Involuntary Actions by Limited Partners vs. L.P.s

In <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?rs=CLWD3.0&amp;vr=2.0&amp;cite=2…
re Paper I Partners L.P.,</i> 283 B.R. 661 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2002)</a>, Bankruptcy Judge <b>Robert E. Gerber</b> addressed issues relating to involuntary cases
filed by former limited partners against limited partnerships. The Paper I
partnership was formed to effect a tender offer for shares of a Swiss company.
While formed under the laws of Delaware, the partnership agreement listed
Luxemburg as the principal place of business and designated a registered office
and agent in Delaware. However, the court found that the business of the
partnership was conducted in significant part out of the offices of the general
partner in New York City. There was also a related case against Papier II,
which was also a limited partnership but organized offshore under the laws of
Turks and Caicos Islands, B.W.I.

</p><p>The
Papier II partnership agreement listed Luxemburg as its principal place of
business and a designated registered office and agent in Turks and Caicos. The
court found, however, that the business of Papier II was also conducted in
significant part out of offices of the general partner in New York City. The 27
limited partners of Paper I and three of the limited partners of Papier II had indicated
an unwillingness to extend the life of the partnership and the general partner
in letters faxed from the New York office, notified the limited partners that
the general partner had elected to treat each as a withdrawn partner and that
each would receive the value of their interest in the partnership within 30
days after the withdrawal date, noting the partnership would be continued after
the withdrawal. The partnership agreement had provisions for valuing
withdrawing limited partners' interest and the currency with which it
could be paid.

</p><p>However,
rather than being paid in cash or with securities held by the partnership, each
received a "distribution" in a document denominated as a
"promissory security." The court found that this delivery did not satisfy
the payment obligation of the partnership agreement, but was instead "a
forced extension of credit by the limited partners to the partnership."
Certain limited partners filed involuntary petitions against the two
partnerships and were subsequently joined by other limited partners. The first
issue the court considered was whether, under <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?rs=CLWD3.0&amp;vr=2.0&amp;cite=1…
U.S.C. §109</a>, the involuntary petition should be dismissed on the
grounds that the partnerships had neither domiciles nor places of business or
property in the United States. The court noted that there were four alternative
means for eligibility to be a debtor: (1) a residence in the United States, (2)
a domicile in the United States, (3) a place of business in the United States
and (4) property in the United States. The court found that §109 does not
require that the debtor's principal place of business be in the United
States, but only that the debtor have "a place of business in the United
States." The court found that the place of business of the
partnership's general partner was in New York City, and as such, the
court had "no doubt" this requirement had been met for each of the
two partnerships. Noting that a place of business or even a principal place of
business is a question of fact, the court found that as a matter of fact each
partnership had a place of business in the United States. The court also noted
that while property in the United States must be real and cannot be "some
type of remote or inchoate claim against property in the United States,"
there was no statutory requirement as to the property's minimum value.
Original business documents are property of the estate for purposes of
§109. <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?rs=CLWD3.0&amp;vr=2.0&amp;cite=2…
re Global Ocean Carriers Ltd.,</i> 251 B.R. 31
(Bankr. D. Del. 2000)</a>. As the general partner maintained
original documents for each of the partnerships in New York, the court found
this was "property in the United States" sufficient to satisfy
§109.

</p><p>Thus
dismissing the first attack, the court went on to address the requirements
under §303(b) that an involuntary case be commenced only if the
petitioning creditors hold "non-contingent, bona fide claims"
against the debtor. The court found that this standard was also satisfied. It
noted that the partnerships' balance sheets showed their obligations to
the former limited partners as a liability that was never presented as disputed
or contingent. The court noted that the only issue is whether the unpaid debt
was "due." The partnerships asserted that the debts to the former
limited partners were not yet due because the partnerships had substituted a
new obligation, the "promissory securities," with a later maturity.
The court rejected that contention, noting that petitioning creditors did not
consent to the substitution, finding that the partnerships had no basis to
"pay" their obligations in that fashion or to modify the maturity
of the debt to the former limited partner. The court then considered whether
the alleged debtor-partnerships were "generally paying their debts as
they become due." The court noted that the matured and unpaid debt of
Paper I was approximately $4.6 million, and Papier II was more than $1.8
million. For each entity, the debt to the former limited partners was in excess
of 60 percent of the total of each partnership's total obligations. Thus,
the court found that the alleged debtor-partnerships were not generally paying
their debts as they mature. The court also rejected the suggestion that it
should abstain or dismiss under §305, relying on standards set forth by
the court in <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?rs=CLWD3.0&amp;vr=2.0&amp;cite=1…
re 801 South Wells Street L.P.,</i> 192 B.R. 718,
723 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996)</a>.

</p><h3>Local Rules Must Be Consistent with Code and FRBP</h3>

<p>In <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?rs=CLWD3.0&amp;vr=2.0&amp;cite=2…
re Steinacher,</i> 283 B.R. 768 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
2002)</a>, the court considered the validity of a local rule. The
court noted that since the validity of a court rule is a question of law, a
bankruptcy court's conclusions related to that rule that are reviewed <i>de
novo</i> and a bankruptcy court's
application of a local rule is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Although the
district courts and bankruptcy courts have been delegated authority to adopt
local rules, that authority is carefully controlled. Any local rules must be
consistent with the Bankruptcy Code and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure. The court noted that in the Ninth Circuit, a three-part test exists
to determine the validity of a local rule: (1) whether it is consistent with
the Acts of Congress and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, (2) whether
it is more than merely duplicative of such statutes and rules, and (3) whether
it prohibits or limits the use of official forms. The court reviewed the local
rule in question and held that it was consistent with §1322 of the
Bankruptcy Code as it abridged the debtor's right to cure default under
§1322. As such, the court held that the rule was invalid and that the
bankruptcy court erred in dismissing the debtor's bankruptcy case because
it did not comply with such local rule.

</p><h3>Miscellaneous</h3>

<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?rs=CLWD3.0&amp;vr=2.0&amp;cite=2…
re Empresas Omajede Inc.,</i> 283 B.R. 636 (D. P.R.
2002)</a> (director's appeal from confirmation of the
bankruptcy reorganization plan dismissed where sole grounds for appeal was that
neither the plan nor disclosure statement had been approved by unanimous
consent of the board of directors as required by the debtor's articles of
incorporation);

</li><li><a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?rs=CLWD3.0&amp;vr=2.0&amp;cite=2…
re Larocque II,</i> 283 B.R. 640 (Bankr. D. R.I. 2002)</a>
(adversary proceedings seeking to enforce and extend right of rescission under
the Truth in Lending Act and for determination that the mortgage on the
debtor's home was void was a core proceeding, as a resolution would
establish whether the lender was a secured or unsecured creditor thereby
affecting how creditors would share in the debtor's assets);

</li><li><a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?rs=CLWD3.0&amp;vr=2.0&amp;cite=2…
re Gantos Inc.,</i> 283 B.R. 649 (Bankr. D. Conn.
2002)</a> (amended complaint filed more than two years after order
for relief seeking to avoid transfer as a fraudulent conveyance did not relate
back to filing of original complaint, which sought to avoid same transfer as
preference);

</li><li><a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?rs=CLWD3.0&amp;vr=2.0&amp;cite=2…
re McCormick,</i> 283 B.R. 680 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
2002)</a> (indemnity clause whereby debtor agreed that any funds
received on a bonded project would be held in trust for payment of subcontractors
and materialmen until bond was discharged was sufficient to create an express
or technical trust of the kind required by the dischargeability exception in
§523(a)(4));

</li><li><a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?rs=CLWD3.0&amp;vr=2.0&amp;cite=3…
re Transtexas Gas Corp.,</i> 303 F.3d 571 (5th Cir.
2002)</a> (when a district court sitting as a court of appeals in
bankruptcy remands a case to the bankruptcy court for significant further
proceedings, the remand order is not "final" and is therefore not
appealable); and

</li><li><a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?rs=CLWD3.0&amp;vr=2.0&amp;cite=2…
re Lord,</i> 284 B.R. 179 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002)</a>
(automatic stay did not prevent long-term disability insurer that had paid
excess benefits pre-petition under group benefit plan from recouping those
overpayments post-petition by withholding disability payments that were
otherwise owed, as the debts were derived from a single transaction).