Out of the Ordinary The Payment of Criminal Defense Fees from an Involuntary Bankruptcy Estate

Journal Issue

Nov 2005

Column Name

Citation

ABI Journal, Vol. XXIV, No. 9, p. 8, November 2005

Journal HTML Content

Just as a bank robber cannot use the loot to wage the best defense
money can buy...so a swindler...cannot use the victims' assets to hire
counsel who will help him retain the gleanings of
crime.<a href="#2" name="2a">2</a>

</blockquote>

While those who stand accused of criminal
conduct in the United States unquestionably have a right to the aid of
legal counsel to defend against the charges directed at them, the
foregoing observation illustrates the point that they do not necessarily
have an unqualified right to retain their counsel of choice. "[A]
defendant may not insist on representation by an attorney he cannot
afford."<a href="#3" name="3a">3</a>

A criminal defendant's right to retain counsel is, in many contexts,
impacted by procedural limitations on his ability to use assets once
under his control. For example, the accused can be prohibited from using
the proceeds of his crime 'or other assets subject to forfeiture'to pay
for a defense attorney,<a href="#4" name="4a">4</a> and a defendant cannot use
administratively frozen assets to pay for his criminal
defense.<a href="#5" name="5a">5</a>

In a bankruptcy context, it seems clear that a debtor in a voluntary
bankruptcy case generally cannot use property of the estate to finance
his criminal defense.<a href="#6" name="6a">6</a> However, bankruptcy courts have not
published any decisions concerning the limits the Bankruptcy Code places
on a debtor's use of estate funds to pay for his criminal defense in an
involuntary bankruptcy proceeding. This article explores that issue, and
concludes that the Code does not permit estate funds to be used in this
manner.

<h4>Overview of Involuntary Bankruptcy Law</h4>

Involuntary bankruptcies are rare. Section 303 of the Code sets forth
many of the rules that govern involuntary bankruptcy filings. Section
303(a) explains that an involuntary bankruptcy can only be filed under
chapter 7 or 11.<a href="#7" name="7a">7</a>
While an involuntary case can be brought against an individual,
partnership or corporation,<a href="#8" name="8a">8</a> it cannot be brought against a
governmental unit, a farmer, family farmer or eleeymosynary institution,
such as a nonprofit corporation.<a href="#9" name="9a">9</a> An involuntary bankruptcy against a person
may only be started by the filing with the bankruptcy court of a
petition by a statutorily-eligible creditor or group of
creditors.<a href="#10" name="10a">10</a>

The Code permits a group of three or more creditors, each of which is
either a holder of a claim against a debtor that is "not contingent as
to liability or the subject of a bona fide dispute as to
liability or amount, or an indenture trustee representing such a
holder," provided the claims at issue aggregate at least $12,300 "more
than the value of any lien on property of the debtor securing such
claims held by the holders of such claims."<a href="#11" name="11a">11</a> In other words, the groups of creditors
must have a total of unsecured claims over $12,300.

In addition, if there are less than 12 such creditors,<a href="#12" name="12a">12</a> one or more specified
creditors that hold in the aggregate at least $12,300 of eligible claims
can petition for involuntary relief. To file such a petition under 11
U.S.C. §303(b)(2)(b)(2), a creditor must hold a claim that is not
contingent nor subject to a bona fide dispute, and cannot be an
employee, insider or transferee of an avoidable transfer.

The debtor can contest an involuntary petition.<a href="#13" name="13a">13</a> After any trial on a
contested petition, the court shall order relief against the debtor only
if—

<ol>
<li>the debtor is generally not paying such debtor's debts as such debts
become due unless such debts are the subject of a bona fide
dispute as to liability or amount, or

</li><li>within 120 days before the date of the filing of the petition, a
custodian, other than a trustee, receiver or agent appointed or
authorized to take charge of less than substantially all of the property
of the debtor for the purpose of enforcing a lien against such property,
was appointed or took possession.<a href="#14" name="14a">14</a>

</li></ol>

The petitioner has the burden of proving that the case is eligible
for involuntary bankruptcy.<a href="#15" name="15a">15</a>

Even though an involuntary case is governed by some unique rules, the
filing of such a case nevertheless creates a bankruptcy
estate,<a href="#16" name="16a">16</a>
consisting of all legal and equitable interests in property that a
debtor held before the date of filing<a href="#17" name="17a">17</a> and causes the automatic stay to go
into effect.<a href="#18" name="18a">18</a>
Consequently, all property owned by a debtor in an involuntary case is
property of the estate, even during the gap period between the date of
filing and the date relief is granted.

When enacting §303, Congress took into consideration the effect
various provisions of the Code might have on the operation of a business
against which an involuntary petition was sought. For example, Congress
wanted to ensure that the limitations on the use of estate proper set
forth in §363 did not unfairly burden a debtor during the time
period between the date of filing and when the petition was ruled on.
Thus, it enacted §303(f), which provides:

<blockquote>
Notwithstanding §363 of this title, except to the extent that the
court orders otherwise, and until an order for relief in the case, any
business of the debtor may continue to operate, and the debtor may
continue to use, acquire or dispose of, property as if an involuntary
case concerning the debtor had not been commenced.
</blockquote>

Section 303(f) does not permit a debtor to dismantle his business during
the gap period.<a href="#19" name="19a">19</a>
For §303(f) to apply, however, the debtor must be operating a
business and must use the property in question to continue the operation
of the business. Conversely, an involuntary debtor is not authorized
under §303(f) to use its property for purposes unrelated to its
pre-petition business.<a href="#20" name="20a">20</a>

Section 502<a href="#21" name="21a">21</a>
of the Code similarly restricts how estate property can be used to
compensate creditors for work done between the date of filing and entry
of the order of relief, otherwise known as the "gap
period."<a href="#22" name="22a">22</a>

Section 502 generally governs the allowance of claims or interests in
bankruptcy. The answer to how the unpaid gap-period claim of a debtor's
criminal defense counsel must be treated is contained in 11 U.S.C.
§502(f):

<blockquote>
In an involuntary case, a claim arising in the ordinary course of the
debtor's business or financial affairs after the commencement of the
case but before the earlier of the appointment of a trustee and the
order for relief shall be determined as of the date such claim arises,
and shall be allowed under subsection (a), (b) or (c) of this section or
disallowed under subsection (d) or (e) of this section, the same as if
such claim had arisen before the date of the filing of the petition.
</blockquote>

Section 502(f) was designed to protect creditors that transact
business with an involuntary debtor during the gap period, "such as
lessors, trade creditors and similar parties, consistent with
§303(f)'s specific grant to the involuntary debtor to conduct its
business in ordinary fashion" while its financial future is
unresolved.<a href="#23" name="23a">23</a>
Thus, in cases where a bankruptcy court is asked to permit payment of a
debtor's "gap period" criminal defense fees from the estate, the plain
meaning of the statute limits its application to cases where the "gap
period" costs of the debtor's criminal defense counsel were in the
"ordinary course of the debtor's business or financial
affairs."<a href="#24" name="24a">24</a> While
no published case law currently addresses the propriety of granting a
"gap period" claim for the services of criminal defense counsel, both
legal precedent and common sense support the proposition that such legal
work is not within the scope of §502(f).

<h4>Criminal Defense Work Is Not in the Ordinary Course of a Debtor's
Business or Financial Affairs</h4>

U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Nancy C. Dreher was among the first
bankruptcy jurists to decide how to interpret the phrase "ordinary
course of the debtor's business" in §502(f) in In re Hanson
Industries Inc., 90 B.R. 405 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988).<a href="#25" name="25a">25</a> Hanson Industries

remains a seminal case in §502(f) law.

The debtor in Hanson Industries had made false statements to
obtain, or in connection with, pre-petition financing.<a href="#26" name="26a">26</a> Further, the Hanson
Industries involuntary debtor "chose to vigorously defend the
petition for involuntary bankruptcy."<a href="#27" name="27a">27</a> After the involuntary petition was
granted, the debtor's bankruptcy counsel requested payment from the
estate of $86,128.81 for his work, with $23,394.09 arising pre-petition
and $62,734.71 arising during the post-petition gap
period.<a href="#28" name="28a">28</a> Judge
Dreher analyzed whether the claim before her could be allowed under the
standards set forth in 11 U.S.C. §502(f).<a href="#29" name="29a">29</a>

The Hanson Industries §502(f) analysis first explained
the purpose of the statute.

<blockquote>
Section 502(f) was intended to protect the creditors who deal with an
involuntary debtor during the gap period, such as lessors, trade
creditors and similar parties, consistent with §303(f)'s specific
grant to the involuntary debtor to conduct its business in ordinary
fashion while its status is resolved.<a href="#30" name="30a">30</a>
</blockquote>

Within this framework, Judge Dreher next examined whether the work
performed by the debtor's attorney was an allowable claim as an expense
rendered in the "ordinary course of the debtor's business" during the
"gap period."

There was little to no case law interpreting §502(f) when
Hanson Industries was decided. Thus, the decision looked to how
other courts had interpreted the phrase "ordinary course of business"
under other parts of the Code, such as §363 or 364. Though noting
that the term "ordinary course of business" had both vertical and
horizontal dimensions as used in §363(c)(1),<a href="#31" name="31a">31</a> Judge Dreher reduced her
analysis to a concise inquiry: "Under either test, an examination of the
transaction vis-a-vis either the debtor's business or the industry, the
size, nature or both, of the transaction may be disposative on the issue
of ordinariness."<a href="#32" name="32a">32</a> The Hanson Industries court also
noted that in the context of preference actions, the phrase "ordinary
course of business" had been held to contemplate "normal credit
transactions, such as the sale of goods for a business supplier on
account."<a href="#33" name="33a">33</a>

Within this framework, the Hanson Industries court did not allow
the claim for most of the fees requested by the debtor's attorney
because "much of the time for which [the attorney sought] second
priority status [fell] outside the ordinary nature of
things."<a href="#34" name="34a">34</a> A
claim of approximately $12,000 was approved, however, for "fees and
expenses incurred in connection with general corporate matters" and
business litigation.<a href="#35" name="35a">35</a>

Hanson Industries essentially requires bankruptcy courts to
examine whether the nature of the claim at issue is for work typically
performed in the debtor's pre-petition business or in the debtor's
industry. If the work is "extraordinary," it falls outside the scope of
§502(f) and cannot be allowed. Other courts have reached similar
conclusions.<a href="#36" name="36a">36</a>

Application of §502(f) and the Hanson Industries test to
the facts of most "gap period" requests for payment of criminal defense
fees from the estate would seemingly compel a bankruptcy court to deny
such a claim.

If a debtor cannot, under §502(f), use estate funds to pay his
bankruptcy counsel for an unsuccessful "gap period" defense against an
involuntary petition, it is difficult to fathom how he can use estate
funds to pay for his personal defense against criminal charges during
the "gap period." If the ordinariness of such claims are assessed under
the Hanson Industry standards, it is clear that they cannot be
incurred in the "ordinary course of the debtor's business." Few'if
any'legitimate businesses require a debtor to ordinarily hire criminal
defense counsel. Such fees are not "trade" expenses that have to be
incurred to keep a business afloat. It is unlikely that similar
businesses in a particular trade or industry ordinarily have a need for
criminal defense counsel. And it is simply difficult to conceive of any
legitimate business that retains the services of criminal defense
counsel in the ordinary course of its ongoing commercial affairs. Under
the Hanson Industry test, a "gap period" claim of a debtor's
criminal defense counsel is simply not within the scope of claims that
can be allowed under §502(f).

Approval of such a "gap period" claim would not only violate
§502(f) but would circumvent fundamental principles of federal
bankruptcy law. American bankruptcy laws are intended to give "the
honest but unfortunate debtor who surrenders for distribution the
property which he owns at the time of bankruptcy a new opportunity in
life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and
discouragement of pre-existing debt."<a href="#37" name="37a">37</a> The Code was crafted to "protect those
in financial, not moral, difficulty. The bankruptcy courts were not
created as a haven for criminals."<a href="#38" name="38a">38</a> The bankruptcy court's responsibility in
administering the estate is to achieve a fair and equitable distribution
of assets to the creditors and to "relieve the honest debtor from the
weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start
afresh."<a href="#39" name="39a">39</a>
Allowing a "gap period" claim of a debtor's criminal defense counsel
would inequitably benefit a dishonest debtor by allowing him to use
estate assets to pay a personal post-petition bill, incurred outside the
ordinary course of business, and thereby avoid having the funds used to
make a fair and equitable distribution to his creditors, including,
perhaps, victims of his crime. The Code should not be interpreted to
allow a debtor to escape his obligation to pay the victims of his
pre-petition criminal activities under the Mandatory Criminal
Restitution Act.<a href="#40" name="40a">40</a> The drafters of the Code certainly did
not intend for §502(f) to authorize a convicted criminal to use
estate property to fill the coffers of his defense counsel at the
expense of his victims and other creditors.

Application of §502(f) in this manner may mean that a debtor's
criminal defense counsel cannot recover payment from the estate for "gap
period" work performed. Under §§507(2) and 502(f), allowed gap
period claims are given second priority among unsecured claims. However,
there is no statutory authority for a bankruptcy court to allow payment
of a denied claim from the bankruptcy estate.<a href="#41" name="41a">41</a>

<h4>Conclusion</h4>

The foregoing discussion illustrates why criminal defense counsel
should carefully consider the impact that a bankruptcy filing'either
voluntary or involuntary'can have on the ability of their clients to
compensate them from assets of a bankruptcy estate. Section 303(f) of
the Code may not permit an involuntary debtor to use estate property for
nonbusiness purposes, such as paying criminal defense counsel. In
addition §502(f) may, after the involuntary petition has been
granted, not allow criminal defense counsel to be paid for "gap period"
work from the bankruptcy estate. In summary, criminal defense counsel's
failure to explore the effect of bankruptcy on a client's ability to pay
his attorneys fees during an involuntary bankruptcy may unexpectedly
transform an anticipated profit-making case into a large pro bono
endeavor.

<hr>
<h3>Footnotes</h3>

<a name="1">1</a> Assistant U.S. Attorney,
Southern District of Iowa; J.D. (1989) Washington University; M.A.
(1986-sociology) and B.A. (1984-journalism) Eastern Illinois University;
former law clerk (1989-91) to the late Hon. Frank W. Koger, U.S.
Bankruptcy Judge, W.D. Mo. The views expressed in this article are
solely those of the author and should not be attributed to the U.S.
Department of Justice, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of
Iowa or any other person or entity associated with him. <a href="#1a">Return to article</a>

<a name="2">2</a> Securities Exchange
Commission v. Quinn, 997 F.2d 287, 289 (7th Cir. 1993) (citations
omitted). <a href="#2a">Return to article</a>

<a name="3">3</a> Wheat v. United
States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988). <a href="#3a">Return to
article</a>

<a name="4">4</a> Caplin & Drysdale
Chtd. v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 631 (1989) (neither the Fifth
nor the Sixth Amendment requires Congress to permit a defendant to use
assets adjudged to be forfeitable to pay the defendant's legal fees);
United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 616 (1989) (no
constitutional violation occurs when, after probable cause is adequately
established, the government obtains a pre-trial restraining order
barring a defendant from dissipating forfeitable assets, including
assets he hopes to use to pay for his defense). <a href="#4a">Return to
article</a>

<a name="5">5</a> United States v.
Spiegel, 995 F.2d 138 (9th Cir. 1993) ("Spiegel is in no different a
position than any other criminal defendant whose assets are tied down by
a lien, a prejudgment attachment or a bankruptcy court order. In all
such cases, the freezing of defendant's assets may interfere with his
ability to pay a lawyer, but this does not empower the district court to
interfere with the bankruptcy proceeding or to lift the lien or
attachment imposed by another court, state or federal"). <a href="#5a">Return to article</a>

<a name="6">6</a> "The estate moneys cannot
be used to pay the debtor's attorney in representing him when he has
been charged with a crime." In re Pajarito American Indian Art
Inc., 11 B.R. 807, 811 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1981); In re Engel,
124 F.3d 567 (3rd Cir. 1997); Matter of Jack Winter Apparel Inc.,
119 B.R. 629 (E.D. Wis. 1990); In re Duque, 48 B.R. 965 (S.D.
Fla. 1984); In re French, 139 B.R. 485 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1992);

In re Dixon, 143 B.R. 671 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992); In re
Stoecker, 114 B.R. 965 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990); In re Moore,
57 B.R. 270 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986); See, also, Gaumer, Craig
Peyton and Griffith, Paul R., "Presumed Indigent: The Effect of
Bankruptcy on a Debtor's Sixth Amendment Right to Criminal Defense
Counsel," 62 UMKC L. Rev. 277 (1993). <a href="#6a">Return to
article</a>

<a name="7">7</a> 11 U.S.C. §303(a).

<a href="#7a">Return to article</a>

<a name="8">8</a> 11 U.S.C. §303(a)
and §101(41) (defining "person"). <a href="#8a">Return to
article</a>

<a name="9">9</a> 11 U.S.C. §303(a).
<a href="#9a">Return to article</a>

<a name="10">10</a> 11 U.S.C. §303(b).

<a href="#10a">Return to article</a>

<a name="11">11</a> 11 U.S.C.
§303(b)(1). <a href="#11a">Return to article</a>

<a name="12">12</a> See 11 U.S.C.
§303(b)(2). Matter of Rassi, 701 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1983).
<a href="#12a">Return to article</a>

<a name="13">13</a> 11 U.S.C. §303(d).
<a href="#13a">Return to article</a>

<a name="14">14</a> 11 U.S.C. §303(h).
<a href="#14a">Return to article</a>

<a name="15">15</a> In re Byrd, 357
F.3d 433 (4th Cir. 2004). <a href="#15a">Return to article</a>

<a name="16">16</a> In re McGinnis, 306
B.R. 279, 284 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2004). <a href="#16a">Return to
article</a>

<a name="17">17</a> 11 U.S.C.
§541(a)(1). <a href="#17a">Return to article</a>

<a name="18">18</a> E.E.O.C. v. McLean
Trucking Co., 834 F.2d 398, 399 (4th Cir. 1987) (automatic stay is
created upon filing of either voluntary or involuntary bankruptcy
petitions); Matter of Eugene L. Pieper P.C., 202 B.R. 294, 297
(Bankr. D. Neb. 1996) ("The automatic stay is triggered by the act of
filing an involuntary petition pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §303, not by
the entry of an order for relief by the court"). <a href="#18a">Return
to article</a>

<a name="19">19</a> In re DiLorenzo,
161 B.R. 752, 754 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("an alleged debtor should
remain in control of his assets unless it is shown that he may attempt
to abscond with assets, dispose of them at less than their fair market
value, or dismantle his business, all to the detriment of [his]
creditors.") citing H.R.Rep. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 323
(1977); Senate Rep. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1978), U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, 5787, 6279, 5819. <a href="#19a">Return to article</a>

<a name="20">20</a> See In re Bankvest
Capital Corp., 276 B.R. 12, 26 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002) ("Section
303(f) refers to an involuntary debtor using its property to carry on
its business"); In re Consolidated Partners Inv. Co., 156 B.R.
982, 984 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993) ("Under §303(f), the debtor, as an
involuntary debtor, was authorized to continue its business operations
unrestrained by the provisions of §363 of the Code"); In re Omni
Graphics Inc., 119 B.R. 641, 643 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1990) (bank's
actions violated automatic stay, and §303(f) did not apply because
sale of the assets "in no manner enabled the debtor to carry on its
business operations. Quite to the contrary, the surrender agreement
contemplated the debtor not engaging in business and was geared to a
complete liquidation of all of the debtor's assets"); In re
Greenwalt, 48 B.R. 804, 807 (D. Colo. 1985) (loan was "outside the
ambit of transfers made in the ordinary course of business [under
§303(f)] because the debtor was not in the business of providing
financing to fledgling companies"). <a href="#20a">Return to article</a>

<a name="21">21</a> The United States does
not waive its prior assertion that the settlement is objectionable
because it may have involved a transaction that is avoidable under 11
U.S.C. §549. Further, it reserves the right to argue that any
allowed post-petition claim for the services of the debtor's criminal
defense counsel should be equitably subordinated to those of general
creditors of the estate, and particularly the victims of the debtor's
crime, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §510. <a href="#21a">Return to
article</a>

<a name="22">22</a> See In re
Commonwealth Sprinkler Co. Inc., 295 B.R. 852 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
2003); In re Monarch Capital Corp., 163 B.R. 899 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1994); In re Manufacturer's Supply Co., 132 B.R. 127 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1991); In re Hanson Industries Inc., 90 B.R. 405 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1988). <a href="#22a">Return to article</a>

<a name="23">23</a> In re Hanson Industries
Inc., 90 B.R. 405, 413 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988) (citing S. Rep.
No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 5787, 5851); In re Manufacturer's Supply
Co., 132 B.R. 127, 129 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1991). <a href="#23a">Return to article</a>

<a name="24">24</a> Cf. Hartford
Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank N. A., 530 U.S. 1, 6
(2000) ("when the statute's language is plain, the sole function of the
courts...is to enforce it according to its terms") (citations omitted).
<a href="#24a">Return to article</a>

<a name="25">25</a> Judge Dreher was placed
in a predicament similar to that in which this court finds itself. She
noted: "I have the rather unwelcome task of passing on requests for
attorneys fees and costs arising out of...[an involuntary bankruptcy
case]...without having the benefit of presiding at the time." Id.
at 406. Though the task of passing judgment on whether attorney's fees
may be paid from the estate can be an unwelcome experience, it is
nevertheless necessary to ensure that the limited asset of a bankruptcy
estate are fairly distributed in the manner provided by the Code. <a href="#25a">Return to article</a>

<a name="26">26</a> Id. at 407. <a href="#26a">Return to article</a>

<a name="27">27</a> Id. at 408. <a href="#27a">Return to article</a>

<a name="28">28</a> Id. at 412. <a href="#28a">Return to article</a>

<a name="29">29</a> Id. at 413-417.
<a href="#29a">Return to article</a>

<a name="30">30</a> Id. at 413,

citing 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5787, 5851. <a href="#30a">Return to article</a>

<a name="31">31</a> Id. at 414. <a href="#31a">Return to article</a>

<a name="32">32</a> Id. <a href="#32a">Return to article</a>

<a name="33">33</a> Id. at 414-415,
citing Kallen v. Litas, 47 B.R. 977 at 984 (N.D. Ill. 1985). <a href="#33a">Return to article</a>

<a name="34">34</a> Id. at 414. <a href="#34a">Return to article</a>

<a name="35">35</a> Id. at 417. <a href="#35a">Return to article</a>

<a name="36">36</a> See In re
Commonwealth Sprinkler Co. Inc., 295 B.R. 852, 854-55 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 2003) (fees of debtor's counsel during gap period were not in
ordinary course of debtor's business); In re Monarch Capital
Corp., 163 B.R. 899, 905 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994) (claim arising from
arrangement prompted by the bankruptcy filing, and claim arising from
sale of corporate subsidiary, were denied because they were out of the
ordinary); In re Manufacturer's Supply Co., 132 B.R. 127 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1991). <a href="#36a">Return to article</a>

<a name="37">37</a> Local
Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). <a href="#37a">Return to
article</a>

<a name="38">38</a> Barnette v.
Evans, 673 F.2d 1250, 1251 (11th Cir. 1982); In re French,
139 B.R. 485, 489 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1992). <a href="#38a">Return to
article</a>

<a name="39">39</a> In re Luongo,
259 F.3d 323, 330 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). <a href="#39a">Return to article</a>

<a name="40">40</a> 18 U.S.C. §3663A.
<a href="#40a">Return to article</a>

<a name="41">41</a> See, e.g., 11
U.S.C. §726 (distribution of property of the estate). <a href="#41a">Return to article</a>

Journal Authors

Craig Peyton Gaumer

Journal Date

Tuesday, November 1, 2005 - 12:00

Bankruptcy Rule

2005