian oil company.
Based on its balance sheet, Yukos presented one of the largest bankruptcy cases
ever filed in the United States.6 Yukos was incorporated under Russian
law and virtually all of Yukos' assets, operations and 100,000 employees were
located in Russia. Moreover, the Texas bankruptcy court found that Yukos' most
significant assets (oil and gas deposits) were "literally a part of the
Russian land" and its operations formed a "central part" of the
Russian economy.7

In contrast, Yukos' presence in the United States was exceedingly limited and
was the result of two circumstances that occurred within the 10-day period prior
to the petition date. First, Yukos' CFO began conducting his activities as CFO
from his home in Houston on Dec. 4, 2004.8 Second, certain funds
were transferred to the United States purportedly for Yukos' benefit. These
funds included $480,000 that were transferred to Yukos' U.S. counsel as a retainer
for legal services on Dec. 10, 2004, and were transferred subsequently to the
account of Yukos USA Inc., a Texas corporation that was incorporated as a Yukos
subsidiary mere hours before the bankruptcy filing.9 Certain other
funds were transferred to the United States purportedly for Yukos' benefit after
the petition date (pursuant to documents that had been "back-dated"
to make it appear that such transfers had occurred on the petition date), which
Yukos acknowledged had been done to "create a better case for jurisdiction"
based on "property" in the United States.10
The Texas bankruptcy court observed that Yukos had filed its chapter 11 proceeding,
among other things, to halt and challenge the Russian government's tax enforcement
actions and to seek redress against the Russian government and other entities.
Yukos had also contested its Russian tax liability in other forums, including
Russian courts and the European Court of Human Rights. In addition, Yukos filed
a demand for arbitration of its tax dispute with the Russian government shortly
before filing its chapter 11 petition.
The primary challenge to Yukos' chapter 11 was prosecuted by Deutsche Bank
AG (DB), a prominent bank that had been involved in the potential YNG auction
until it was enjoined by the chapter 11 TRO due to its ties to the United States.
DB sought dismissal of the case based on numerous grounds, including: (1) lack
of jurisdiction, (2) abstention under §1112(b) of the Bankruptcy Code,
(3) forum non conveniens, (4) international comity and (5) the act of state
doctrine.
The bankruptcy court first had to determine the threshold issue of whether
it had jurisdiction pursuant to §109 of the Code. Section 109 provides
extremely broad bankruptcy jurisdiction over any entity that "resides or
has a domicile, a place of business or property in the United States."11
Yukos claimed jurisdiction existed because (a) it had "property" in
the United States based on the funds that had been transferred shortly before
the petition date and (b) Misamore's home office was a "place of business"
in the United States. The court determined that the $480,000 that was in the
account of Yukos USA Inc. (an affiliated nondebtor in the case) on the petition
date was being held "for Yukos' benefit" and therefore constituted
"property" of Yukos in the United States for jurisdictional purposes.12
The court then declined to consider, as unnecessary, whether Yukos had a "place
of business" in the United States.13

While the bankruptcy court (in the context of its §1112 analysis discussed
below) determined that the $480,000 had been transferred to the United States
for the purpose of creating bankruptcy jurisdiction, the court appears to have
rejected the argument that this property could not serve as a basis for bankruptcy
jurisdiction because it was moved to the United States to "manufacture"
jurisdiction for improper forum-shopping purposes. This aspect of the court's
ruling is significant because it contradicts prior jurisprudence that indicated
that property transferred to the United States to manufacture jurisdiction should
not be considered in determining whether bankruptcy jurisdiction exists.14
As a result, this ruling represents perhaps the most expansive decision yet
regarding the jurisdictional reach of the Code.
Despite its jurisdictional finding, the bankruptcy court ultimately declined
to exercise such jurisdiction over Yukos and instead dismissed the chapter 11
case pursuant to §1112(b) of the Code.15 Section 1112(b) provides
courts with the discretionary authority to dismiss chapter 11 proceedings "for
cause" where, among other things, such dismissal serves "the best
interest of creditors and the estate."16 Citing the "totality
of the circumstances," the court determined to dismiss the case because
(1) the sheer size of Yukos' operations and its importance to the Russian economy
favor permitting resolution of the disputes presented by Yukos in a forum where
the Russian government will participate; (2) Yukos' proposed plan of reorganization
was not, in essence, a financial reorganization but rather a challenge to the
actions of the Russian government and a forum to litigate other causes of action
that Yukos believes it holds; (3) Yukos had commenced proceedings in several
other forums and sought to replace such forums (and otherwise applicable foreign
and international law) with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court (which is not uniquely
qualified to determine Yukos' various disputes) and U.S. law; (4) the court's
personal jurisdiction over many pertinent parties to Yukos' disputes was questionable;
(5) the vast majority of Yukos' business operations were in Russia; (6) any
reorganization of Yukos would require the cooperation of the Russian government;
and (7) the "property" to support jurisdiction was transferred to
the United States for the purpose of creating jurisdiction less than one week
before the petition date.17
In essence, the court deferred to Russian courts as the more appropriate, practical
and effective forum for resolution of Yukos' dispute and its financial crisis.
Notably, the court's ruling rejected the arguments that the case should be dismissed
based upon the independent doctrines of (a) an act of state, (b) forum non
conveniens and (c) international comity.18 However, the essential
substance of each of these theories is clearly inextricably interwoven in the
court's "totality of the circumstances" analysis under §1112(b).
At bottom, the Yukos ruling flatly rejected the company's forum shopping as
a litigation tactic to prevent a takeover of its YNG business through the Russian
government's foreclosure proceeding. The case also is a clear example of the
practical limitation to the use of chapter 11 to restructure foreign enterprises
in highly contested cases, which stands in contrast to other cases where foreign
enterprises have successfully invoked chapter 11 jurisdiction where there was
critical creditor support for such a restructuring.19 It will serve
as a significant consideration for any foreign enterprise that seeks to restructure
exclusively under chapter 11 where there is any significant resistance, particular
resistance by the sovereign power of such enterprise's home country.

The Yukos Chapter 15 Case 
After dismissal of the chapter 11 case, an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding
was commenced against Yukos in the Arbitrazh Court of the City of Moscow, Russia,
in which the court appointed Eduard K. Rebgun as the interim receiver of the
company under Russian law.20 Shortly thereafter a new dispute erupted
between the receiver and Yukos' management regarding management's efforts to
sell the company's indirect 57.3 percent interest in Lithuanian AB Mazeikiu
Nafta (Nafta), one of Yukos' most valuable investments, valued at as much as
U.S. $1.4 billion. According to the receiver, under Russian law and orders of
the Arbitrazh court, Yukos and its management were prohibited from selling such
a material asset without the receiver's consent. Moreover, the receiver alleged
that management had strategically transferred Yukos' interests in Nafta to a
Dutch entity outside of Russia and that management intended to use the sale
proceeds to discriminatorily and preferentially satisfy the claims of Yukos
creditors who management determined to be "true creditors" (i.e.,
creditors other than the Russian government). In other words, the receiver alleged
that management sought to evade the Russian bankruptcy proceeding and his authority
and duty under Russian law.
On April 13, 2006, the receiver commenced a chapter 15 case in the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court for the Southern District of New York seeking a temporary and permanent
injunction to, among other things, prohibit Yukos and its management and affiliates
from consummating any sale of the Nafta interests without the receiver's consent.21
Like the YNG sale, the Nafta transaction contemplated a sale of interests in
a non-U.S. business between non-U.S. parties that was to occur outside of the
United States. However, because key members of Yukos' management were U.S. citizens
(or were subject to the U.S. bankruptcy court's jurisdiction), the injunction
strategically sought to block the transaction by preventing such third parties
from taking action to facilitate the Nafta transaction.
The bankruptcy court granted a temporary injunction prohibiting the sale, which
was quickly opposed by Yukos' management, which claimed that the injunction
was facilitating an illegal expropriation and dismemberment of Yukos by the
Russian government through its agents (which included, according to Yukos' management,
the Russian receiver). Battle had been joined once again, though in a different
U.S. bankruptcy court.
The chapter 15 interim injunction and court proceedings provided a forum in
which the receiver and Yukos' management were forced to negotiate regarding
the Nafta sale. While the receiver was not ultimately opposed to a sale of Nafta
at an adequate price, the receiver alleged that it could not determine whether
an adequate price and a fair sales process had occurred because Yukos' management
had not shared information regarding the sale with him. In addition, the receiver
was concerned that any sale proceeds not be used to pay creditors in an improperly
discriminatory or preferential manner. Through the chapter 15 proceeding, the
receiver was able to pressure Yukos' management to provide such information
to him. In addition, the receiver obtained an opportunity to analyze this information
regarding the transaction because the chapter 15 injunction effectively blocked
Yukos' management from consummating a sale without U.S. bankruptcy court permission.22
Based on the information that he received through the chapter 15 case, the
receiver ultimately concluded that the sale price and process was fair, but
he nonetheless requested the bankruptcy court to maintain the interim injunction
prohibiting consummation of the Nafta sale because the receiver believed that
there were unreasonable risks regarding the purchaser's ability to consummate
the sale.23 While the bankruptcy court acknowledged the legitimacy
of many of the receiver's concerns, it ultimately concluded that the risk of
causing the Nafta sale to fall apart by continuing the interim injunction outweighed
the risks identified by the receiver. Looming large in the court's analysis
was the fact that the purchaser had conditioned its offer to purchase upon execution
of a sale agreement on or before May 26, 2006, and the fact that the Lithuanian
government, which was the other major shareholder of Nafta, supported the transaction.24
Accordingly, on May 26, 2006, the bankruptcy court permitted the interim injunction
to expire.25

However, that was not the end of the chapter 15 case. In addition to discussing
(through private negotiations and hearings with the court) the adequacy of the
sale process, the chapter 15 case also provided a forum to address the receiver's
concern regarding the distribution of the approximately $1.5 billion of sale
proceeds from the Nafta sale. As noted above, the receiver sought to ensure
that such proceeds would not be applied preferentially and would be, at least
in part, available to satisfy the claims of Yukos' creditors in the Russian
insolvency proceeding. Ultimately, the parties agreed upon a consensual order
that was entered by the bankruptcy court to resolve these issues on May 26,
2006 (the "consensual order").26 The consensual order set
forth a specific process through which the proceeds would be placed into an
escrow/trust account and distributed according to a Dutch court-supervised process
for resolution of claims against the proceeds. Among other things, the consensual
order directed Yukos' management and relevant affiliates to take corporate actions
necessary to (a) have the proceeds deposited with the bailiff of the Dutch court
or in a segregated interest-bearing account if the bailiff could not receive
the proceeds, (b) seek the release of all encumbrances against the Nafta interests
and their proceeds, (c) request the Dutch court to establish a claims reconciliation
process to provide a reasonable opportunity for parties with claims against
the proceeds to assert their claims and for other parties-in-interest to object
to such claims, if appropriate and (d) request the Dutch court to grant the
Russian receiver standing before the Dutch court to assert the claims of creditors
that were subject to the Russian insolvency proceeding. The consensual order
also served as a respectful request from the New York bankruptcy court to the
Dutch court to implement the forgoing process as a matter of international comity.
 In addition, the consensual order imposed significant reporting and disclosure
duties upon Yukos and its management to provide the receiver with prior notice
and adequate information regarding any future material asset sales (or similar
transactions) of any Yukos entity outside the ordinary course of business. The
consensual order also required the receiver to (a) include a copy of Yukos management's
proposed reorganization plan for Yukos in the receiver's report to creditors
in the Russian insolvency proceeding and (b) take reasonable steps to facilitate
Yukos management's attendance at the meeting of creditors to be held in connection
with the Russian insolvency proceeding.
At bottom, the receiver successfully used chapter 15 as a litigation strategy
to block a change-of-control transaction until he had gained sufficient information
to become comfortable with the economic and procedural fairness of the Nafta
transaction. In addition, the receiver was able to gain significant informational
rights going forward through the continuing notice and disclosure duties that
the consensual order imposed on Yukos' management outside of Russia. Furthermore,
the consensual order and the continuing pendency of the chapter 15 case also
provide a readily accessible judicial forum for the receiver to litigate any
dispute that it may have regarding future asset sales or other issues. Indeed,
the bankruptcy court exhibited its willingness to entertain such claims by the
receiver by entering the initial injunction that blocked the Nafta transaction
for six weeks based on the receiver's assertion that the sale might be improper.
So understood, the chapter 15 case stands in sharp contrast to Yukos' failed
attempt to invoke chapter 11 powers to halt the YNG transaction, which resulted
in prompt dismissal of that proceeding.
Notably, all of the relief in the Yukos chapter 15 case was granted
without the court ever actually granting "recognition" to the Russian
insolvency proceeding under §1517 of the Code. Instead, the interim relief
and the consensual order were entered based on the court's power to grant interim/temporary
relief under §1519.27 The use of §1519 to, in effect, provide
comprehensive expedited relief in the Yukos case demonstrates the breadth and
flexibility of the relief available under new chapter 15.
While the Yukos cases differ in their results, they bear some striking
similarities. The courts in both U.S. bankruptcy cases deferred, as a matter
of international comity, to the insolvency and judicial procedures of other
nations regarding the Yukos dispute. The initial chapter 11 case was
dismissed in deference to the judicial insolvency procedures available in Russia.
Similarly, the chapter 15 case provided substantial relief to aid the Russian
insolvency proceeding that followed dismissal of the chapter 11 case. In addition,
the chapter 15 case substantially deferred to (and requested reciprocal aid
from) the Dutch judicial proceedings that were pending regarding the Nafta sale
and the use of such sale proceeds.

Furthermore, both cases sought to harness the power of U.S. bankruptcy jurisdiction
to halt otherwise non-U.S. transactions between non-U.S. parties by targeting
peripheral parties to the transactions who were subject to U.S. bankruptcy jurisdiction
and therefore could be deterred from facilitating the transactions. In the chapter
11 case, Yukos attempted to implement this technique by targeting Deutsche Bank
and other important third parties involved in the YNG auction. In the chapter
15 case, the Russian receiver successfully targeted Yukos' key managers who
were precluded from taking necessary corporate actions to consummate a Nafta
transaction because of the chapter 15 injunction. This innovative use of the
new expansive powers under chapter 15 may likely serve as a model for other
contested distressed transactions in the future.
While Yukos' chapter 15 case has clearly not come to an end, as discussed
above, the initial battle has served as an instructive example for cross-border
insolvency practitioners seeking to navigate the uncharted territory of new
chapter 15.
<blockquote>
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<hr>
<h3>Footnotes</h3>
 1 The author thanks and acknowledges his colleague Evan Flaschen for his consultation
and support regarding this article. 
2 See In re Yukos Oil Co., 321 B.R. 396 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005).

3 For the bankruptcy court's description of the circumstances relating to the
Yukos dispute and its chapter 11 filing, see In re Yukos, 396
B.R. at 399-406. 
4 In re Yukos, 396 B.R. at 399. 
5 Yukos also sought to use the U.S. bankruptcy court to obtain a series of
orders to advance its efforts to challenge the Russian government's tax assessments,
including motions requesting orders (a) authorizing it to serve the Russian
government with process in the bankruptcy case, (b) compelling Russia to arbitrate
the tax dispute with Yukos and (c) declaring that U.S. law applies to Yukos'
property located in foreign nations. In re Yukos, 396 B.R. at 403. In
addition, Yukos filed a proposed chapter 11 reorganization plan, the primary
features of which were equitable subordination of all of the Russian government's
tax claims and a litigation trust to pursue claims that Yukos believed it possessed
against the Russian government. Id.

6 See id. at 399 (noting that Yukos' chapter 11 proceeding appeared
to be the "largest bankruptcy ever filed in the United States"). 
7 Id. 
8 See id. at 402. 
9 See id. 
10 In re Yukos, 396 B.R. at 403.

11 11 U.S.C. §109. Section 109(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides the
eligibility requirements to be a "debtor" under chapter 11. 11 U.S.C.
§109(a). The place of business need not be the debtor's main place of business.
See In re Spanish Cay Co. Ltd., 161 B.R. 715, 721 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993)
(finding that debtor had place of business even though debtor did not file tax
returns, did not register to do business in Florida, and did not register for
appropriate business license). Various types of property in the United States
have been found sufficient to support chapter 11 jurisdiction. See Bank of
Am. N.T. & S.A. v. World of English N.V., 23 B.R. 1015, 1019-23 (D.C.
Ga. 1982) (bank account); In re Axona Int'l Credit & Comm. Ltd.,
88 B.R. 597 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1988), aff'd., 115 B.R. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (bank
account); In re Paper I Partners LP, 283 B.R. 661, 672-74 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2002) (business records); In re Global Ocean Carriers Ltd., 251 B.R.
31, 37-38 (Bankr. D. Del. 2000) (unearned portion of U.S. counsel's retainer,
bank account and business records); Spanish Cay, 161 B.R. at 721-22 (bank account,
equipment and advertising materials); In re World of English, 16 B.R.
817, 819 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (accounts receivable owed by U.S. party to foreign
enterprise). Courts do not require that such property or place of business be
substantial, but rather will find chapter 11 available based on even a small
U.S. bank account. See Global Ocean Carriers, 251 B.R. at 38 ("we
conclude that the bank accounts constitute property in the United States for
purposes of eligibility under §109 of the Bankruptcy Code, regardless of
how much money was actually in them on the petition date"); In re McTague,
198 B.R. 428 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1996) ($194 in a bank account qualifies the debtor
under §109 to file chapter 7 case).

12 In re Yukos, 321 B.R. at 406-07. 
13 See id. 
14 See In re Head, 223 B.R. 648, 652 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1998) ("to
make the record clear, if these debtors were to continue to assert eligibility
by virtue of having acquired U.S. mailing addresses and opening small bank accounts
in the U.S., then this court would directly hold that one cannot so manufacture
eligibility..."); Bank of Am. N.T. & S.A. v. World of English, N.V.,
23 B.R. 1015, 1022 (D.C. Ga. 1982) (debtors satisfied "property" element
of §109, "there being no evidence that the bank account was transferred
from Japan to California merely to create jurisdiction for a future bankruptcy
proceeding involving debtors..."); cf. In re McTague, 198 B.R. 428,
432 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1996) ("if property has been specifically placed or
left in the United States for the sole purpose of creating eligibility that
would not otherwise exist, then dismissal might be appropriate...").

15 See In re Yukos, 321 B.R. at 410-11. 
16 11 U.S.C. §1112. The Yukos decision was rendered before the
2005 amendments to the Code became effective on Oct. 17, 2005. Those amendments
substantially altered §1112(b) to, among other things, expand the grounds
for §1112(b) relief and mandate expedited judicial resolution of §1112
motions to dismiss or convert a chapter 11 case. 
17 See In re Yukos, 321 B.R. at 410-11. 
18 See id. at 407-410.

19 See, e.g., In re Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia S.A. Avianca (In
re Avianca), 303 B.R. 1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (denying motion to dismiss
voluntary chapter 11 proceeding commenced by Colombian airline with support
of key creditor consituencies); In re Global Ocean Carriers Ltd., 251
B.R. 31, 37 (Bankr. D. Del. 2000) (denying motion to dismiss voluntary chapter
11 proceeding regarding Greek shipping company with support of key creditor
consituencies); In re Edelnor S.A., S.D.N.Y. Case No. 02-14530 (ALG)
(pre-packaged chapter 11 proceeding of Chilean power company overwhelmingly
supported by bondholders impaired by plan); In re Chivor S.A. E.S.P.,
S.D.N.Y. Case No. 02-13291 (BRL) (pre-packaged chapter 11 proceeding of Colombian
power company overwhelmingly supported by bank debt-holders impaired by plan).

20 As of the time of writing this article, no published decision had been issued
in the Yukos chapter 15 case. Accordingly, the factual background regarding
the Yukos chapter 15 case is derived from the orders, transcripts and
pleadings filed in the chapter 15 case, which can be found on the electronic
docket of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York at
https://ecf.nysb.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/login.pl. In addition, some docket items
can be obtained from www.chapter15.com.

21 See In re Yukos Oil Co., S.D.N.Y. Case No. 06-B-10775 (RDD), Docket
No. 1 (chapter 15 petition). 
22 The initial temporary restraining order entered on April 13, 2006, broadly
enjoined Yukos and its management and others from even negotiating a sale of
the Nafta interests. See In re Yukos Oil Co., S.D.N.Y. Case No. 06-B-10775
(RDD) Docket No. 9 (Order to Show Cause with Temporary Restraining Order dated
April 13, 2006 at p.3-4). Subsequent bridge orders entered by the bankruptcy
court permitted negotiation but prohibited Yukos and its management from actually
entering into any agreement regarding such a transaction. See id. Docket
No. 37 (Bridge Order dated April 21, 2006); id. Docket No. 46 (Second
Bridge Order dated April 26, 2006); id. Docket No. 51 (Third Bridge Order
dated April 28, 2006); id. Docket No. 58 (Fourth Bridge Order dated May
4, 2006); id. Docket No. 73 (Fifth Bridge Order dated May 19, 2006).

23 See id. Docket No. 83 (Transcript of May 26, 2006 Hearing, at p.
8-14). 
24 See id. Docket No. 83 (Transcript of May 26, 2006 Hearing, at p.
8-14). 
25 See id. (Transcript of May 26, 2006 Hearing, at p. 19). 
26 See id. Docket No. 83 (Case No. 06-B-10775 (RDD)) (consensual order).

27 See 11 U.S.C. §1519. All of the interim orders and the consensual order
cite only §1519 as the basis for the relief granted therein. See In
re Yukos Oil Co., S.D.N.Y. Case No. 06-B-10775 (RDD) Docket No. 83 (consensual
order, p. 1); id. Docket No. 83 (May 26th Transcript at p. 5) (noting
that context of relief sought was a motion under §1519 and that "recognition
has not been sought or granted"); id. Docket No. 9 (Order to Show
Cause with Temporary Restraining Order dated April 13, 2006 at p.1) (citing
only 11 U.S.C. §1519 as statutory basis for relief); id. Docket
No. 37 (Bridge Order dated April 21, 2006); id. Docket No. 46 (Second
Bridge Order dated April 26, 2006); id. Docket No. 51 (Third Bridge Order
dated April 28, 2006); id. Docket No. 58 (Fourth Bridge Order dated May
4, 2006); id. Docket No. 73 (Fifth Bridge Order dated May 19, 2006).

Journal Authors

Kurt A. Mayr

Journal Date

Saturday, July 1, 2006 - 12:00

Bankruptcy Rule

2006

none