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Almost thirty years after the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York confirmed the Chapter 11 plans of Johns-Manville Corporation (“Manville”) and Manville Forest Products (“MFP”), pursuant to which creditors were enjoined from pursuing asbestos claims against them, a plaintiff sought to recover from Graphic Packaging International (“Graphic”), a purported successor of MFP. In In re Johns-Manville Corp.,[1] the Bankruptcy Court enjoined Ms. Berry from pursuing asbestos claims arising from her exposure to asbestos on her husband’s work clothes.[2] According to the Bankruptcy Court, because Graphic is a successor of MPF, a bankruptcy debtor and a wholly-owned subsidiary of Manville, Ms. Berry must first pursue her asbestos claims against the Manville Personal Injury Trust (the “Trust”) in accordance with the Chapter 11 Plan (the “Manville Plan”).[3]
In In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (“Lehman”), Judge Shelley C. Chapman of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed a complaint filed by Lehman Brothers Holding Inc. (“LBHI”) and Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. (“LBSF”) challenging the early termination of forty-four credit default swap agreements.[1] The complaint alleged the subsequent liquidation of the collateral underlying those agreements after the early termination and the distribution of those proceeds violated the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) despite LBSF’s default.[2] Of the forty-four swap agreements, the court found five contained provisions that “effected an ipso facto modification of LBSF’s rights . . . .”[3] However, the distributions from those transactions were protected by the Code’s safe harbor provision.[4] Judge Chapman found the priority provisions in the other thirty-nine swap agreements did not operate as ipso facto clauses because they did not modify any rights of LBSF.[5] The payment priority for those agreements was not set at any time prior to the termination of the swap, thus no right to payment priority could be modified by a termination.[6] As a result, all nineteen counts of the complaint were dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.[7]
Educational loans made, insured, or guaranteed by a governmental unit are not dischargeable in a chapter 7 bankruptcy case, unless the debtor obtains a hardship determination.[1] Thus, it is very difficult to discharge student loans through a bankruptcy case. This is true even if the loan is made, insured, or guaranteed by a foreign governmental unit. In the case of In re Mulley, the Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California determined that government guaranteed student loans, made pursuant to the Canada Student Loans Act (“CSLA"), were non-dischargeable under the United States Bankruptcy Code.[2]
In Chapter 11 airline cases, a court will typically balance the interests of debtors and creditors in determining the method, timing and condition of collateral returns and whether or not the parties must comply with the underlying contractual obligations. In In re Republic Airways Holdings, Inc.,[1] the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that a debtor is not required to comply with underlying contractual requirements for the return of aircraft and engines as collateral.[2] After filing for Chapter 11, Republic Airways Holdings, Inc. (“Republic”) sought to surrender or abandon certain aircrafts and engines subject to liens of Citibank, pursuant to an agreement to secure Republic’s obligations with respect to a credit and guaranty agreement.[3] Republic moved for an order authorizing them to (i) transfer title to and abandon certain aircrafts and engines and reject a related aircraft lease, and (ii) to fulfill their obligations under a certain engine purchase agreement and directing Citibank to cooperate with the closing of that agreement.[4]
Under the Bankruptcy Code, a discharge of student loan debt is not justified “unless excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph would impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor's dependents . . . .”[1] A finding of undue hardship is difficult to establish; accordingly, student loan debt is rarely discharged.[2] However, in In re Fern,[3] the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Iowa applied the totality of the circumstances test and held that the debtor presented sufficient evidence demonstrating that excepting her student loans from discharge would impose an undue hardship on her and her family and, therefore, the debt was dischargeable.[4]
