Scaled Back Employee Abuse Prevention Bill Would Elevate Employee Claims
Scaled Back Employee Abuse Prevention Bill Would Elevate Employee Claims

By: Prof. G. Ray Warner

Robert M. Zinman American Bankruptcy Institute Scholar in Residence

On September 19, 2002, Senator Dick Durbin (D-IL) introduced a substitute
amendment to the Employee Abuse Prevention Act of 2002 (S. 2798). The substitute deletes the most
controversial provisions of the prior bill, while retaining most of the
provisions designed to protect employees and retirees when businesses file
bankruptcy. The substitute amendment does not include a venue provision that
would have limited Delaware and New York filings, provisions that would have
enhanced the trustee’s power to challenge security interests and asset
securitization transactions, a provision that would have given claims for ERISA
fiduciary breaches a super-priority, lien-priming status, and a provision that
would have limited the section 546(e) safe harbor for securities settlement
payments to financial intermediaries.
Like the original bill, the changes made by the substitute amendment
would be effective immediately upon enactment and would apply to cases pending
on that date.

Retiree Health Benefits

Several provisions of the bill address employee and retiree issues. First,
current section 1114 prevents a Chapter 11 debtor from unilaterally modifying
certain retiree benefits, such as retiree health insurance, during the case
unless an authorized retiree representative is appointed and agrees to the
modification, or the court authorizes the modification as necessary to the
reorganization. The bill would amend section 1114 to prevent debtors from
evading its requirements by terminating retiree benefit plans on the eve of
bankruptcy. The bill would require retroactive reinstatement of retiree
benefits that were modified "in contemplation of bankruptcy" within
180 days before filing unless the pre-petition modification was essential to
the continuation of the debtor’s business. Modifications made within the
180-day period would be subject to a rebuttable presumption that they were made
in contemplation of bankruptcy.

Employee Wage, Severance and Pension Priority

Several provisions are designed to enhance the employees’ recovery on
pension and wage claims. The bill would increase the current section 507(a)(3)
priority for unpaid wage claims from $4,650 to $13,500, and would extend the
time period during which wages could qualify for priority from 90 day to 180
days.

More importantly, unlike the original bill, the substitute would deem
severance payments to be earned in full on the day of layoff or
termination. Thus, for employees
terminated within 180 days before bankruptcy, the entire severance obligation
would be subject to the section 507(a)(3) priority, rather than merely that
portion deemed to have been earned during the final 180 days. The bill makes a corresponding change
to section 503(b) that would give administrative expense priority treatment to
the first $13,500 of severance obligations owed to employees who are terminated
post-petition. Contra In re Hechinger Investment Co., 298 F.3d 219 (3d Cir.
2002) (“stay-on” benefits apportioned between pre-petition and
post-petition periods). The full
amount of severance owed would be given administrative expense status if the
debtor had assumed the collective bargaining agreement or other contract that
included the severance obligation.

Of greater significance, in certain instances the bill would convert
employee equity security interests held in pension plans from
"interests" to "claims." The bill would amend the section
101(5) definition of "claim" to include equity securities held in an
ERISA pension plan if the employee was forced to invest the pension assets in
equity securities of the debtor or an affiliate of the debtor. The
"claims" thus created would be entitled to priority under the section
507(a)(4) "employee benefit plan contribution" provision. The amount
of the section 507(a)(4) priority claim would be set at the market value of the
stock at the time it was contributed to, or purchased by, the pension plan.
Note that the section 507(a)(4) benefit plan priority is limited to the unused
portion of the 507(a)(3) priority times the number of employees. This would
remain the case for benefit plan contributions. No dollar limit would apply,
however, to the new pension plan stock claim. The effect of these changes would
be to elevate covered employee pension plan stock interests from the lowest
priority common stock level to a fourth level priority ahead of general
unsecured claims. In a case like Enron, where the contributed stock had a high
value at the time of the contribution, this provision could divert all of the
residual value of the estate from the unsecured creditors to the employees.

Enhanced Avoidance of Fraudulent Transfers and Excessive Compensation

The bill would also enhance the recovery of voidable transfers and impose
limits on executive compensation. Two changes would make it easier for the
estate to avoid pre-petition transfers. First, the one-year look-back period
for fraudulent transfers under section 548 would be extended to four years.
Thus, both actual fraudulent transfers and constructive fraudulent transfers
(transfers for less than reasonably equivalent value when the debtor is
insolvent) could be avoided by the estate if they occurred within four years
before bankruptcy. This change would have relatively little impact in most
cases since most such transfers already could be avoided under section 544(b)
using very similar state fraudulent transfer laws. The provision would enhance
the estate’s recovery in those cases where the state law statute of
limitations was less than four years or where the state law was less expansive
than section 548.

The bill would also expand section 548 to allow the recovery of excessive
benefit transfers and obligations made to insiders (including officers and
directors) during the four years prior to bankruptcy if the debtor was
insolvent or was rendered insolvent by the transaction. This provision would
apply even though the transaction was not otherwise fraudulent. A two-part test
would be used to determine whether the benefit was excessive, and thus
avoidable. If similar benefits were provided to non-management employees during
the same calendar year, then the benefit would be excessive if it was equal to
or greater than 10 times the average similar benefits provided to
non-management employees during the same calendar year. If no such benefits
were provided to non-management employees, then the benefit would be excessive
if it was equal to or greater than 125% of the amount of any similar benefit
provided in the calendar year prior to the year of the benefit transaction. The
bill appears to avoid the entire transaction, and not merely the portion deemed
excessive. This appears to be intended as a disincentive to engage in such
transactions. The bill does not indicate whether the section 548(c) "good
faith transferee for value" defense could be used to limit avoidance in
appropriate cases. Although the provision appears to be designed to apply to
management compensation, nothing in the language of the provision expressly
limits it to compensation. Arguably it could be used to avoid non-fraudulent
transfers between corporate affiliates if they met or exceeded the 125%
threshold.

Limitations on Retention and Severance Programs

The bill also would impose new standards for the approval of retention and
severance programs for officers and directors. Retention payments to insiders
(including officers and directors) would not be allowed unless the court finds
"based on evidence in the record" that the retention benefit is
“essential” to the retention of such person and “essential to
the survival of the business.”

The substitute does not include the original bill’s requirement
that the person have a competing job offer. Further, the amount of the retention benefit could not be
greater than 10 times the average similar benefit provided to non-management
employees during the same calendar year or, if no similar benefits were
provided to non-management employees, the retention benefit could not exceed
125% of any similar benefit provided to the same insider during the prior
calendar year. It is not clear which benefits would be considered in computing
these caps since the bill refers to "similar" transactions "for
any purpose". While use of the term "similar" suggests that the
comparison is to other retention benefits, the "any purpose" language
suggests that the cap is computed on the basis of total compensation. The bill
would not limit retention programs for non-management employees.

The bill would also limit severance benefits for insiders (including
officers and directors). The severance payment would have to be part of a
program that is generally applicable to all full-time employees and could not
be greater than 10 times the average severance given to non-management
employees during the same calendar year.

Post-Petition Employment of Officers or Consultants

Finally, the bill contains broad language barring post-petition transfers
and obligations that are outside the ordinary course of business, unless they
are justified by the facts and circumstances of the case. Transfers to, and obligations incurred
for the benefit of, officers, managers, or consultants hired post-petition would
be deemed to be outside the ordinary course of business. The effect of this
provision would be to subject the compensation arrangements for management
personnel and consultants hired post-petition to greater scrutiny by the
court. While such compensation
arrangements are the obvious focus of the provision, the new “justified
by the facts and circumstances” standard would apply to all non-ordinary
course post-petition transfers and obligations. It is not clear whether this language would impose
significant new limitations on the debtor’s ability to use business
judgment in entering into non-ordinary course transactions.

To provide that bonuses and other extraordinary or excessive compensation of corporate insiders and wrongdoers may be included in the bankruptcy estate.

S. 2901 Would Recover Excessive Payments To Insiders

S. 2901 Would Recover Excessive Payments To Insiders

A
bill introduced by Senator Grassley (R-Iowa) on September 3, 2002, would permit
the recovery of excessive compensation paid to insiders, officers, or directors
of the debtor during the year prior to bankruptcy. In addition, in cases involving securities law violations or
accounting irregularities, the look-back period would be expanded to allow
avoidance of both compensation transfers and of obligations incurred for
compensation within four (4) years prior to bankruptcy. The bill has been referred to the Committee
on the Judiciary.

S.
2901 is drafted to amend both the section 547 preference provision and the
section 548 fraudulent transfer provision. The amendment to section 547 creates a one-year look-back
period and allows recovery of transfers made within the year prior to
bankruptcy to insiders, officers, or directors of the debtor if those transfers
were for "any bonuses, loans, nonqualified deferred compensation, or other
extraordinary or excessive compensation." Although this provision would be added to the preference
section, it would not technically be a preference since the section would
permit recovery of compensation even if the debtor was solvent and even if
there was no pre-existing debt owed to the insider.

It is not clear whether the phrase
"other extraordinary or excessive compensation" is meant to modify
the listed terms. For example,
would all bonus and loan transfers be avoidable, or only those which are either
unusual or excessive? Further,
with respect to a "transfer … made …for any …
loan," is unclear whether the section is limited to loans that are
"compensation." If not,
this language would permit recovery of all loan payments made to insiders (a
term that includes affiliated corporate entities) within the year prior to
bankruptcy, even if the loan transaction was legitimate and not related to
compensation. The provision is not
limited to publicly traded companies and would apply in all cases.

Finally, since the provision establishes
"excessive" and "extraordinary" as alternative grounds for
avoidance, it might result in the avoidance of completely proper bonus
arrangements merely because the debtor's financial condition required it to
resort to unusual compensation schemes as its condition worsened. For example, if a turnaround
professional were employed as an officer on terms that were unusual for the
debtor company, the compensation arrangement might be at risk even if the terms
were not excessive.

The
bill would also add a new sub-section to the section 548 fraudulent transfer
provision establishing a four-year look-back period for the recovery of
compensation in certain cases. The
compensation recovery provision applies only to officers, directors, or
employees of an “issuer of securities” who have engaged in
securities law violations or improper accounting practices. The provision applies both to transfers
made and obligations incurred and thus would allow the debtor to negate a
compensation agreement made within four years before bankruptcy as well as the
payments made pursuant to such an agreement. Note that unlike true fraudulent transfers, this provision
would permit avoidance even though the debtor was not insolvent or in financial
difficulty at the time the transfer was made or the obligation incurred.

The provision targets the same
types of transfers as the amendment to the preference provision and raises
similar interpretive difficulties.
The targeted class of persons is both broader and narrower than the related
preference provision. While the
inclusion of “employees” expands the section’s scope, it does
not apply to insiders who are not officers or directors of the debtor, and thus
would not apply to a controlling shareholder or an affiliated company. Further, unlike the preference
amendment, this provision only applies to issuers of securities that are
registered under section 12 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, or that
are required to file reports under section 15(d) of the Act.

The
subject transfers and obligations are avoidable if the officer, director, or
employee committed: (i) a violation of state or federal securities law or any
regulation or order issued there under; (ii) fraud, deceit, or manipulation in
a fiduciary capacity or in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered under section 12 or 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
or under section 6 of the Securities Act of 1933; or (iii) illegal or deceptive
accounting practices. This section
potentially has a very broad sweep.
The securities violation provision could be read to apply to technical
violations or violations resulting from negligence that might not involve
intentional improper conduct. The
accounting practices prong could also be interpreted broadly since the term
“deceptive” apparently covers practices that are not illegal. In addition, the provision does not
appear to require that the defendant’s improper action relate to the compensation
that would be avoided – either by causation, or by time. Presumably, a securities
violation committed shortly before bankruptcy could be the basis for the
recovery of bonuses paid years earlier.

Prof. G. Ray Warner, ABI Resident Scholar, Professor of Law
at the University of Missouri-Kansas City.

Employee Abuse Prevent Bill Would Change Venue Rules And Elevate Employee Claim

Employee Abuse Prevent Bill Would Change Venue Rules And Elevate Employee Claims

By: Prof. G. Ray Warner

Robert M. Zinman American Bankruptcy Institute Scholar in Residence

On August 1, 2002, Senator Dick Durbin (D-IL) and Rep. William Delahunt (D-MA) introduced a package of amendments to the Bankruptcy Code that are designed to protect employees and retirees when businesses file bankruptcy. The proposed Employee Abuse Prevention Act of 2002 (S. 2798 & H.R. 5221) expands the estate’s power to challenge pre-bankruptcy transactions and provides greater protection to the claims of employees and retirees. In addition, the bill would eliminate Delaware as a proper venue for most corporate cases by removing the state of incorporation as a venue option. Finally, the bill would reverse some of the bankruptcy-related changes made by the recent revision of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code by enhancing the estate’s ability to attack asset securitization transactions and to avoid security interests. All but one of the changes made by the bill would be effective immediately upon enactment and would apply to cases pending on that date.

Venue At Corporation’s Center of Gravity

On the venue front, the bill would amend 28 U.S.C. 1408 to provide that the domicile and residence of a corporation are conclusively presumed to be the debtor’s principal place of business in the United States. This change would eliminate the debtor’s state of incorporation as a venue option and would have a major impact on the Delaware bankruptcy practice. Under the change, venue would be appropriate in the districts where the debtor’s principal place of business or principal assets in the United States were located.

In addition, the bill would change the "affiliate venue" rules that currently permit the filing of a case in any district where a case involving an affiliate of the debtor is pending. Instead, the new affiliate rule would limit the debtor to filing in a jurisdiction where its parent (an entity that owns, controls, or has the power to vote 20 percent or more of the debtor’s outstanding voting securities) has a pending case. If the parent corporation is not in bankruptcy, then the subsidiary could file in the district where the debtor’s affiliate that has the greatest assets in the United States has its principal place of business, whether or not that affiliate has filed bankruptcy. This provision could not be used by the parent to expand its venue options. Under the proposed revision, an entire corporate group could file only in the districts where the parent could file. A sub-group that included only subsidiaries could file only where the affiliate with the greatest U.S. assets has its principal office. The changes in the affiliate rules would affect New York, since cases like Enron could not be filed there. However, since many major corporations have their headquarters in New York, the net effect of shifting those filings from Delaware to New York might offset the loss of cases resulting from the affiliate rule changes.

Finally, the venue rules would be amended to require that cases filed in an improper venue either be dismissed or transferred to a district in which venue properly lies if a timely objection to venue is made. Although the venue provisions would apply to cases pending on the enactment date, the "timely objection" requirement might prevent the transfer of cases already pending in districts where venue would be improper under the amendment.

Pension and Retiree Protections

Several provisions of the bill address employee and retiree issues. First, current section 1114 prevents a Chapter 11 debtor from unilaterally modifying certain retiree benefits, such as retiree health insurance, during the case unless an authorized retiree representative is appointed and agrees to the modification, or the court authorizes the modification as necessary to the reorganization. The bill would amend section 1114 to prevent debtors from evading its requirements by terminating retiree benefit plans on the eve of bankruptcy. The bill would require retroactive reinstatement of retiree benefits that were modified "in contemplation of bankruptcy" within 180 days before filing unless the pre-petition modification was essential to the continuation of the debtor’s business. Modifications made within the 180-day period would be subject to a rebuttable presumption that they were made in contemplation of bankruptcy.

Several provisions are designed to enhance the recovery on pension and wage claims. The bill would increase the current section 507(a)(3) priority for unpaid wage claims from $4,650 to $13,500. More importantly, in certain instances the bill would convert employee equity security interests held in pension plans from "interests" to "claims." The bill would amend the section 101(5) definition of "claim" to include equity securities held in an ERISA pension plan if the employee was forced to invest the pension assets in equity securities of the debtor or an affiliate of the debtor. The "claims" thus created would be entitled to priority under the section 507(a)(4) "employee benefit plan contribution" provision. The amount of the section 507(a)(4) priority claim would be set at the market value of the stock at the time it was contributed to, or purchased by, the pension plan. Note that the section 507(a)(4) benefit plan priority is limited to the unused portion of the 507(a)(3) priority times the number of employees. This would remain the case for benefit plan contributions. No dollar limit would apply, however, to the new pension plan stock claim. The effect of these changes would be to elevate covered employee pension plan stock interests from the lowest priority common stock level to a fourth level priority ahead of general unsecured claims. In a case like Enron, where the contributed stock had a high value at the time of the contribution, this provision could divert all of the residual value of the estate from the unsecured creditors to the employees.

Certain pension claims would be elevated even higher. An almost incomprehensible provision appears to prime both secured lenders and administrative expenses (including professional fees) where a claim is based on the breach of an ERISA or state law fiduciary duty respecting a pension plan. The bill initially would amend section 503(b) to grant such breach of fiduciary duty claims an administrative expense priority. This would place such claims on parity with other administrative expenses, but ahead of other types of priority claims and general unsecured claims. However, the bill would then amend section 507(b) to provide that these claims would have priority over every other administrative expense claim. Finally, the bill would amend section 506 to provide that any pension plan, any plan participant, or any plan beneficiary could recover any unpaid amount of such claim from property securing allowed secured claims. This provision is designed to encourage secured creditors to monitor the debtor and ensure that it complies with its fiduciary obligations under its pension plans. The net effect of these provisions would be to give such claims a superpriority on any unencumbered assets and, if that was not sufficient to satisfy them in full, a surcharge against secured claims. As a practical matter, these changes might increase the costs and reduce the availability of credit and might deprive the estate of the funds necessary to administer cases with large pension plan fiduciary breach claims. The provision priming secured claims is the only provision of the bill that would not become effective immediately or apply to pending cases. It would apply only to liens created after the bill becomes law.

Avoidance of Security Interests and Asset Securitization Transactions

Although only tangentially related to pension security and employee protection, several provisions of the bill would make it easier for the estate to avoid pre-petition security interests and asset securitization transactions. These proposed changes would have a significant impact in all cases and would only incidentally aid employees by enlarging the estate and providing a greater dividend to unsecured creditors.

Asset securitization is a financing method that attempts to insulate the financing transaction from a bankruptcy of the debtor. This is done by creating a new bankruptcy remote special purpose entity ("SPE") and transferring income-producing assets of the debtor to the SPE in a "true sale" transaction. The financing transaction then occurs at the SPE’s level. By the time the debtor files bankruptcy, the assets belong to the SPE and are not property of the estate. Thus, the lender is not subject to the automatic stay, use of cash collateral, or any other bankruptcy-based alteration of its rights. While bankruptcy courts currently can review the transaction to determine whether the formalities of a true sale were complied with, the amendment would expand the court’s power to recharacterize such sales as secured loans. The bill would expressly override non-bankruptcy law, such as laws in some states that purport to make the parties’ characterization of the transaction as a "true sale" binding on the courts. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. Tit. 6, § 2701A, et seq. In addition, the bill appears to create a new federal standard that allows the court to recharacterize a transaction if the "material characteristics" of the transaction are "substantially similar" to the characteristics of a secured loan. The section-by-section analysis accompanying the bill indicates that the provision is designed to allow the court to "look through the formalities of a ‘sale’.…"

In addition, the bill would undo much of the additional protection from bankruptcy attack that secured creditors obtained from last year’s revision of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Under current law, the trustee’s "strong arm" power under section 544 of the Code gives the trustee the powers of a "lien creditor" with respect to personal property assets. The recent revision of Article 9 significantly reduced the trustee’s avoiding powers by reducing the powers of lien creditors under state law. See C. Scott Pryor, How Revised Article 9 Will Turn the Trustee’s Strong-Arm Into a Weak Finger, 9 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 229 (2001); see also G. Ray Warner, The Anti-Bankruptcy Act: Revised Article 9 and Bankruptcy, 9 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 3 (2001). The bill purports to restore the trustee’s power by upgrading the trustee’s status to that of a hypothetical "good faith reliance purchaser for value." The new status would allow the trustee to avoid an Article 9 security interest based on any error in the financing statement. Current law only allows avoidance based on a name error or an error in the collateral designation. In addition, the trustee could avoid security interests in instruments and investment property if the secured creditor had relied on the filing of a financing statement as its method of perfection. The wording of the section may go even further. In addition to treating the trustee as a good faith purchaser for value, it also treats the trustee as though he/she had taken possession of the property. In the case of negotiable instruments, this change may give the trustee priority over even a holder in due course of the instrument, a result presumably not intended by the drafters. The good faith purchaser status could create other inconsistencies and possibly unintended consequences.

Enhanced Avoidance of Fraudulent Transfers and Excessive Compensation

The bill would also enhance the recovery of voidable transfers and impose limits on executive compensation. Two changes would make it easier for the estate to avoid pre-petition transfers. First, the one-year look-back period for fraudulent transfers under section 548 would be extended to four years. Thus, both actual fraudulent transfers and constructive fraudulent transfers (transfers for less than reasonably equivalent value when the debtor is insolvent) could be avoided by the estate if they occurred within four years before bankruptcy. This change would have relatively little impact in most cases since most such transfers already could be avoided using very similar state fraudulent transfer laws. The provision would enhance the estate’s recovery in those cases where the state law statute of limitations was less than four years or where the state law was less expansive than section 548. A more important provision would amend the section 546(e) safe harbor for securities settlement payments to limit the safe harbor protection to brokers, clearing agents, and other financial intermediaries. The safe harbor would no longer protect the actual shareholders who are the beneficiaries of an avoidable transfer involving securities. Compare Lowenschuss v. Resorts Int’l, Inc. (In re Resorts Int’l, Inc.), 181 F.3d 505 (3d Cir. 1999) (safe harbor protects shareholders), with Munford v. Valuation Research Corp. (In re Munford), 98 F.3d 604 (11^th Cir. 1996) (shareholders not protected).

The bill would also expand section 548 to allow the recovery of excessive benefit transfers and obligations made to insiders (including officers and directors), general partners, and affiliated persons during the four years prior to bankruptcy if the debtor was insolvent or was rendered insolvent by the transaction. This provision would apply even though the transaction was not otherwise fraudulent. A two-part test would be used to determine whether the benefit was excessive, and thus avoidable. If similar benefits were provided to nonmanagement employees during the same calendar year, then the benefit would be excessive if it was equal to or greater than 10 times the average similar benefits provided to nonmanagement employees during the same calendar year. If no such benefits were provided to nonmanagement employees, then the benefit would be excessive if it was equal to or greater than 125% of the amount of any similar benefit provided in the calendar year prior to the year of the benefit transaction. The bill appears to avoid the entire transaction, and not merely the portion deemed excessive. This appears to be intended as a disincentive to engage in such transactions. The bill does not indicate whether the section 548(c) "good faith transferee for value" defense could be used to limit avoidance in appropriate cases. Although the provision appears to be designed to apply to management compensation, nothing in the language of the provision limits it to compensation. Arguably it could be used to avoid non-fraudulent transfers between corporate affiliates if they met or exceeded the 125% threshold.

The bill also would substantially limit the bankruptcy court’s authority to approve retention and severance programs for officers and directors. Retention payments to insiders (including officers and directors) would not be allowed unless the court finds "based on evidence in the record" that the retention benefit is essential because the individual has a bona fide job offer at the same or greater rate of compensation and that the services of the individual are essential to the survival of the business. Further, even after those elements were shown, the retention benefit could not be greater than 10 times the average similar benefit provided to nonmanagement employees during the same calendar year or, if no similar benefits were provided to nonmanagement employees, the retention benefit could not exceed 125% of any similar benefit provided to the same insider during the prior calendar year. It is not clear which benefits would be considered in computing these caps since the bill refers to "similar" transactions "for any purpose". While use of the term "similar" suggests that the comparison is to other retention benefits, the "any purpose" language suggests that the cap is computed on the basis of total compensation. The bill would not limit retention programs for nonmanagement employees. The bill would also limit severance benefits for insiders (including officers and directors). The severance payment would have to be part of a program that is generally applicable to all full-time employees and could not be greater than 10 times the average severance given to nonmanagement employees during the same calendar year.

Finally, the bill contains broad language barring post-petition transfers and obligations that are outside the ordinary course of business, unless they are justified by the facts and circumstances of the case. Compensation of officers, managers, or consultants hired post-petition would be deemed to be outside the ordinary course of business. The effect of this provision would be to subject the compensation arrangements for management personnel and consultants hired post-petition to greater scrutiny by the court.

To increase the priority dollar amount for unsecured claims, and for other purposes. (Introduced in Senate)

To protect employees and retirees from corporate practices that deprive them of their earnings and retirement savings when a business files for bankruptcy under title 11, United States Code.

To strengthen the safety net for agricultural producers, to enhance resource conservation and rural development, to provide for farm credit, agricultural research, nutrition, and related programs, to ensure consumers abundant food and fiber, and for other purposes.

To amend title 49, United States Code, to preserve nonstop air service to and from Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport for certain communities in case of airline bankruptcy. (Introduced in Senate)

To amend title 11, United States Code, and for other purposes.

To amend title 11, United States Code, and for other purposes.