Ninth Circuit Slams Shut the Back Door Access to Patented Technology

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Apr 1999

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In an earlier "On the Edge" column, Virginia Henschel noted that bankruptcy courts would
likely be forced to resolve intellectual property issues in the context of a chapter 11
reorganization.<a href="#2" name="2a">2</a> At the time, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held in its decision of Institute
Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp. that in certain situations, a debtor-in-possession (DIP),
which is the licensee under a non-exclusive patent license, may assume the non-exclusive
patent license over the objection of the patent owner.<a href="#3" name="3a">3</a> As a result of the Cambridge Biotech

decision, Henschel noted that the back door appeared to be open for the strategic acquisition of
otherwise unaccessible patented technology by industry competitors.<a href="#4" name="4a">4</a>

Earlier this year, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in its Catapult Entertainment decision,
examined a case virtually identical to the case decided by the First Circuit and shut the "back
door" when it held that a DIP may not assume the non-exclusive patent license over the
objection of the patent owner.<a href="#5" name="5a">5</a> This article will re-examine earlier decisions relating to a
non-exclusive patent license in the context of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Catapult
Entertainment.<a href="#6" name="6a">6</a>

<h3>Non-exclusive Patent Licenses Are Executory Contracts</h3>

As a preliminary matter, this article will address recent circuit court decisions relating to
non-exclusive patent licenses.<a href="#7" name="7a">7</a> The initial Ninth Circuit case addressing issues relating to
non-exclusive patent licenses is Everex Systems Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp. (In re CFLC Inc.).<a href="#8" name="8a">8</a> In
CFLC, prior to filing for bankruptcy, the debtor paid a one-time royalty payment to Cadtrak in
exchange for a royalty-free, worldwide, non-exclusive license to use certain patents. The
license agreement provided, among other things, that the license was non-transferable and that
the debtor had no right to sublicense. In its bankruptcy case, the debtor filed a motion to assume
and assign the non-exclusive patent license, and Cadtrak objected.<a href="#9" name="9a">9</a>

<big><center>
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Catapult Entertainment, while protecting the
interests of the licenseholder, has provided the
licensors under non-exclusive patent licenses (and
arguably, non-exclusive copyright licenses) with
extraordinary power over DIPs.
</center></big>
<hr>
</blockquote></blockquote>

Initially the Ninth Circuit in CFLC addressed the issue of whether the license was an executory
contract. While <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=… U.S.C. §365(a)</a> authorizes a trustee or DIP to assume or reject an executory
contract, the Bankruptcy Code is silent as to the definition of an executory contract. In the Ninth
Circuit, the courts have defined an "executory contract" as one in which performance is due to
some extent on both sides, and in which the obligations of both parties are so far unperformed
that the failure of either party to complete performance would constitute a material breach, and
thus excuses the performance of the other.<a href="#10" name="10a">10</a> The court noted that Cadtrak owed significant
continued performance on the license, since it must continue to refrain from suing the debtor
for infringement because "a non-exclusive patent license is, in essence, 'a mere waiver of the
right to sue' the licensee for infringement."<a href="#11" name="11a">11</a> The court further noted that the licensee also
has performance obligations because it must mark all products made under the license with the
proper statutory patent notice; the obligation is material, because the failure to mark the
products would deprive the patent holder of damages in an infringement action before the
infringer has the actual notice of the infringement.<a href="#12" name="12a">12</a> Therefore, the court held that the
non-exclusive patent license was an executory contract under <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=… U.S.C. §365.</a><a href="#13" name="13a">13</a>

<h3>Federal Law Bars the Assignment of Non-exclusive Patent Licenses</h3>

Next, the CFLC court turned to the issue of whether federal or state law applied to the
interpretation of the non-exclusive patent license and the limitations on assignability. Pursuant
to <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=… U.S.C. §365(a)</a>, a trustee or DIP may generally assume or reject an executory contract.
In the context of this article, Congress placed limitations on assumption and assignment in <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=…
U.S.C. §§365(c)</a> and (f).<a href="#14" name="14a">14</a> As a preliminary matter, the court observed (1) that the statutes
governing patents are basically silent on the issue of licenses, and (2) that the construction of
patent licenses is generally a matter of state contract law, except where state law would be
inconsistent with the aims of federal patent policy.<a href="#15" name="15a">15</a> In holding that federal patent policy
justified the application of federal law to the assignability of the license, the court reasoned that

<blockquote>the fundamental policy of the patent system is to "encourage the creation and disclosure
of new, useful, and nonobvious advances in technology and design" by granting the
inventor the reward of "the exclusive right to practice the invention for a period of
years." <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=… Boats Inc. v. Thundercraft Boats Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51, 109 S.Ct.
971, 977-78, 103 L.Ed.2d 118(1989)</a>. Allowing free assignability—or more
accurately, allowing states to allow free assignability—of non-exclusive patent licenses
would undermine the reward that encourages invention because a party seeking to use the
patented invention could either seek a license from the patent holder or seek an
assignment of an existing patent license from the licensee. In essence, every licensee
would become a potential competitor with the licensor/patent holder in the market for
licenses under the patent. While the patent holder could presumably control the absolute
number of licenses in existence under a free assignability regime, it would lose the very
important ability to control the identity of the licensees. Thus, any license a patent holder
granted—even to the smallest firm in the product market most remote from its
own—would be fraught with the danger that the licensee would assign it to the patent
holder's most serious competitor, a party to whom the patent holder itself might be
absolutely unwilling to license. As a practical matter, free assignability of patent
licenses might spell the end to paid-up licenses such as the one involved in this case. Few
patent holders would be willing to grant a license in return for a one-time lump-sum
payment, rather than for-use royalties, if the license could be assigned to a completely
different company which might make far greater use of the patented invention than could
the original licensee.<a href="#16" name="16a">16</a>
</blockquote>

Thus, in order to further the policies of the patent system, the CFLC court held that federal law
would control the assignability of non-exclusive licenses.<a href="#17" name="17a">17</a>

Finally, the CFLC court addressed the issue of whether federal law bars the assignment of
non-exclusive patent licenses. The court noted that federal law holds a non-exclusive patent
license to be personal and non-delegable, and would therefore excuse Cadtrak from accepting
performance from, or rendering it to, anyone other than the debtor.18 Therefore, because other
applicable law would not require the licensor to accept performance from anyone other than the
debtor, the court held that the debtor could not assume and assign the non-exclusive patent
license under <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=… U.S.C. §365.</a><a href="#19" name="19a">19</a>

<h3>First Circuit Authorizes Assumption of Non-exclusive Patent License</h3>

The First Circuit Court of Appeals was the first appellate court to address the issue of whether a
DIP could merely assume a non-exclusive patent license. In Cambridge Biotech, the DIP was the
holder of two non-exclusive licenses to utilize patents from the Institute Pasteur. In the plan of
reorganization, the debtor proposed the assumption of the non-exclusive patent licenses and the
sale of all the debtor's stock to the principal competitor of the Institute Pasteur. The Institute
Pasteur objected to the plan, stating that the debtor could not assume the non-exclusive patent
license.<a href="#20" name="20a">20</a>

In Cambridge Biotech, the First Circuit followed its earlier decision of Summit Investment and
Development Corp. v. Leroux (In re Leroux)<a href="#21" name="21a">21</a> and applied an "actual test" to determine
whether the DIP could assume the non-exclusive patent license. Under this "actual test," the
court will allow a DIP to assume a contract that is non-assignable as a result of the contract
being personal and non-delegable, unless the non-debtor party can establish that it would not
receive the benefit of its bargain with the debtor.<a href="#22" name="22a">22</a> Applying the facts of the case, the First
Circuit in the Cambridge Biotech case concluded that no prohibition exists to the debtor
assuming the non-exclusive patent license because the Institute Pasteur did not prove that it
would no longer be getting "the benefit of its bargain."<a href="#23" name="23a">23</a>

As an additional argument, the Institute Pasteur protested the fact that the reorganized debtor's
stock was being issued to the principal competitor of the Institute Pasteur, an entity with which
the Institute Pasteur refused to conduct business. The First Circuit was not moved and, after
noting that general corporate law requires the recognition of separate corporate entities, held
that the non-exclusive patent was still owned by the debtor, the party with which the Institute
Pasteur originally agreed to conduct business.<a href="#24" name="24a">24</a> As a consequence of this ruling, Henschel noted
that the "back door" is open for competitors to acquire otherwise unaccessible technology.<a href="#25" name="25a">25</a>

<h3>Ninth Circuit Bars the Assumption by a Debtor of Non-patent Licenses</h3>

Earlier this year, the Ninth Circuit slammed shut the "back door" by disagreeing with the First
Circuit's decision in Cambridge Biotech, furthering its holding in CFLC and holding that <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=…
U.S.C. §365(c)</a> prohibits a DIP from assuming a non-exclusive patent license. In Catapult
Entertainment, the debtor entered into a non-exclusive patent license with Perlman in 1994.
Subsequently, in 1996 Catapult filed for chapter 11. As part of its plan of reorganization,
Catapult filed a motion with the bankruptcy court seeking to merely assume the non-exclusive
patent license; Perlman objected. Both the bankruptcy court and the district court held that the
debtor could assume the non-exclusive patent licenses, and the Ninth Circuit reversed.<a href="#26" name="26a">26</a>

The Ninth Circuit's analysis focuses on the language of <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=… U.S.C. §365</a>. The court started with
the observation that in the bankruptcy context, a DIP has the authority to assume, assign or
reject an executory contract or unexpired lease notwithstanding any contract provisions
appearing in the contract or lease. However, the court further noted that this extraordinary
authority is not absolute.<a href="#27" name="27a">27</a>

In the context of assumption, the court was focused on the proper interpretation of <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=… U.S.C.
§365(c)(1)</a>. The court noted that a disagreement exists among the courts and commentators as
to the test for assumption. On the one side are the courts who adhere to the plain statutory
language, and these courts establish a "hypothetical test" to govern the assumption of executory
contracts.<a href="#28" name="28a">28</a> On the other side of the argument are those courts that forsake the statutory
language in favor of an "actual test" that, in their view, better accomplishes the intent of
Congress.<a href="#29" name="29a">29</a>

The Catapult Entertainment court reasoned that the plain language of <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=… U.S.C. §365(c)(1)</a>

links non-assignability under "applicable law" together with the prohibition on assumption in
bankruptcy. In other words,

<blockquote>the statute by its terms bars the debtor-in-possession from assuming an executory
contract without the non-debtor's consent where applicable law precludes assignment of
the contract to a third party. The literal language of §365(c)(1) is thus said to establish
a 'hypothetical test': a debtor-in-possession may not assume an executory contract over
the non-debtor's objection if applicable law would bar assignment to a hypothetical third
party, even where the debtor-in-possession has no intention of assigning the contract in
question to any such third party.<a href="#30" name="30a">30</a></blockquote>

The court then held that since federal patent law makes non-exclusive patent licenses personal
and non-delegable, <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=… U.S.C. §365(c)(1)(A)</a> is satisfied, and as a consequence, the debtor was
barred from assuming the Perlman license absent Perlman's consent.<a href="#31" name="31a">31</a>

<h3>Conclusion</h3>

The decisions of the First Circuit in Cambridge Biotech and the Ninth Circuit in Catapult
Entertainment highlight the inconsistent policies underlying patent law and bankruptcy law. The
First Circuit has concluded, at least in the context of assumption of a non-exclusive patent
license, that the bankruptcy policy of maximizing equal distributions to all creditors should
prevail over the patent policy of protecting the rights of the patent holder. As a result of the
First Circuit's decision, the competitors of a patent owner were given an opportunity to acquire
otherwise unaccessible technology. However, the Ninth Circuit has concluded that the language of

<a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=… U.S.C. §365(c)</a> subordinates the bankruptcy policies to patent policies. The Ninth Circuit's
decision in Catapult Entertainment, while protecting the interests of the licenseholder, has
provided the licensors under non-exclusive patent licenses (and arguably, non-exclusive
copyright licenses) with extraordinary power over DIPs. The ability of the licensors to
prohibit the assumption of non-exclusive patent licenses may, in certain circumstances,
render reorganization impossible for a debtor at the expense of other creditors.

<hr>
<h3>Footnotes</h3>

<a name="1">1</a> Shareholder of professional corporation Jenkens & Gilchrist in Dallas. Mr. Hesse obtained his Bachelor of Business Administration cum laude from Southern Methodist University
in Dallas in 1986 and his J.D., with honors, from the University of Texas at Austin in 1988. <a href="#1a">Return to article</a>

<a name="2">2</a> Henschel, Virginia, "'Back Door' Access to Patented Technology," 17 ABI Journal 40 (February, 1998). <a href="#2a">Return to article</a>

<a name="3">3</a> <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=… Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 104 F.3d 489</a> (1st Cir.). cert. denied, U.S. _, <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=… S.Ct. 2511, 138 L.Ed.2d 1044 (1997)</a>. <a href="#3a">Return to article</a>

<a name="4">4</a> Henschel, Virginia, 17 ABI Journal at 41. <a href="#4a">Return to article</a>

<a name="5">5</a> <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=… v. Catapult Entertainment Inc. (In re Catapult Entertainment Inc.), 165 F.3d 747 (9th Cir. 1999)</a>. <a href="#5a">Return to article</a>

<a name="6">6</a> The Bankruptcy Code does not provide specific statutory treatment of licenses of intellectual property in the context of the licensee's bankruptcy case. However, in the case of a
licensor's bankruptcy case, the rights of the parties to the license of intellectual property are set forth in <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=… U.S.C. §365(n)</a>. <a href="#6a">Return to article</a>

<a name="7">7</a> While this article specifically addresses non-exclusive patent licenses, it may also apply to non-exclusive copyright licenses because courts in copyright cases frequently look to
patent law for guidance due to the "historic kinship between patent law and copyright law." <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=… re Patient Education Media Inc., 210 B.R. 237, 241 N. 7 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997)</a>
(citing Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439, 104 S.Ct. 774, 787, 78 L.Ed.2d 574 (1984)). <a href="#7a">Return to article</a>

<a name="8">8</a> <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=… F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 1996)</a>. <a href="#8a">Return to article</a>

<a name="9">9</a> <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=…; 89 F. 3d at 674-675</a>. <a href="#9a">Return to article</a>

<a name="10">10</a> <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=…; 89 F.3d at 677</a> (citing Griffel v. Murphy (In re N.A. Wegner), 839 F.2d 533, 536 (9th Cir. 1988)). The definition of an executory contract is substantially identical to the
definition proposed by Prof. Vern Countryman in <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=… Contracts in Bankruptcy, 57 Minn. L. Rev. 439, 460 (1973)</a>. <a href="#10a">Return to article</a>

<a name="11">11</a> <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=…; 89 F.3d at 677</a> (quoting DeForest Radio Telephone Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 236, 242, 47 S.Ct. 366, 367-68, 71 L.Ed. 625 (1927)). <a href="#11a">Return to article</a>

<a name="12">12</a> <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=…; 89 F.3d at 677</a>, citing <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=… U.S.C. §287</a>. <a href="#12a">Return to article</a>

<a name="13">13</a> <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=…; 89 F.3d at 677</a>. See, also, <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=… re Alltech Plastics Inc.,</a><a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=…; 71 B.R. 686, 687 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1987)</a>, and <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=… Education Media, 210 B.R. at 211</a> ("Bankruptcy courts
have generally treated non-exclusive copyright and patent licenses as executory contracts."). While the Ninth Circuit did not rely upon his work, Prof. Countryman concluded in
his article that patent licenses were in fact executory contracts. Countryman, <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=… Contracts in Bankruptcy, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 479, 501-502 (1974)</a>, quoted in <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=… King
Corp. v. Rovine Corp. (In re Rovine Corp.), 6 B.R. 661, 665- 666 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1980)</a>. <a href="#13a">Return to article</a>

<a name="14">14</a> The relevant portion of <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=… U.S.C. §365(c)</a> states:
<blockquote>(c) The trustee may not assume or assign any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts assignment of rights
or delegation of duties, if—
<blockquote>(1)(A) applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to such contract or lease from accepting performance from or rendering performance to an entity other than the
debtor or the debtor-in-possession, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties; and</blockquote>
(B) such party does not consent to such assumption or assignment...</blockquote>
The relevant portion of <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=… U.S.C. §365(f)</a> states:

<blockquote>(f)(1) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor, or in applicable law, that
prohibits, restricts, or conditions the assignment of such contract or lease, the trustee may assign such contract or lease under paragraph (2) of this subsection;... 
(2) The trustee may assign an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor only if—
<blockquote>(A) the trustee assumes such contract or lease in accordance with the provisions of this section; and 
(B) adequate assurance of future performance by the assignee of such contract or lease is provided, whether or not there has been a default in such contract or lease.</blockquote>
(3) Notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor, or in applicable law that terminates or modifies, or permits a party other than the
debtor to terminate or modify, such contract or lease or a right or obligation under such contract or lease on account of an assignment of such contract or lease, such contract,
lease, right, or obligation may not be terminated or modified under such provision because of the assumption or assignment of such contract or lease by the trustee. <a href="#14a">Return to article</a></blockquote>

<a name="15">15</a> <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=…; 89 F.3d at 677</a>. <a href="#15a">Return to article</a>

<a name="16">16</a> <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=…; 89 F.3d at 679</a>. See, also, <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=… Education Media, 210 B.R. at 242-24</a> (adopting the reasoning of CFLC in the context of a non-exclusive copyright). <a href="#16a">Return to article</a>

<a name="17">17</a> <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=…; 89 F.3d at 679</a>. See, also, <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=… re Alltech Plastics Inc., 71 B.R. at 689</a>. <a href="#17a">Return to article</a>

<a name="18">18</a> <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=…; 89 F.3d at 679</a> (Citing <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=… v. Republic of Ireland, 787 F.2d 655, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1986)</a>; <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=… Corp. v. Fulkerson, 972 F.2d 726, 729 n.2 (7th Cir. 1992)</a>; <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=…
Industries Inc. v. Guardian Industries Corp., 597 F.2d 1090, 1093 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 44 U.S. 930, 100 S.Ct. 272, 62 L.Ed.2d 187 (1979)</a>; and <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=… Industries Inc. v. Kelley
Co., 465 F.2d 1303, 1306 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 929, 93 S.Ct. 1365, 35 L.Ed.2d 590 (1973)</a>). See, also, <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=… re Alltech Plastics Inc., 71 B.R. at 689</a>. <a href="#18a">Return to article</a>

<a name="19">19</a> <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=…; 89 F.3d at 679</a>. See, also, <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=… re Alltech Plastics Inc., 71 B.R. at 689</a>, and <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=… Education, 210 B.R. at 243</a> (holding that debtor was prohibited from assigning a
nonexclusive copyright to a third party). <a href="#19a">Return to article</a>

<a name="20">20</a> <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=… Biotech, 104 F.3d at 490-491</a>. <a href="#20a">Return to article</a>

<a name="21">21</a> <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=… F.3d 608 (1st Cir. 1995)</a>. <a href="#21a">Return to article</a>

<a name="22">22</a> <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=… Biotech, 104 F.3d at 493</a>, <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=… Investment, 69 F.3d at 613</a>. <a href="#22a">Return to article</a>

<a name="23">23</a> <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=… Biotech, 104 F.3d at 495</a>. While the issue was not before the court, the reasoning of Cambridge Biotech implied that the First Circuit would not allow the assumption
and assignment of the nonexclusive patent license. <a href="#23a">Return to article</a>

<a name="24">24</a> <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=…; at 494</a>. <a href="#24a">Return to article</a>

<a name="25">25</a> Henschel, Virginia, 17 ABI Journal at 41. <a href="#25a">Return to article</a>

<a name="26">26</a> <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=… Entertainment, 165 F.3d at 748-749</a>. <a href="#26a">Return to article</a>

<a name="27">27</a> <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=…; at 749</a> (Citing 11 U.S.C. §§365(c) and (f)). <a href="#27a">Return to article</a>

<a name="28">28</a> Id. (citing <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=… re James Cable Partners, 27 F.3d. 534, 537 (11th Cir. 1994)</a>); <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=… re West Electronics Inc., 852 F.2d 79, 83 (3rd Cir. 1988)</a>; and In re Catron, 158 V.R. 629, 633-38
(E.D. Va. 1993), aff'd without op., <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=… F.3d 1038 (4th Cir. 1994)</a>. <a href="#28a">Return to article</a>

<a name="29">29</a> <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=…; (citing <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=… Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 104 F.3d 489, 493</a> (1st Cir.), cert. denied, U.S. _, <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=… S.Ct. 2511, 138 L.Ed.2d 1014 (1997)</a>). <a href="#29a">Return to article</a>

<a name="30">30</a> <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=… Entertainment, 165 F.3d at 750</a> (citing one David G. Epstein, Steve H. Nichols and James J. White, Bankruptcy §5-15 at 474 (1992); In re James Cable, 27 F.3d at 537;
and In re West Electronics, 852 F.2d at 83). <a href="#30a">Return to article</a>

<a name="31">31</a> <a href="http://www.westdoc.com/find/default.asp?rs=CLWP1.1&vr=1.0&cite=… Entertainment, 165 F.3d at 750</a>. <a href="#31a">Return to article</a>

Journal Authors

Gregory G. Hesse

Journal Date

Thursday, April 1, 1999 - 12:00