The Many faces of Directors Fiduciary Duties
With the increased number of derivative actions against directors for breach of fiduciary duty, corporate directors
now realize that the business judgment rule no longer stands as an impenetrable shield against personal liability.
Recent Delaware opinions alerting directors of their fiduciary duties to corporations and shareholders should not be
taken lightly. A fiduciary must act with loyalty and honesty in a manner consistent with the best interests of its
beneficiary at all times. In the world of corporate governance, this means that the trustworthy performance of a
corporation's officers and directors, as carried out through their fiduciary duties, ensures the survival and stability of
a corporation. One Colorado court aptly recognized, "By [the directors'] efforts, the institution operates; only
through their diligence, loyalty, care and candor may it prosper."<small><sup><a href="#2" name="2a">2</a></sup></small> In today's rocky economy and unpredictable
market, directors of corporations are beginning to think twice when considering whether to accept or remain in their
positions of both solvent and insolvent corporations. And as current Delaware decisions indicate, corporate directors
must always proceed cautiously to avoid the imposition of personal liability because the rules by which directors
must abide change once a corporation is no longer financially healthy.<small><sup><a href="#3" name="3a">3</a></sup></small> This article will address the fiduciary duties
of directors of: (1) solvent and insolvent corporations, (2) public and private companies, and (3) limited liability
companies.
</p><h3>Duties of Directors of Solvent Corporations</h3>
<p>Directors are expected to maintain the utmost fidelity in their dealings with and on behalf of the corporation. In
determining if a director has violated the duty of loyalty, the threshold inquiry involves consideration of whether
the director has a conflict of interest in the transaction. Directors are considered "interested" if they "appear on both
sides of a transaction" or expect to derive any personal financial benefit from the transaction through self-dealing.<small><sup><a href="#4" name="4a">4</a></sup></small>
</p><p>In many instances, however, the business judgment rule shields directors from liability where plaintiffs have
brought actions on the issue of breach of fiduciary duty. The business judgment rule serves as a standard of judicial
review, not as a standard of business conduct.<small><sup><a href="#5" name="5a">5</a></sup></small> Therefore, the business judgment rule is not a guide for directors to
follow, but rather a defense against judicial scrutiny if certain standards are met. In solvent corporations, there exist
two significant ways to rebut the business judgment rule: the "self-interested" option, where the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the decision was a product of the directors' self-interest, and the "uninformed director" option,
where the plaintiffs must prove that the directors failed to adequately inform themselves of necessary facts regarding
the decision.<small><sup><a href="#6" name="6a">6</a></sup></small>
</p><p>Accordingly, if the plaintiff challenges the decision under the "self-interested option," the burden then shifts to the
defendants to prove that the decision was fair. Burden-shifting does not necessarily create liability on the part of the
defendants, but the defendants must still demonstrate the decision was the product of both fair dealing and fair
price. If, however, the plaintiff proceeds under the "uninformed director" option, the burden does not shift to the
defendants, and the plaintiff is allowed to present proof that the defendants breached their duties of loyalty or care.
Delaware courts use the standard of gross negligence to determine whether a business judgment reached by a board
of directors is an informed decision.<small><sup><a href="#7" name="7a">7</a></sup></small>
</p><p>Shareholders of corporations voluntarily enter into a contractual relationship with the corporation (through direct or
indirect stock purchase) in order to receive voting rights, dividends, rights to inspect books and records, rights to
distributions on liquidation, and rights to sell, assign or pledge these interests in contractual or commercial
transactions. By contracting in this manner, shareholders relinquish direct control over the corporation to the board
of directors, who manage the corporation according to their fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. Therefore,
shareholders are limited to equitable remedies where directors breach their fiduciary responsibilities.
</p><p>In solvent corporations, the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty do not extend to a corporation's creditors. Courts do
not allow the fiduciary duties to extend to creditors because they do not have an existing property right or an
equitable interest that support these duties when a corporation is solvent; creditors, in fact, have only a contractual
relationship with the corporation.<small><sup><a href="#8" name="8a">8</a></sup></small> In other words, their rights and duties are typically negotiated through
arm's-length bargaining and are governed by contract principles. Creditors who fear insolvency or dissolution of the
corporation may negotiate a security interest in unencumbered corporate assets, seek limited proxy rights, or
negotiate representation on the board for the term of their contract.<small><sup><a href="#9" name="9a">9</a></sup></small>
</p><h3>Duties of Directors of Insolvent Corporations</h3>
<p>The Model Business Corporation Act defines insolvency as "the inability of a corporation to pay its debts as they
become due in the usual course of business," Model Bus. Corp. Act §6.40(c)(2) (1985), while the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code defines insolvency as "a financial condition such that the sum of such entity's debts is greater than all of such
entity's property at a fair valuation." <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?rs=CLWD3.0&vr=2.0&cite=1… U.S.C. §101(32)(A)</a>. The Delaware Chancery Court routinely opts to use
the Model Business Corporation Act definition because it better reflects the dynamics of the corporate culture.<small><sup><a href="#10" name="10a">10</a></sup></small>
</p><p>When a shift from solvency to insolvency occurs, the director's fiduciary duties also shift from the shareholders to
the corporation's creditors. Essentially, an officer or director of an insolvent corporation has a duty to the
corporation's creditors to be loyal, to act solely for the financial benefit of the creditors in all matters, and to
enhance the financial interest of the insolvent corporation.<small><sup><a href="#11" name="11a">11</a></sup></small> The directors should manage the insolvent corporation
as trustees for the corporate creditor-beneficiaries and not attempt, in an effort to forgive debts, to improperly
transfer corporate property or make preferential payments to the detriment of the corporation's creditors.<small><sup><a href="#12" name="12a">12</a></sup></small> Directors
may continue to operate a corporation during insolvency, provided that the purpose of the continued operation is not
solely to benefit the directors at the expense of the corporation and its creditors.<small><sup><a href="#13" name="13a">13</a></sup></small>
</p><p>Courts allow the fiduciary shift during insolvency because, in essence, creditors become the equitable owners of the
corporation; after all, upon insolvency of a corporation they are the sole interested parties in the corporation's
assets.<small><sup><a href="#14" name="14a">14</a></sup></small> Seemingly, the directors no longer represent the shareholders due to the insolvency. Instead, they become
trustees of the corporation's assets for the benefit of its creditors and are charged with the responsibility of assuring
that the creditors are either paid in full or <i>pro rata</i> from the remaining assets.<small><sup><a href="#15" name="15a">15</a></sup></small> In doing so, directors cannot give
preference to themselves or particular creditors by transferring corporate property.
</p><p>However, shareholders are sometimes given preference over creditors in limited circumstances. In <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?rs=CLWD3.0&vr=2.0&cite=2… Financial
Corp. v. MNVA Railroad Inc., et al.,</i> 212 F.3d 1076. (8th Cir. 2000)</a>, a Minnesota federal court found that the
directors of the nearly insolvent MNVA Railroad Inc. did not breach their duty under Minnesota law when they
distributed the stock of an MNVA subsidiary to MNVA shareholders for free, even though MNVA failed to pay its
creditors shortly thereafter. The district court dismissed the claims after finding that the law did not create a
fiduciary duty to creditors for a distribution in which the officers and directors did not personally benefit. The court
ruled that the simple act of preferring shareholders over creditors was not a breach of duty. Further, the court noted
that while officers and directors of a nearly insolvent corporation may not prefer themselves over creditors, they have
no duty to favor creditors over shareholders.
</p><p>Directors must act cautiously to safeguard themselves against a creditor's claim of breach of fiduciary duty. Some
protective strategies that directors could employ include strictly maintaining board minutes and clearly addressing
the competing concerns among interested parties, providing detailed explanations as to steps taken to search out
other buyers in the event that the sales of assets are made to insiders, and even abstaining from voting if board
members are also creditors and shareholders.<small><sup><a href="#16" name="16a">16</a></sup></small>
</p><blockquote><blockquote>
<hr>
<big><i><center>
Although the business judgment rule continues to be the first
defense in derivative suits, the rule does not apply where
directors fail to inform themselves of all information
reasonably available to them or where they fail to exercise the
requisite level of care...
</center></i></big>
<hr>
</blockquote></blockquote>
<h3>Liability of Directors of Public Companies: <i>In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation</i></h3>
<p>The May 2003 ruling of <i>In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation</i> has many corporate directors concerned
about their own personal liability when making decisions on behalf of their corporations. The chancery court of
Delaware warned that directors who take a "we don't care about the risks" attitude regarding material corporate
decision-making face serious legal and financial repercussions.<small><sup><a href="#17" name="17a">17</a></sup></small> Consequently, the <i>Walt Disney</i> decision serves as
a warning to corporate directors that state courts are now willing to allow plaintiffs to prove that directors who fail
to exercise due care in carrying out their fiduciary duties should be liable to the shareholders of the corporation, even
without the suggestion of self-dealing.
</p><p>The facts of <i>Walt Disney</i> make it an easy case for "conscious indifference" by corporate directors, according to the
court. The chief executive officer of Disney, Michael Eisner, unilaterally made the decision to hire Michael Ovitz, a
long-time personal friend. Throughout Ovitz's hiring process, no employment agreement drafts were presented to
the compensation committee or board for review, the board did not raise any questions concerning Ovitz's hiring,
the board approved Ovitz's hiring even though the employment agreement was still being negotiated, and the final
employment agreement was negotiated and signed without any further input from the board.<small><sup><a href="#18" name="18a">18</a></sup></small> Further, Ovitz and
his attorneys negotiated the employment contract with Eisner instead of an impartial entity, such as the
compensation committee, allowing him to devise a severance package worth over $140 million after barely a year of
mediocre to poor job performance.<small><sup><a href="#19" name="19a">19</a></sup></small> The court found that the shareholders sufficiently alleged that the directors'
conduct in executing the employment contract and no-fault termination clause fell outside of the business judgment
rule and that the directors breached their fiduciary duties. In short, the plaintiffs will now be allowed to prove all of
the allegations that they have asserted.
</p><p>At the heart of <i>Walt Disney</i> remains the oft-cited business judgment rule, which has traditionally protected corporate
decision-making in derivative actions. Although Judge William Chandler III of the chancery court noted that courts
are typically hesitant to second-guess the business judgment of disinterested and independent directors, he noted
that the facts of <i>Walt Disney</i> "do not implicate merely negligent or grossly negligent decision-making by corporate
directors...quite the contrary; the complaint suggests that the Disney directors failed to exercise any business
judgment and failed to make <i>any</i> good faith attempt to fulfill their fiduciary duties to Disney and its
stockholders."<small><sup><a href="#20" name="20a">20</a></sup></small> The court used as a basis for this analysis the seminal case of <i>Smith v. Van Gorkom,</i><small><sup><a href="#21" name="21a">21</a></sup></small> in which
the court applied the standard of gross negligence in determining the validity of a director's decision and held that
the board of directors was grossly negligent in approving a merger where the facts indicated that the board's decision
was made in a hurried manner, without reading all of the reports or considering the alternatives. Upon first glance,
the facts of <i>Walt Disney</i> and <i>Van Gorkom</i> seem to mirror one another. However, as the chancery court has
suggested, the directors in <i>Walt Disney</i> did not merely use negligent judgment in their decision-making: They failed
to use <i>any</i> judgment at all.
</p><p><i>Walt Disney</i> should serve as a wake-up call for corporate directors in public companies. Although the business
judgment rule continues to be the first defense in derivative suits, the rule does not apply where directors fail to
inform themselves of all information reasonably available to them or where they fail to exercise the requisite level of
care, as the court insinuated was the case in <i>Walt Disney.</i> The court refused to accept the defendants' contention that
Disney's charter provision based on <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?rs=CLWD3.0&vr=2.0&cite=8… Del. C. §102(b)(7)</a> protected individual directors from personal damages for
any breach of care. Finding that acts or omissions not undertaken honestly and in good faith, or that involve
intentional misconduct, do not fall within the protective ambit of the statute, the court refused to dismiss the
complaint.<small><sup><a href="#22" name="22a">22</a></sup></small> Moreover, the court implied that the directors consciously ignored their fiduciary duties and
knowingly proceeded with indifferent decision-making, thereby causing economic injury to both the corporation and
its shareholders.
</p><h3>Liability of Directors of Private Companies: <i>Pereira v. Cogan</i></h3>
<p>In <i>Pereira v. Cogan,</i><small><sup><a href="#23" name="23a">23</a></sup></small> the court ruled that the directors of Trace International Holdings owed fiduciary duties of
due care, loyalty and good faith to the corporation and its creditors, specifically when the corporation was in danger
of insolvency. Further, the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders, the court found, must take
precedence over any interests possessed by the director, officer or controlling shareholders. The holding comes as a
result of the directors' failure to investigate certain undeclared dividends and blindly voting to ratify compensation
set by the corporation's former CEO, Michael Cogan. Over a span of a decade, Cogan earned almost $7 million
more than other executives in comparable positions, approved personal loans from the company to his secretary and
wife in the amount of $1.7 million and approved $4.2 million in dividends to shareholders of preferred stock, all
while he knew that Trace was insolvent. Additionally, Cogan spent more than $1 million of the company's funds
for his 60th birthday party, paid his daughter more than $400,000 of company funds for writing a book for which
the corporation never received any revenue, and persuaded his secretary not to retire by lending her $300,000 and
then forgiving the loan without board approval. The court summed up Cogan's conduct by commenting, "Once
Cogan created the cookie jar—and obtained outside support for it—he could not without impunity take from it."<small><sup><a href="#24" name="24a">24</a></sup></small>
That impunity resulted in a judgment against Cogan for nearly $44 million.
</p><p>Particularly, the court found appalling Cogan's blatant disregard for his fiduciary duty to the corporation during the
time leading to the corporation's insolvency.<small><sup><a href="#25" name="25a">25</a></sup></small> Cogan and his co-defendants argued that insolvency exists when the
corporation's liabilities exceed its assets (which the plaintiffs also agreed upon) or where the corporation is unable to
meets its current maturing obligations in the ordinary course of business.<small><sup><a href="#26" name="26a">26</a></sup></small> However, the court rejected the second
test by reasoning that by the time a corporation cannot pay its current debts, or is in the vicinity of not being able
to pay its current maturing debts, it would be too late to protect a creditor's interest in such a way as to give the
fiduciary duty any meaning.<small><sup><a href="#27" name="27a">27</a></sup></small> Consequently, the court found that Trace was in the vicinity of insolvency from
1995 until its bankruptcy filing in 1999 because the corporation did not have enough cash to pay for its projected
obligations and fund its business requirements for working capital and expenditures. Therefore, the officers and
other directors of Trace owed fiduciary duties of due care, loyalty and good faith to the corporation and its creditors
during this four-year period.
</p><p>Another important issue raised by the court focuses on whether the defendants could be classified as corporate
officers for liability purposes. The court found that a defendant may be classified as a corporate officer if he had
discretionary authority in the relevant functional area and the ability to cause or prevent the alleged action.<small><sup><a href="#28" name="28a">28</a></sup></small> In this
case, Cogan, along with five other directors, did have the ability to make decisions regarding financial decisions of
the corporation because they knew about the challenged expenditures, yet unreasonably failed to take action or steps
that would have informed them of those expenditures.
</p><p>Even the business judgment rule could not save the officers and directors from liability in this case, according to the
court. Courts typically are reluctant to second-guess the managerial decisions of corporate officers and directors
because the court presumes that directors and officers have acted in good faith and in the best interests of the
company. In order to determine whether the directors were liable, the court first had to assess if the officers violated
their fiduciary duties. Returning to the argument that the officers were well aware of Trace's precarious financial
situation, the court ruled that the defendants should have questioned the calculations purporting to find a surplus of
company funds. Because the officers and directors failed to question the surplus and act in a situation in which due
care would have prevented a loss, the court found that they abdicated their fiduciary duties and breached their duties
of loyalty and due care. Thus, the defense of the business judgment rule was of no assistance to the defendants.
</p><p>As <i>Pereira</i> cautions, directors of private companies must take their fiduciary duties as seriously as those in the
public realm. The significance of the case lies in the court's use of the same criteria for fiduciary responsibility
typically used for public corporations. As Elizabeth Warren, a professor at Harvard Law School, remarked, "It is a
warning to directors and officers of private companies that they can be held personally liable for failing to manage
their businesses properly. A decision like this has powerful ramifications."<small><sup><a href="#29" name="29a">29</a></sup></small> Indeed, the ramifications are powerful
because even though the siphoned funds largely benefited Cogan, the controlling shareholder and CEO, the other
directors were held liable because of their failure to speak up and against the unilateral decisions made by Cogan.
</p><h3>Liability of Directors of Limited Liability Companies</h3>
<p>The emergence of limited liability companies (LLCs) is a relatively new trend in corporate governance. LLCs are
often attractive options for new businesses because of the combined features of partnerships and corporations. More
notably, LLCs avoid the double-taxation problem because the company is taxed as a partnership, which allows
earnings to flow directly to the investors. Typically, the members of the company manage the organization and are
not liable to the limited liability company or each other, as long as their management actions are believed to be in
good faith and in the best interests of the company. Similar to corporations, LLC managers owe fiduciary duties of
loyalty and care to its members, and are held to a "prudent person" standard. The Uniform Limited Liability
Company Act<small><sup><a href="#30" name="30a">30</a></sup></small> also provides that fiduciary duties are owed to the LLC and its members. In a member-managed
LLC, however, all members owe fiduciary duties, while in a manager-managed LLC, only those members serving
as managers owe duties.<small><sup><a href="#31" name="31a">31</a></sup></small> Members who are not managers are permitted to bring a derivative suit on behalf of the
LLC for a breach of the fiduciary duty. Although there exists limited authority regarding the boundaries of the
fiduciary duties owed by LLC managers, the language of the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act suggests that
the managers owe a duty directly to the LLC.
</p><p>An advantage of organizing a business as an LLC is the substantial freedom of contract that members and managers
of an LLC may exercise. Parties may expand, restrict or eliminate any duties and liabilities of members or
managers, such as indemnifying and holding harmless members or managers from and against any claim or demand
arising in connection with the LLC. The exceptions to indemnification usually include that the parties may not
indemnify members or managers for intentional misconduct or knowing violations of law, or for transactions
triggering the receipt of personal benefits in violation of an existing operating agreement.<small><sup><a href="#32" name="32a">32</a></sup></small>
</p><p>Because case law is more developed regarding limited partnerships than LLCs, analogous cases in the limited
partnership context are often consulted in examining whether directors of limited partnerships have been found
personally liable for breach of fiduciary duty to limited partners. For example, in the case of <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?rs=CLWD3.0&vr=2.0&cite=L… Re USACafes L.P.
Litigation,</i></a><small><sup><a href="#33" name="33a">33</a></sup></small> the Delaware Chancery Court held that corporate directors are fiduciaries for the limited partnership.
Although the defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court found that "[T]he assertion by the
directors that the independent existence of the corporate general partner is inconsistent with their owing fiduciary
duties directly to limited partners is incorrect."<small><sup><a href="#34" name="34a">34</a></sup></small>
</p><p>The court reasoned by analogy that directors of a corporate general partner owe fiduciary duties to the partnership
and its limited partners by stating, "...[t]he principle of fiduciary duty, stated most generally, [is] one who controls
the property of another may not, without implied or express agreement, intentionally use that property in a way
that benefits the holder of the control to the detriment of the property of its beneficial owner."<small><sup><a href="#35" name="35a">35</a></sup></small> Thus, directors of a
corporate general partner owe a fiduciary duty to the limited partners because of the directors' control of the
partnership's property. Using this rationale, managers or member-managers of LLCs cannot escape personal liability
if they knowingly cause the LLC to commit a breach of trust resulting in financial loss.
</p><hr>
<h3>Footnotes</h3>
<p><small><sup><a name="1">1</a></sup></small> Gary W. Marsh is a partner with McKenna Long & Aldridge LLP and is Board-certified in business
bankruptcy and creditors' rights law by the American Board of Certification. Petrina Hall was a 2003 summer
associate with the firm. <a href="#1a">Return to article</a>
</p><p><small><sup><a name="2">2</a></sup></small> <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?rs=CLWD3.0&vr=2.0&cite=1… re Bush,</i> 1991 WL 540753</a> at 5, 6. <a href="#2a">Return to article</a>
</p><p><small><sup><a name="3">3</a></sup></small> The Delaware Chancery Court held in <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?rs=CLWD3.0&vr=2.0&cite=1… Lyonnais Bank Nederland N.V. v. Pathe Communications
Corp.,</i> 17 Del. J. Corp. L. 1099 (Del. Ch. 1991)</a>, that the board of a corporation in the vicinity of insolvency is
"obligated to act not in the best interests of the shareholders, but rather in accordance with the community of
interests that sustain the corporation." <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?rs=CLWD3.0&vr=2.0&cite=1…; at 1157</a>. <a href="#3a">Return to article</a>
</p><p><small><sup><a name="4">4</a></sup></small> <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?rs=CLWD3.0&vr=2.0&cite=1…, supra.</i></a> <a href="#4a">Return to article</a>
</p><p><small><sup><a name="5">5</a></sup></small> <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?rs=CLWD3.0&vr=2.0&cite=4… v. Van Gorkom,</i> 488 A.2d at 872</a> (ruling that "[t]he rule itself is a presumption that, in making a
business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief
that the action taken was in the best interests of the corporation."). <a href="#5a">Return to article</a>
</p><p><small><sup><a name="6">6</a></sup></small> <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?rs=CLWD3.0&vr=2.0&cite=2… re Healthco,</i> 208 B.R. at 302</a>; <i>Van Gorkom, supra</i> (finding no business judgment rule protection for
directors who have made an unintelligent or unadvised judgment). <a href="#6a">Return to article</a>
</p><p><small><sup><a name="7">7</a></sup></small> <i>Van Gorkom, supra</i> at 873. <a href="#7a">Return to article</a>
</p><p><small><sup><a name="8">8</a></sup></small> <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?rs=CLWD3.0&vr=2.0&cite=5… v. Cogan,</i> 549 A.2d 300, 304</a> (determining that directors of solvent corporation owed no fiduciary
duty to holders of convertible debentures, the Supreme Court of Delaware noted that "before a fiduciary duty arises,
an existing property right or equitable interest supporting such a duty must exist."). <a href="#8a">Return to article</a>
</p><p><small><sup><a name="9">9</a></sup></small> Stilson, Ann E., "Reexamining the Fiduciary Paradigm at Corporate Insolvency and Dissolution: Defining
Directors' Duties to Creditors," <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?rs=CLWD3.0&vr=2.0&cite=2… Del. J. Corp. L. 1 (1995)</a>. <a href="#9a">Return to article</a>
</p><p><small><sup><a name="10">10</a></sup></small> <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?rs=CLWD3.0&vr=2.0&cite=1… AG & Co. v. On Target Tech.,</i> 1998 WL 928382 (Del. Ch. 1998)</a>. <a href="#10a">Return to article</a>
</p><p><small><sup><a name="11">11</a></sup></small> <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?rs=CLWD3.0&vr=2.0&cite=1… Options of Chicago Inc. v. Polonitza,</i> 1990 WL 114740 (N.D. Ill. July 31, 1990)</a>. <a href="#11a">Return to article</a>
</p><p><small><sup><a name="12">12</a></sup></small> <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?rs=CLWD3.0&vr=2.0&cite=1… Options, supra.</i></a>; Bernstein, Donald S. and Sibal, Amit, "Current Developments: Fiduciary Duties of
Director and Corporate Governance in the Vicinity of Insolvency," 819 PLI/Comm. 653 (2001). <a href="#12a">Return to article</a>
</p><p><small><sup><a name="13">13</a></sup></small> <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?rs=CLWD3.0&vr=2.0&cite=1… re Logue Mechanical Contracting Corp.,</i> 106 B.R. 436, 440</a> (holding that directors had violated their
fiduciary obligation to the corporation by continuing to operate the business for nine months prior to filing
bankruptcy solely for the benefit of themselves when a reasonable person using ordinary skill, care and diligence
would have immediately ceased operations and proceeded to liquidate the business to maximize the return to
creditors). Most courts, however, have held that corporate officers do not owe a duty to creditors during insolvency
unless there is proof of self-dealing or some extraordinary fraudulent or criminal act. <i>Bank of America, et al. v.
Musselman, et al.,</i> No. 02-253 (E.D. Va., Oct. 7, 2002). <a href="#13a">Return to article</a>
</p><p><small><sup><a name="14">14</a></sup></small> Gross, Steven R., et al., "Shifting Duties: Directors Face Risks in Workout," Nat'l. L.J., Apr. 15, 1991,
at 19. <a href="#14a">Return to article</a>
</p><p><small><sup><a name="15">15</a></sup></small> <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?rs=CLWD3.0&vr=2.0&cite=7… re Mortgag Am. Corp.,</i> 714 F.2d 1266, 1271 (5th Cir. 1983)</a>. <a href="#15a">Return to article</a>
</p><p><small><sup><a name="16">16</a></sup></small> Barton, Roger E., "Venture Capitalists as Directors: Avoiding Increased Liability from Serving on the
Board of an Insolvent Company," A.C.O.D.L.L.R., March 25, 2002. <a href="#16a">Return to article</a>
</p><p><small><sup><a name="17">17</a></sup></small> <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?rs=CLWD3.0&vr=2.0&cite=2… re The Walt Disney Co.,</i> 2003 WL 21267266</a>, pg. 11. <a href="#17a">Return to article</a>
</p><p><small><sup><a name="18">18</a></sup></small> <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?rs=CLWD3.0&vr=2.0&cite=2… Disney, supra,</i> pg. 2-6</a>. <a href="#18a">Return to article</a>
</p><p><small><sup><a name="19">19</a></sup></small> <i>Id.</i> at 7. <a href="#19a">Return to article</a>
</p><p><small><sup><a name="20">20</a></sup></small> <i>Id.</i> at 1. <a href="#20a">Return to article</a>
</p><p><small><sup><a name="21">21</a></sup></small> <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?rs=CLWD3.0&vr=2.0&cite=4… A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985)</a> (finding no business judgment rules protection for directors who have
made an unintelligent decision or unadvised judgment). <a href="#21a">Return to article</a>
</p><p><small><sup><a name="22">22</a></sup></small> <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?rs=CLWD3.0&vr=2.0&cite=2… Disney, supra</i> pg. 9</a>. <a href="#22a">Return to article</a>
</p><p><small><sup><a name="23">23</a></sup></small> <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?rs=CLWD3.0&vr=2.0&cite=2… WL 21039976</a> (S.D.N.Y.). <a href="#23a">Return to article</a>
</p><p><small><sup><a name="24">24</a></sup></small> <i>Id.</i> at 1. <a href="#24a">Return to article</a>
</p><p><small><sup><a name="25">25</a></sup></small> In determining whether a duty attaches, Delaware uses "insolvency in fact" rather than insolvency as
defined by statutory filings. <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?rs=CLWD3.0&vr=2.0&cite=6… v. Ingersoll Pubs. Co.,</i> 621 A.2d 784, 787-88 (Del. Ch. 1992)</a>. <a href="#25a">Return to article</a>
</p><p><small><sup><a name="26">26</a></sup></small> <i>See Gibralt Capital Corp. v. Smith,</i> 2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 68 at 25 (Del. Ch. May 8, 2001). <a href="#26a">Return to article</a>
</p><p><small><sup><a name="27">27</a></sup></small> <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?rs=CLWD3.0&vr=2.0&cite=2…; 2003 WL 21039976</a> at 55. <a href="#27a">Return to article</a>
</p><p><small><sup><a name="28">28</a></sup></small> <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?rs=CLWD3.0&vr=2.0&cite=4… v. Sloan,</i> 486 F.2d 340, 351 (4th Cir. 1973)</a> (officers who lack "the slightest connection" with events
in question or ability to meaningfully participate should not be considered officers for liability purposes.). <a href="#28a">Return to article</a>
</p><p><small><sup><a name="29">29</a></sup></small> Fabrikant, Geraldine, "Private Concern, Public Consequences," <i>The New York Times,</i> Sunday, June 15,
2003. <a href="#29a">Return to article</a>
</p><p><small><sup><a name="30">30</a></sup></small> Uniform Limited Liability Company Act §409, 6A U.L.A. 464 (1995). <a href="#30a">Return to article</a>
</p><p><small><sup><a name="31">31</a></sup></small> <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?rs=CLWD3.0&vr=2.0&cite=4…; <a href="#31a">Return to article</a>
</p><p><small><sup><a name="32">32</a></sup></small> <i>See</i> <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?rs=CLWD3.0&vr=2.0&cite=8… Partners L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners L.P., et. al.,</i> 817 A.2d 160, 167-68</a> (Del. 200);
<a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?rs=CLWD3.0&vr=2.0&cite=7… Atochem North America Inc. v. Jaffari,</i> 727 A.2d 286, 290-291 (Del. 1999)</a> (finding the Delaware LLC act to provide substantial contracting freedom for parties). <a href="#32a">Return to article</a>
</p><p><small><sup><a name="33">33</a></sup></small> <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?rs=CLWD3.0&vr=2.0&cite=6… A.2d 43 (Del. Ch. 1991)</a>. <a href="#33a">Return to article</a>
</p><p><small><sup><a name="34">34</a></sup></small> <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?rs=CLWD3.0&vr=2.0&cite=6…; at 48</a>. <a href="#34a">Return to article</a>
</p><p><small><sup><a name="35">35</a></sup></small> <a href="http://www.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?rs=CLWD3.0&vr=2.0&cite=6…; at 48</a>. <a href="#35a">Return to article</a>