The Importance of Being Plain A Textual Response to Cybergenics II

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Nov 2002

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On Sept. 20, 2002, a panel of the <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP2.1&vr=1.0&cite=… Circuit Court of Appeals</a><a href="#2" name="2a">2</a> departed
from 100 years of settled bankruptcy law based on a "plain statutory language"
analysis that the panel believed was mandated by the Supreme Court's decision in

Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank N.A.<a href="#3" name="3a">3</a> Under the
Bankruptcy Code,<a href="#4" name="4a">4</a> the power to sue third parties on behalf of a debtor's estate
is statutorily conferred upon the trustee in bankruptcy.<a href="#5" name="5a">5</a>

In reorganization cases under chapter 11, the debtors' management routinely continues
in possession of the property of the debtor and assumes all of the rights and powers
of a trustee as a debtor-in-possession (DIP).<a href="#6" name="6a">6</a> Thus, courts have uniformly held
in corporate reorganization cases that a DIP is the proper party to exercise the
various rights and powers conferred upon a trustee under the Code for the benefit of
the estate's creditors.

However, a significant line of authority dating back to at least 1900 provides
a qualified right of creditors to sue "in the name of" the trustee if the trustee
(or DIP) fails to perform its duties.<a href="#7" name="7a">7</a> When such failure to perform is alleged,
the bankruptcy court has broad discretion to determine whether the interests of all
creditors is best furthered by permitting someone other than the trustee or DIP to
sue on behalf of the estate, and the court has historically been the intended
gatekeeper of this derivative power. In appropriate instances (such as when the DIP
needs to investigate claims against its own directors and officers), the statutory
committee of creditors appointed in chapter 11 reorganization cases has been authorized
to commence lawsuits on behalf of the estate.<a href="#8" name="8a">8</a>

This practice has been upheld for decades by federal appeals courts<a href="#9" name="9a">9</a> and is in
fact the common and expected practice among DIPs and creditors' committees,
particularly in bankruptcy cases involving pre-bankruptcy fraud or other irregularities
in which the business is nevertheless best left to management to operate. In a
quest to maximize value, the parties who are best positioned to rehabilitate a
company's operating performance may not be the best parties to investigate the
pre-bankruptcy malfeasance of their colleagues or the board. Instead of forcing the
estate to choose a team best suited for one, but not both, missions, bankruptcy
courts (until Cybergenics II) had the flexibility to accommodate both objectives
by authorizing committees to investigate and prosecute such causes of action on behalf
of the estate.

Notwithstanding statutory and judicial support for derivative standing, a panel of
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, relying on the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Hen House, held that the Bankruptcy Code's use of the phrase "the trustee
may" authorizes only the trustee or DIP to sue on behalf of the estate. Although
this result was explicitly not mandated by the Supreme Court in Hen House,<a href="#10" name="10a">10</a>

the Cybergenics II panel extended the Supreme Court's "plain statutory language"
analysis to foreclose a bankruptcy court even from having discretion to authorize
another party to stand in the shoes of the trustee.<a href="#11" name="11a">11</a> The Third Circuit panel
concluded that the Bankruptcy Code "leaves a creditor or creditors' committee with
several options should they desire that fraudulent transfer claims be prosecuted where
the DIP declines to do so."<a href="#12" name="12a">12</a> Specifically, a creditor or creditors' committee
could either "move for the appointment of a trustee under §1104," or
alternatively, a committee "could move...to dismiss the bankruptcy petition under
§1112 so that it could pursue its state law avoidance claims in state court."<a href="#13" name="13a">13</a>

According to the chief bankruptcy judge of Delaware, before whom the author
appeared shortly after Cybergenics II was handed down, the Third Circuit panel's
decision could adversely impact "hundreds" of pending actions. Indeed, if the
panel's decision is not overruled en banc, the split of appellate authority would be
of such significance that it warrants resolution by the Supreme Court on certiorari.

<h3>Limiting Hen House to Non-derivative Actions</h3>

<h4>The Supreme Court's Holding vs. Footnote 5</h4>

In Hen House, the straightforward issue presented was whether §506(c) of the
Bankruptcy Code "allows an administrative claimant of a bankruptcy estate to seek
payment of its claim from property encumbered by a secured creditor's lien."<a href="#14" name="14a">14</a>
Because administrative expenses in bankruptcy<a href="#15" name="15a">15</a> do not have priority over secured
claims, the claimant (Hartford Underwriters Insurance Co.) sought to invoke
§506(c) of the Bankruptcy Code which provides "an important exception to the
rule."<a href="#16" name="16a">16</a> Specifically, the claimant sought to recover for its own account (not for
the benefit of reimbursing the estate) workers' compensation insurance premiums that the
debtor (then a DIP) neglected to pay.<a href="#17" name="17a">17</a> Section 506(c) of the Bankruptcy
Code permits the trustee in bankruptcy (which would include a DIP in chapter 11
cases) to recover expenses and costs attendant to maintaining a secured creditor's
collateral: "The trustee may recover from property securing an allowed secured claim the
reasonable, necessary costs and expenses of preserving, or disposing of, such property
to the extent of any benefit to the holder of such claim."<a href="#18" name="18a">18</a>

The Supreme Court held that "the natural reading of the text" specifically "the
trustee may," requires an interpretation that only the trustee—not individual claimants—may
charge administrative costs and expenses against the collateral of a secured
creditor.<a href="#19" name="19a">19</a> In footnote 5 to the unanimous Supreme Court opinion, the court
expressly stated that it "do[es] not address whether a bankruptcy court can allow other
interested parties to act in the trustee's stead in pursuing recovery under
§506(c)."<a href="#20" name="20a">20</a> The court noted that "[w]hatever the validity of that practice, it
has no analogous application here, since petitioner did not ask the trustee to pursue
payment under §506(c) and did not seek permission from the bankruptcy court to take
such action in the trustee's stead. Petitioner asserted an independent right to use
§506(c), which is what we reject today."<a href="#21" name="21a">21</a>

<h4>No "Established Pre-Code Practice" Found in Hen House</h4>

The Supreme Court dismissed the administrative claimant's argument that the ability
of administrative creditors to surcharge a secured creditor's collateral was an established
pre-Code practice under the former Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and that such practice
was not intended to be overruled by the Bankruptcy Code's permissive use of the words
"the trustee may."<a href="#22" name="22a">22</a> The reason for dismissing such an argument, however, was that
the petitioner was unable to establish a bankruptcy practice "sufficiently widespread and
well recognized to justify the conclusion of implicit adoption by the Code."<a href="#23" name="23a">23</a>
Significantly, the court was not convinced that a random administrative creditor's right
to surcharge a secured creditor's collateral was "the type of 'rule' that...Congress
was aware of when enacting the Code."<a href="#24" name="24a">24</a> In any event, the court held that
§506(c) of the Bankruptcy Code—the only statute relied on by the petitioner—was
sufficiently unambiguous to require no interpretation beyond its plain meaning.<a href="#25" name="25a">25</a>

The Cybergenics II panel took the Supreme Court's footnote reference to derivative
standing in Hen House as standard procedure for an issue not addressed but for which
the same analysis should probably apply.<a href="#26" name="26a">26</a> While it is true that Hen House did
not involve a claimant seeking to invoke derivative standing on behalf of the estate,
the court affirmatively (and deliberately, based on the oral argument before the
court) concluded in footnote 5 that derivative standing cases "have no analogous
application here." Moreover, the court appeared to agree with the Seventh Circuit's
Xonics Photochemical decision, which (like the Hen House court) rejected a creditor's

independent right to sue and noted in dicta that the creditor could have sought leave
of the court to assert a derivative action.<a href="#27" name="27a">27</a>

<h4>The Record of Oral Argument Is Telling</h4>

The reasons behind footnote 5 in Hen House are clear from the oral argument
before the court held on March 20, 2000. Indeed, the theme of derivative
standing permeated the questions by the justices of the court. These questions
demonstrated the court's careful thought in ensuring that no court would read Hen
House as having analogous application to the derivative standing cases:

<blockquote>
Q: I know, but what I am trying to do for my own purposes is to find an
analogy, and I know it's a rough analogy, but I would like to know just
for my own purposes what happens, and it must happen often, of when a trustee
doesn't bring a lawsuit to get some money for the estate, that a big creditor
thinks he ought to bring. [How] [d]oes bankruptcy normally work—this can't be
unusual.

A: It's not unusual.

Q: And in such circumstances, there are two possibilities. One is that you
bring a suit to sue the trustee and make him do it. Another possibility is,
you bring your own lawsuit but it—somehow you're standing in the shoes of the
trustee.

A: Both exist...[Y]ou can seek what is known as derivative standing.

Q: Fine. Now, if that's so in that circumstance, why shouldn't that be so
in this circumstance?

A: Because in this circumstance, Hartford didn't follow that procedure.
Hartford didn't ask the trustee to act, and Hartford didn't go to the
bankruptcy court to force the trustee to act, and Hartford didn't go to the
bankruptcy court having made a record on that subject and said, you know,
somebody needs to sue Union Planters because we think there's a pretty good
506(c) claim...<a href="#28" name="28a">28</a>

* * *

Q: If we assume that is correct, then, if we assume that is a proper
practice, then if Hartford had done two things differently, Hartford would be
entitled to recover, I take it, on the assumption that there may be a
derivative action, and the two different things are, number 1, Hartford would
have to have gone to the trustee, and the trustee would have had to indicate
refusal.

* * *

Q: And number 2, Hartford, bringing its suit, would have to have captioned
it, Hartford ex rel, or trustee ex rel Hartford, rather than Hartford, and
if those two facts had been different, assuming derivative actions are
appropriate, Hartford could recover here. Am I right, or am I missing
something?<a href="#29" name="29a">29</a>

</blockquote>

Thus, reading footnote 5 and the entirety of the Hen House decision, in light
of the questions posed by the court at oral argument, more than merely passing mention
must be given the Supreme Court's statement that derivative standing cases "have no
analogous application here." The question, then, is whether Hen House has application
to derivative standing cases.

<h4>Post-Hen House Derivative Standing Cases</h4>

The threat of unintended consequences of Hen House had been considered by several
bankruptcy courts<a href="#30" name="30a">30</a> and one appellate panel<a href="#31" name="31a">31</a> prior to the Third Circuit panel's
decision in Cybergenics II. In those cases that have given in-depth consideration
to the established underpinnings of derivative standing cases, Hen House has been
found not to bar non-trustee actions brought on behalf of the estate if such
derivative actions are approved by the bankruptcy court. The common theme in these
bankruptcy court decisions is that because Hen House clearly stated that cases like

Xonics, which upholds derivative standing, "were not analogous" to the controversy being
decided by the Supreme Court, "it follows that [Hen House] is not analogous
here."<a href="#32" name="32a">32</a>

In the post-Hen House case of Commodore International Ltd., a panel of the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals had occasion to uphold and even expand its seminal
decision on derivative standing, Unsecured Creditors Committee v. Noyes (In re STN
Enterprises).<a href="#33" name="33a">33</a> Although not expressly distinguishing (or even mentioning) Hen
House, the Commodore panel reaffirmed the Second Circuit's rule of permitting
derivative standing for creditors' committees when a trustee or DIP failed or declined
to bring suit, and such suit is demonstrated to be in the best interests of the bankruptcy estate. Commodore further clarified that the DIP's reasons for refusal to
bring suit need not be the subject of protracted litigation if the DIP is willing
to confer its authority upon the creditors' committee. While the bankruptcy court is
still required to determine that a potential derivative suit is necessary and beneficial
to the estate, upholding agreements to confer standing consensually provide for a
"reasonable and practicable division of labor between the creditors' committee and the
DIP or trustee."<a href="#34" name="34a">34</a>

The Cybergenics II court declined to follow any of the post-Hen House lower
courts based on the Supreme Court's deference to the "plain statutory language" of the
text of the Bankruptcy Code and found that the Second Circuit's Commodore decision
was distinguishable because the creditors' committee's authority was conferred by agreement
of the DIP.<a href="#35" name="35a">35</a> However, deference to the whole of the text<a href="#36" name="36a">36</a> of the Bankruptcy
Code, as demonstrated below, would have produced the opposite result than that reached
by the panel in Cybergenics II.

<h3>Pre-Code Practice Was Intentionally Continued by Congress</h3>

<h4>Bankruptcy Act §64(a)(1) Became Bankruptcy Code §503(b)(3)(B)</h4>

The Supreme Court has held that "[w]hen Congress amends the bankruptcy laws, it
does not write 'on a clean slate.'"<a href="#37" name="37a">37</a> In that regard, the court has been careful
not to accept arguments that would interpret the Code "to effect a major change in
pre-Code practice that is not the subject of at least some discussion in the
legislative history."<a href="#38" name="38a">38</a> Indeed, in Hen House, the Supreme Court went to
considerable lengths to examine whether there was any established and widespread pre-Code
practice relating to independent rights of administrative creditors to surcharge
collateral, and it expressly found that none existed. Contrary to the claimant's
hollow interpretive attempts in Hen House, there is no question that, notwithstanding
trustee primacy, "[i]t has been the settled law since 1898 that creditors may
recover property for the benefit of the estate."<a href="#39" name="39a">39</a>

A recent bankruptcy court decision not considered by the Cybergenics II panel
thoroughly studied the pre-Code practice of derivative standing of creditors to prosecute
estate actions. In In re Godon Inc., the bankruptcy court noted that such rights
were judicially developed and were recognized by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
as early as 1900.<a href="#40" name="40a">40</a> In 1903, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act of
1898 "to make explicit what had already been determined to be implicit:"<a href="#41" name="41a">41</a>

<blockquote>
(a) The debts to have priority, in advance of the payment of dividends to
creditors, and to be paid in full out of bankrupt estates, and the order of
payments shall be: (1)...; where property of the bankrupt, transferred or
concealed by him either before or after the filing of the petition, is recovered
for the benefit of the estate of the bankrupt by the efforts and at the cost
and expense of one or more creditors, the reasonable costs and expenses of such
recovery;...<a href="#42" name="42a">42</a>

</blockquote>

However, these rights of derivative standing were not unlimited. In keeping with
the primacy of a trustee, creditors needed to obtain permission either from the trustee
or the court before acting.<a href="#43" name="43a">43</a> No less a judicial authority than Judge Learned Hand
(then circuit judge) explained the rationale for permitting creditor derivative suits,
conditioned upon obtaining authorization from the court:

<blockquote>
The receiver is responsible for the collection of the assets, and he alone can
authorize charges against them. If any creditor, petitioning or other, learns
facts which lead him to suppose that property has been concealed, he may, and
indeed he should, advise the receiver, and if the receiver prove[s] slack, he
may apply to the referee [bankruptcy judge] to stir him to action. The referee
or the [district] judge may then authorize the creditor to proceed, and he will
be entitled to his reward under [§64(a)(1)], but not otherwise.<a href="#44" name="44a">44</a>
</blockquote>

The authority to recoup costs, pursuant to §64(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Act,
of a creditor who brings suit on behalf of the estate was expressly continued by
Congress in enacting the Bankruptcy Code in 1978. The Report of the Commission
on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States explicitly stated, in the context of what
is now §503(b)(3)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code, "[the new proposed section]
continues the policy of §64a(1) and allows a creditor to recover expense incurred
which actually benefits the estate."<a href="#45" name="45a">45</a> The only issue that remained in dispute prior
to actual enactment of the Bankruptcy Code was whether the creditor needed to obtain

prior court approval in order to recoup costs in service to the estate, and the
resulting text in §503(b)(3)(B) "represents a compromise"<a href="#46" name="46a">46</a> within Congress
and requires prior court approval. Section 503(b)(3)(B) of the Bankruptcy
Code currently provides, in pertinent part:

<blockquote>
(b) After notice and a hearing, there shall be allowed administrative
expenses...including—
<blockquote>
(3) the actual, necessary expenses...incurred by—
<blockquote>
(B) a creditor that recovers, after the court's approval, for the
benefit of the estate any property transferred or concealed by the
debtor;...<a href="#47" name="47a">47</a>
</blockquote>
</blockquote>

</blockquote>

Thus, contrary to the suggestion in Cybergenics II that the Bankruptcy Code
provides no statutory authority for creditors or creditors' committees to bring derivative
actions on behalf of the estate, §503(b)(3)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code, and
its predecessor, §64(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Act, provide the requisite textual
support. Interestingly, the Third Circuit panel in Cybergenics II considered and
dismissed the import of §503(b)(3)(B) in its discussion of one post-Hen
House bankruptcy court decision, In re Blount.<a href="#48" name="48a">48</a> It appears that the Third
Circuit panel construed §503(b)(3)(B) as merely providing authority to recover
"various administrative expenses" without considering that the statute contemplates a
creditor first "recover[ing], after the court's approval, for the benefit of the estate
any property transferred or concealed by the debtor."<a href="#49" name="49a">49</a> Under the Third Circuit
panel's restrictive construction, a creditor has authority to recoup administrative
expenses in connection with recovering property for the benefit of the estate, but that
creditor could not be authorized to recover the property in the first place. Such a
literal reading of the Bankruptcy Code is belied by the well-established practice of
derivative standing in bankruptcy and, more textually, would render
§503(b)(3)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code, and its predecessor statute,
internally inconsistent.

The Cybergenics II panel also cast Blount as a decision that supposedly agreed
that the Supreme Court's decision in Hen House threatened the validity of derivative
standing cases. Blount in fact held the opposite to be true:

<blockquote>
Section 503(b)(3)(B), therefore, must be interpreted to provide statutory
authority for a court to approve a creditor to act instead of a trustee, and
thus provides an express statutory grant of the authority of the court to confer
derivative standing upon creditors to pursue actions that will lead to recovery
of property transferred or concealed by the debtor, for the benefit of the
estate.<a href="#50" name="50a">50</a>

</blockquote>

In addition, the pre-Code practice of courts having discretion to permit derivative
standing was prevalent, even without a textual reference to §64(a)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Act, based in large part on the power of courts to have flexibility as
gatekeepers to ensure an estate's value was maximized. In addition to several lower
court cases,<a href="#51" name="51a">51</a> the Supreme Court itself confirmed the propriety of permitting an
entity other than the trustee to maintain an estate's cause of action during the
pendency of a trustee's tenure. In Meyer v. Fleming,<a href="#52" name="52a">52</a> a case discussed by
Justice Breyer at oral argument in Hen House,<a href="#53" name="53a">53</a> a substantial but minority
shareholder of a debtor commenced a derivative suit on behalf of the debtor
pre-bankruptcy alleging that the defendant and the debtor had conspired to violate
antitrust laws. After the commencement of the debtor's bankruptcy case, a trustee
was appointed for the debtor, and the defendant moved to dismiss the suit on the
grounds that the action "had become vested in [the debtor's] bankruptcy trustee and
could no longer be asserted" by the shareholder.<a href="#54" name="54a">54</a> Refusing to dismiss the suit,
the Supreme Court held that while the bankruptcy trustee may be the proper party by
statute to commence a new suit or take control of the existing lawsuit, the bankruptcy
court had the inherent power to determine how best to proceed.<a href="#55" name="55a">55</a> Significantly, the
Supreme Court noted, in dicta, that if the action had been sought to be commenced
by the shareholder after the debtor's bankruptcy case was commenced, "it could be done
only with the consent of the bankruptcy court, [f]or it has exclusive authority to
determine how causes of action which have a become part of the bankruptcy estate shall
be enforced."<a href="#56" name="56a">56</a>

<h4>Legislative History Supports Discretion to Confer Derivative Standing</h4>

1. Disappointing Creditor Involvement. Although resorting to legislative history
is not necessary in light of the plain statutory language of §503(b)(3)(B)
of the Bankruptcy Code and §64(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Act, a brief look
at the official congressional statements accompanying the 1978 reform legislation speaks
volumes for maximizing creditor involvement, not minimizing it, and encouraging vigilance
and action, not stifling them. According to the Bankruptcy Code's accompanying Report
of the Committee on the Judiciary, the "Bankruptcy Act was designed in 1898 to
give creditors control over the bankrupt's assets which in equity belong to them."<a href="#57" name="57a">57</a>

In reforming the Bankruptcy Act, the Report of the Committee noted disappointingly
that "creditor control of bankruptcy cases has become a myth in all but the largest
cases."<a href="#58" name="58a">58</a> The Committee further explained that "[c]reditors take little interest in
pursuing a bankrupt debtor [because] [t]hey are unwilling to throw good money after
bad. As a result, creditor participation in bankruptcy cases is very low."<a href="#59" name="59a">59</a>

2. Statutory Role of Creditors' Committees. With the foregoing criticism of poor
creditor participation as the backdrop, Congress repealed the Bankruptcy Act of
1898 and enacted the Bankruptcy Code. The significance of statutory creditors'
committees in chapter 11 reorganization cases was expressly made part of the
accompanying Report of the Committee on the Judiciary:

<blockquote>
Under the [new legislation for reorganizations and arrangements]...[t]here will
be at least one committee in each case. Because unsecured creditors are normally
the largest body of creditors and most in need of representation, the bill
requires that there be a committee of unsecured creditors.<a href="#60" name="60a">60</a>
</blockquote>

While the foregoing references to legislative history as to the need for bankruptcy
reform legislation cannot overcome the text of the Bankruptcy Code, they are certainly
instructive in interpreting the practical application of Congress' broad grants of
statutory authority and power.<a href="#61" name="61a">61</a>

<h3>Statutory Authority of Court and Creditors' Committees in Chapter 11</h3>

<h4>Court's Power to "Condition" and "Limit" DIP's Trustee Rights and Powers</h4>

When Congress expressly grants broad equitable powers to bankruptcy courts, it is
contrary to the text to minimize such grants by insisting that bankruptcy is a
Code-based, plain language, law that requires textual support for every conceivable
outcome. This is particularly true when, unlike the case in Hen House, it is the
bankruptcy court's own power, not that of a single creditor, that is the subject of
the legislation. In the context of the role of a DIP, it bears emphasizing that
§1107(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which confers "all the rights...and powers"
of a trustee upon a DIP, is expressly subject "to such limitations or conditions
as the court prescribes."<a href="#62" name="62a">62</a> This specific qualification on the DIP's rights and
powers, applicable in chapter 11 cases, is in addition to the bankruptcy court's
general equitable power under §105(a) to "issue any order, process or judgment that
is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title."<a href="#63" name="63a">63</a>

<h4>DIP Does Not Have All Trustee Duties</h4>

The textual differences between trustees and DIPs are even more pronounced in the
context of the duties of a DIP because Congress expressly limited the duties of
DIPs as compared with the duties imposed on chapter 11 trustees.<a href="#64" name="64a">64</a> Although not
often raised by bankruptcy courts or practitioners, §1107(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code requires that a DIP "perform all the functions and duties, except the duties
specified in §1106(a)(2), (3) and (4) of this title, of a trustee
serving in a case under this chapter."<a href="#65" name="65a">65</a> The excluded duties encompass the essential
and anticipated trustee function to "investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities
and financial condition of the debtor...."<a href="#66" name="66a">66</a> Section 1107(a) also excludes any
duty of the DIP to "file a statement of [such] investigation...including any fact
ascertained pertaining to fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, misconduct, mismanagement or
irregularity in the management of the affairs of the debtor, or to a cause of action
available to the estate."<a href="#67" name="67a">67</a>

Of course, creditors would expect that an estate-funded fiduciary would investigate
and, if appropriate, prosecute causes of action available to the estate. But if the
DIP—supposedly the exclusive estate representative where no trustee is appointed—has no
duty to investigate such wrongs, who will investigate potential avoidance actions and
other sources of recovery for the benefit of the estate? Congress certainly could not
have envisaged that lackluster creditor participation under the Bankruptcy Act would
suddenly be transformed into enthusiastic vigilantism by individual creditors who were
previously reluctant "to throw good money after bad" pursuing the debtor.

<h4>Statutory Creditors' Committees Expressly Authorized to Investigate and Perform "Such Other Services"</h4>

Congress seamlessly resolved the hole left by the limited trustee duties imposed on
DIPs in §1107(a) of the Bankruptcy Code by mandating<a href="#68" name="68a">68</a> the appointment of a
statutory unsecured creditors' committee and specifically authorizing that committee to
undertake all of the investigative duties of a trustee. Section 1103(c) of the
Bankruptcy Code enumerates the rights and powers of a statutory creditors' comm

Journal Authors

Susheel Kirpalani

Journal Date

Friday, November 1, 2002 - 12:00

Bankruptcy Rule

2002